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Abstract  
 
This thesis constitutes a pioneering effort to explore the mechanisms of innovation legitimation, 
a critical process in enabling movement of breakthrough innovations from the formative phase 
to a wider adoption.  Guided by the importance of understanding why most breakthrough 
technological innovations fail to move beyond the formative phase of adoption and acquire 
critical mass on one hand, and the paucity of studies on the early phases of the innovation 
phenomena on the other, this research reviews the most relevant innovation theories and 
models in search of solid theoretical and analytical starting points to conduct the empirical 
study.  Technological innovation systems (TISs) is selected as the most appropriate lens to 
explain the early phases of the innovation phenomena. Built on general system theory and co-
evolutionary perspectives of innovation, TIS views technological innovation as a collective 
endeavour of actors, networks and institutions. Legitimation is identified in TIS literature as a 
critical process to move innovation from formative phases to wider diffusion. However, 
surprisingly, legitimation is largely under-researched in TIS literature. 
Taking a critical realist perspective, this research explores TIS legitimation through 
qualitative research across two case studies for two different breakthrough technological 
innovations, in which document analysis and participant observation complements 33 semi-
structured interviews with high profile experts. 
This thesis’ findings advance knowledge on how legitimation is built across different 
institutional contexts. The findings reveal the critical role of system builders along the 
legitimation process. The research identifies the extent of their transformative capacity when 
acting individually or in alliance with incumbent firms. Moreover, this thesis evidences the 
relevance of the pragmatic legitimacy dimension, largely ignored in TIS literature. In relation to 
this, this thesis partially supports the idea that societal problems and public debates contribute 
to legitimate breakthrough innovations, as research data suggests that adopters will additionally 
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perform pragmatic evaluations in search of appropriable benefits. Finally, this research discloses 
new relevant mechanisms for the legitimation of TISs, like the need to align the different 
organising visions in the TIS or the criticality to co-create knowledge. 
The findings of this thesis have important implications for theory and practice. On the 
theoretical side, the research validates the principles of TIS for innovations outside the energy 
sector and it offers a set of propositions and a framework that contribute to unfold the 
mechanisms of innovation legitimation. Moreover, the framework and the developed 
propositions provide innovation practitioners with a practical tool to develop successful 
innovation strategies. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
This chapter introduces the thesis, which aims to explore the mechanisms that lead 
breakthrough technological innovations (BTIs) to successful diffusion trajectories. The chapter 
starts with a discussion of the research rationale, in which the theoretical and practical reasons 
that motivate the study, are discussed. After that, the research aim and proposed research 
questions are presented.  The subsequent sections provide the reader with an overview of the 
research. These include a summary of the key contributions, main aspects of research 
methodology and an outline of the thesis structure. 
1.2 Research rationale 
Breakthrough technological innovations (BTIs) can be defined as radical or discontinuous 
innovations embodied by a technology that results in new market infrastructures (Garcia & 
Calantone, 2002).  In contrast to incremental innovations, BTIs create new technological 
trajectories that transform the relationships between individuals, organisations and industries 
(Dosi, 1982; Anderson & Tushman, 1990).  The diffusion of BTIs is by far more difficult than the 
diffusion of incremental innovations: whereas producers of incremental innovations benefit 
from existing structures and aligned institutions, producers of radical innovation need to deal 
not only with larger doses of change in the existing knowledge base, but also with the need to 
build up new structures as well as adapting, or possibly developing, new formal and informal 
institutions (Kukk et al., 2016). 
BTIs play a critical role in macro and micro-economic success and are the main driver 
behind socio economic growth ( Foster & Kaplan, 2011; Nelson & Winter, 2002). However, and 
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despite of its importance, we are still far from understanding how and why many BTIs fail to 
fully diffuse (Chesbrough, 2006; Stevens & Burley, 1997; Norman & Verganti, 2014). Whereas 
the majority of innovation studies over the last 70 years have focused on explaining how 
innovations diffuse once they’ve acquired critical mass, less attention has been paid to 
examining the formative phase of the phenomenon, where, as illustrated in paths B and C in 
figure 1-1, the majority of BTIs fail to disperse extensively and either remain niche or disappear 
completely (Geroski, 2000; Rogers, 2003; Hekkert et al., 2011; Ghobadian et al., 2018).   
Therefore, the rationale for this research emerges from important theoretical and 
practical motives aiming to identify the mechanisms that contribute to build successful diffusion 
trajectories (path A in figure 1-1). After examining main strands of innovation studies (see 
chapter 2 on literature review), this research takes technological innovation systems (TIS) 
(Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991; Hekkert et al., 2007; Bergek et al., 2008a), as the theoretical and 
analytical basis for the study of BTIs. Built on general system theory and co-evolutionary 
perspectives of innovation (Nelson, 1994; Nelson & Winter, 2002), TIS approach has attained 
over the last years increasing attention both in the policy arena and in social-science research 
(Markard et al., 2016). Consequently, this research seeks also to develop useful knowledge in 
the promising field of TIS. 
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Figure 1-1 Figure 1 1 Phases of innovation diffusion. (Ghobadian et al., 2018) 
1.3 Research aim and research questions 
As outlined in the previous section, the overall aim of this research is to contribute to unfold the 
mechanisms that lead BTIs to successful diffusion trajectories (path A in figure 1-1). To 
accomplish such endeavour, this research takes systems of innovation, and in particular TIS 
(Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991; Hekkert et al., 2007; Bergek et al., 2008a), as the theoretical and 
analytical starting point for the analysis. TIS can be defined as the set of actors, networks and 
institutions that contribute to the overall function of developing and diffusing technological 
innovation (Bergek et al., 2008a). Therefore, in this research, TIS define the theoretical and 
analytical setting for the analysis of BTIs.  
As discussed in section 2.6.3, TIS literature identifies legitimation as a critical process to 
move technological innovations (BTIs) from the formative phase to wider diffusion. Legitimation 
is defined as the process of acquiring social acceptance and compliance with the relevant actors 
and institutions such as norms, values, beliefs etc. (Bergek et al., 2008b). Legitimation is 
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necessary to create demand and mobilise resources. It involves getting the new technology 
accepted as a desirable and realistic alternative to incumbent technology (Bergek et al., 2008b).   
In the words of Stinchcombe and March (1965), acquiring legitimation is a necessary condition 
to overcome the ‘liability of newness’. However, despite its criticality, there is a lack of empirical 
research on how TISs acquire and build legitimacy (Bergek et al., 2008b; Bergek et al., 2015; 
Markard et al., 2016). In particular Kern (2015) suggests that TIS empirical research should look 
into the strategies developed by system builders to build legitimacy. 
As a result of the above discussion, the overall aim of this research: unfolding the 
mechanisms that lead BTIs to successful diffusion trajectories, can be better accomplished by 
narrowing it down into a set of more specific questions around legitimation as a key process to 
move TIS from the formative to the growth phase (figure 1-1). These research questions, further 
discussed in section 2.7, are: 
R.Q.1: how do and the extent to which system builders contribute to establishing legitimacy 
within a TIS? 
R.Q.2: what are the principal mechanisms aiding the legitimation of a TIS? 
R.Q.3: what are the key legitimation strategies capable of overcoming the ’liability of 
newness’? 
1.4 Research contributions 
This thesis makes contributions to theory, methodology and practice. The next three 
subsections provide a summary of the key contributions, which are further discussed and 
detailed in section 6.5.  
1.4.1 Contribution to theory 
 
The overall theoretical contribution of this thesis, is developing a set of propositions and a 
framework explaining TIS legitimation dynamics that can be incorporated into TIS literature. 
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Within the proposed framework, this research provides additional contributions to TIS 
legitimation, socio-technical transitions and theories of innovation and firms’ competition.  
A first theoretical contribution of this thesis relates to the contextual aspects of the 
legitimation process. This thesis evidences that legitimation is a process highly dependent on 
the external institutional contexts where the TIS needs to be accepted. Particularly, the 
framework presented in section 6.4, suggests that system builders will initially select 
institutional contexts where they perceive legitimation can be more readily attained.  A second 
theoretical contribution of this thesis is the incorporation of pragmatic legitimacy into the TIS 
legitimation analysis.  This research, extends the work of Suchman (1995) for the legitimation 
of new industries, by evidencing that system builders need to build legitimacy along 3 axes: 
pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. The pragmatic dimension of legitimation has been 
largely ignored by organisational and TIS studies (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Scott, 1995; Zimmerman 
& Zeitz, 2002; Markard et al., 2016).  A consequence regarding the relevance of pragmatic 
legitimation, is that this research provides new insights on the influence of societal problems or 
public debates in the legitimation process. Scholars like Geels (2005a) propose that pressures at 
landscape level, like societal problems or public debates, act as triggers for technological 
change. Aligned to this, Markard et al. (2016) argues that problem agendas at the societal level 
contribute to build (or destroy) legitimation. As further developed in section 6.5.1, this thesis 
suggests that, although public debates and societal problem agendas contribute to mobilising 
resources and building moral legitimacy around certain TISs, this might become insufficient if 
relevant audiences (i.e. potential adopters) do not perceive appropriable benefits (pragmatic 
legitimation) in those technologies. 
Another theoretical contribution is the identification of levers that contribute to 
building TIS legitimacy. As detailed in section 6.3, these include aspects like system builders’ 
reputation, alignment of organising visions, contrasting expectations with evidence, or probably 
the most critical, the co-creation of knowledge.  
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Additionally, the results of this thesis partially question the attackers’ advantage 
positions postulated by different theories of innovation and firms’ competition (Anderson & 
Tushman, 1990; Chirstensen, 1997). Whereas these theories postulate the creative destruction 
of incumbent firms in the event of technological paradigm changes, this thesis finds that 
incumbent firms compete and collaborate with system builders and entrant firms during the 
formative phase of a TIS. They build on the knowledge developed by system builders, and 
mobilise their resources towards innovation trajectories that can better preserve their 
competitive advantage.  As the research evidences, incumbents become critical for TIS 
legitimation in contexts with complex institutional structures. 
 
1.4.2 Contribution to methodology 
 
In addition to theoretical contributions, this research provides a set of methodological 
contributions pertaining to the operationalisation of different TIS analytical frameworks.  
This study is one of the few that has operationalised TIS out of the field of sustainable 
technological transitions in the energy sector. Therefore, this research validates the principles 
of TIS for technologies outside the energy field.  
The operationalisation of TIS frameworks has typically taken a meso level perspective 
focused in the analysis of the different TIS functions (Hekkert et al., 2007; Bergek et al., 2008a).  
However, more recent TIS studies have incorporated system builders as the centre of the TIS 
analysis  (Hellsmark & Jacobsson, 2009; Hellsmark, 2010; Musiolik & Markard, 2011; Kukk et al., 
2016).  This research contributes to TIS methodologies by evidencing that TIS studies centred 
on system builders provide richer empirical results, particularly when looking at the dynamics 
surrounding different institutional contexts.   
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1.4.3 Contribution to practice  
 
The results of this research are relevant to practitioners like policy makers, system builders and 
incumbent firms. The framework and its propositions can be valuable in the development of 
strategies and policy actions towards the successful diffusion of BTIs.  As an example, the 
framework helps system builders to identify favourable contexts to legitimate BTIs. Moreover, 
this thesis provides a set of actions contributing to the development of pragmatic, moral and 
cognitive legitimacy. Chief among them is co-creation of knowledge. Additionally, this research 
provides insights on the factors that enhance the development of system builders’ 
transformative capacity. As shown in figure 4-5 of section 4.3.3, organisational, institutional and 
leadership factors influence their ability to develop TISs. 
Policy makers, on the other hand, can also benefit from the insights and results of this 
thesis. Their role is critical to mobilise resources and facilitate both the alignment of the 
different organising visions and the creation of collaborative spaces for knowledge 
development. The proposed framework helps them to identify and remedy frictions and 
misalignment along the different involved institutional contexts.  
1.5 Research methodology 
To accomplish the research’s aim and questions discussed in section 1.3, this thesis conducted 
two case studies on two different breakthrough technological innovations (BTIs), as detailed in 
section 3.4.2. The first case study analyses a BTI named Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD). 
CFD is a simulation technology developed by scientists that lead to the creation of a multibillion-
dollar market and the transformation of a number of industries like the automotive industry 
(Hanna, 2015).  The second case study analyses mobile Health (mHealth), a technological field 
that despite its great potential, hasn’t yet been widely adopted due to a number of barriers 
(Labrique et al., 2013; WHO, 2016). Both case studies were carefully selected during the 
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research design phase to represent two opposing poles with respect to innovation legitimation. 
As Eisenhardt (1989) recommends, the selection of contrasting case studies is an optimal 
strategy when the number of cases that can be studied is limited.   
The case studies were conducted following a qualitative research approach with elite 
interviews of top experts and stakeholders as the main data source. To enhance data validity, 
as proposed by Yin (2003), interviews were triangulated with participant observation and 
document analysis. Moreover, as further discussed in section 3.7, other measures to enhance 
validity and reliability, like interview checks (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), were undertaken.  
Research data was coded with N-Vivo 10 and thematic analysis was performed as described in 
section 3.6. As the result of the process, a set of propositions and a legitimation framework 
emerged, as discussed in sections 6.3 and 6.4 respectively.  
The research takes a critical realist perspective (Bhaskar, 1989) that is consistent with 
both the underpinning theories and models used for the study, and the aim of the thesis.  An in-
depth discussion of the rationale for adopting a critical realist perspective is provided in section 
3.2 and subsection 3.2.1. 
1.6 Thesis structure 
This thesis is structured as follows:  
Chapter 2 offers a critical literature review on the main strands of innovation studies 
with the aim of identifying the best theoretical and analytical starting points for the analysis of 
BTIs. The chapter analyses Rogers’ theory on Diffusion of Innovation (DOI), as well as different 
co-evolutionary innovation approaches like Studies of Science, Technology and Society (STS), 
Actor- Network Theory (ANT), Large Technological Systems (LTS), Multilevel Perspective (MLP) 
and Technological Innovation Systems (TIS).  The last section of the chapter (section 2.7) 
provides a justification for the selection of TIS, as the most suitable theoretical and analytical 
starting point for the analysis of the formative phase of BTIs (see figure 1-1). Moreover, 
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legitimation is identified as a critical and under-researched process during the formative phase. 
After that, the chapter finishes with a discussion on the identified gaps in TIS literature regarding 
legitimation and three research questions aimed at answering those gaps, and ultimately 
providing clarity on the mechanism leading to BTIs’ successful diffusion trajectories. 
Chapter 3 details the research methodology used in conducting the research. It 
discusses the philosophical considerations, the research approach and methods, the research 
context, the reliability and validity of data, the research ethics and the justification for the choice 
of research parameters like the selection of the case studies, the unit of analysis and the 
participants’ profile.  In addition, it provides the details regarding data collection and data 
analysis. 
Chapters 4 and 5 analyse and discuss the two case studies in the thesis: the origins of 
Computational Fluid Dynamics, and mHealth technologies for diagnostics and chronic disease 
management, respectively.  Data analysis is organised in four main areas of investigation and 
discussed in relation to relevant literature. As the result of the discussion of emergent themes, 
research findings are outlined.  
The sixth and final chapter presents a summary of the research and a discussion of the 
attainment with respect to the research primary objective and the research questions. Following 
this, the chapter summarises the research findings and suggests a set of propositions that 
ground a framework attempting to explain the dynamics and strategies for the legitimation of 
TISs. The chapter continues with the research’s contribution to theory, methodology and 
practice.  The chapter ends by presenting the study’s limitations and suggestions for future 
research.   
1.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has introduced the thesis by outlining the research rationale, aim and research 
questions. It has also provided an overview of the contributions made by this study to theory 
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methodology and practice. The next chapter provides the reader with a review of the literature 
on different innovation strands with the aim of selecting the theoretical grounds for the study 
of BTIs. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
As discussed in sections 1.2 and 1.3, despite its importance, there is a paucity of empirical 
research focusing on the early phases of innovation. Therefore, the aim of this literature review 
chapter is to identify, among the different strands of innovation studies, those that can better 
serve as a starting point to unfold the early dynamics of the innovation phenomena leading to 
innovation success or failure. 
Classifying innovation literature is a complicated task. Innovation studies are 
characterised by a multiplicity of propositions that focus on different aspects of the phenomena, 
involve different levels of analysis and are grounded on different disciplinary literatures such as 
economics, organisational studies, entrepreneurship, marketing or sociology among others 
(Baregheh, Rowley & Sambrook, 2009; Crossan & Apaydin, 2010; Garcia & Calantone, 2002).   
To accomplish the aim of the literature review, a narrative literature review approach 
was undertaken. As Bryman (2012) argues, a narrative literature review is the appropriate 
strategy when the review is a process of discovery in which the researcher cannot anticipate 
where it will take her.  In contrast to systematic literature reviews, narrative literature reviews 
are wide-ranging in scope and less explicit about the criteria for inclusion and exclusion of 
studies. However, narrative reviews can incorporate practices from systematic reviews 
(Bryman, 2012). In this review, an exclusion criterion was applied to purely market perspectives 
or micro models entirely based on technology attributes1. The justification for the exclusion 
relies on the focus of the research on the early phases of BTIs. Moreover, as Bleda and del Rio 
(2013) contend, one of the few widely accepted premises of innovation research is that market 
factors are not the sole cause for BTI’s failure, as internal dynamics in the environment where 
                                                          
1 This includes for example New Product Development (NPD) and Technological Acceptance Model (TAM) 
12 
 
the innovation emerges can also block its development. The literature review process extended 
for more than a year. During this period, the researcher screened the most relevant journals 
and specialised books on innovation and technological change, and incorporated relevant 
publications into an EndNote database.  Additionally, at the end of the review process, the 
researcher contacted via email and Researchgate three of the most cited scholars on Multilevel 
Perspective (MLP) and Technological Innovation Systems (TIS), who kindly answered her 
questions and provided additional references.  
Consistently with the above discussion, this chapter provides the reader with an 
analytical and critical review of the most relevant models and theories that account for the early 
phases of the innovation process. The organisation of the chapter is as follows: section 2.2 
analyses Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations (DOI) theory (Rogers, 1962; Rogers, 2003), as it is 
considered one of the most cited and used models in innovation studies.  Section 2.3 analyses 
the grounds of evolutionary perspectives of innovation, where the phenomenon is analysed as 
the co-evolution of technology with society, firms, institutions etc. Section 2.4 focuses on Social 
Construction of Technology (SCOT) (Pinch & Bijker, 1987), Actor-Network Theory (ANT) (Callon 
& Latour, 1981), and Large Technological systems (Hughes, 1987), three theories based on the 
co-evolution of science, technology and society. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 analyse Multilevel 
Perspective (MLP) (Geels, 2005a) and Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) (Carlsson & 
Stankiewicz, 1991; Hekkert et al., 2007; Bergek et al., 2008a) respectively, two similar constructs 
grounded on the co-evolution of technology, firms and institutions. Finally, section 2.7 provides 
the reader with the conclusions and the justification for the theoretical and analytical starting 
points for the research. In addition, the gaps in the literature are discussed and three research 
questions are presented. 
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2.2 Diffusion of innovations  
 
Innovation diffusion models have served as the primary tool to analyse technological innovation 
across different disciplines such as marketing, sociology, anthropology or economics (Hall, 2004; 
Meade & Islam, 2006; Rogers, 2003). Rogers’ theory on diffusion of innovations (DOI) (1962) 
became the first general theory joining in a unified model the principles of different diffusion 
research traditions. Nowadays, Rogers’ DOI is widely used within the innovation diffusion 
studies (Geroski, 2000; Rogers, 2003). Rogers (2004) estimates that in over 50 years of 
development of innovation diffusion theory, more than 5000 studies have been published in 
scholarly journals, with a rate of almost one study per working day in the first decade of this 
century. In the technological arena, Roger’s theory has been extensively applied to many BTIs 
such as Internet, mobile technologies, online banking etc.(Gerrard & Barton Cunningham, 2003; 
Hsu, Lu & Hsu, 2007; Lee, 2004) 
As figure 2-1 illustrates, innovation diffusion is characterised by a sigmoid function (S-
curve) that plots how an innovation propagates over time.  The steepness of the S-curve, called 
rate of adoption, is attributed to a number of different factors across the different innovation 
diffusion models 2 depending on the theoretical lenses and the unit of analysis.  
The next two sections provide the reader with an in-depth critical analysis of Rogers’ 
(2003) theory of diffusion of innovations (DOI), with a particular focus on how it accounts for 
the dynamics in the early stages of the innovation process.  
2.2.1 Overview of Rogers’ diffusion of innovations theory (DOI) 
Rogers (2003, pp. 5-6) defines diffusion as: ”...the process in which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system […] 
                                                          
2 see reviews by Geroski (2000) and Meade and Islam (2006) 
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Diffusion is kind of a social change, defined as the process by which alteration occurs in the 
structure of a social system. When ideas are invented, diffused, adopted or rejected, leading to 
certain consequences, social change occurs…”  
For Rogers (ibid), diffusion happens on a heterophily context in which adopters, 
individuals or organisations, differ in their disposition to accept the innovation.  Those adopting 
it earlier (early adopters) act as change agents for the rest of the population. Therefore, critical 
mass, the point at which enough individuals have adopted the innovation that further diffusion 
becomes self-sustaining, is dominated by a communication process from early adopters to the 
rest of the social system (figure 2-1). As previously discussed, the focus of this research is on the 
early dynamics of the innovation phenomenon, or according to Rogers, on the dynamics before 
an innovation reaches (or not), enough critical mass to become self-sustaining. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Critical mass in Rogers’ DOI. (Rogers, 2003, p.344) 
 The decision to adopt or reject the innovation consists of five stages: (1) knowledge, when the 
potential adopter is exposed to the innovation and understands its functioning; (2) persuasion, 
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when the adopter forms an attitude,  favourable or unfavourable,  towards the innovation; (3) 
decision, when the adopter engages in activities that lead to accept or reject the innovation; (4) 
implementation, when the adopter starts using the innovation; and (5) confirmation, when the 
adopter reinforces or reverses its decision.   
Rogers states that the rate of adoption of an innovation depends on five main variables, as 
shown in figure 2-2. These variables are: (i) perceived attributes of innovation, (ii) type of 
decision, (iii) communication channels, (iv) nature of the social system and (v) promotion efforts 
of the change agent. 
(i) The perceived attributes of innovation are the ones contributing most to the 
variance in the rate of adoption. Rogers establishes five perceived attributes of 
innovation: (1) Relative advantage is the degree to which an innovation is perceived 
as better than the idea it replaces. Advantage can be an economic or a social factor 
such as social prestige, satisfaction etc. (2) Compatibility is the degree to which an 
innovation is perceived as consistent with values, experiences and the needs of 
potential adopters. (3) Complexity is the degree to which an innovation is perceived 
as difficult to understand and use. (4) Trialability is the degree to which an 
innovation can be easily experimented and implemented. (5) Observability or the 
degree to which the results of an innovation are visible to others.  
(ii) The type of decision also influences the rate of adoption. According to Rogers, 
collective decisions or decisions taken at an organisational lever take longer than 
individual decisions, particularly if the former are authority decisions and the latter 
optional.  Therefore, optional decisions made by individuals are in general less 
complex and take less time than authority decisions made at an organisational level.  
(iii) Communication channels. The type of communication channels employed to diffuse 
an innovation also have an influence on its rate of adoption. Rogers states that 
although mass media might be a satisfactory channel for less complex innovations, 
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interpersonal channels to create awareness-knowledge, are often required to 
explain complex innovations or to reach late adopters. Consequently, if 
interpersonal channels are required, the rate of adoption is slowed. 
(iv) Nature of the social system. Rogers defines a social system as: “a set of interrelated 
units that are engaged in joint problem solving to accomplish a common goal. The 
members or units of a social system may be individuals, informal groups, 
organisations, and/or subsystems.” (Rogers, 2003,. p.24). According to Rogers, all 
members in the social system cooperate with the shared objective of solving a 
common problem. According to Rogers, the structures in the social system can 
facilitate or impede the diffusion of innovation in the system. The structures in the 
social system include formal and informal arrangements in the form of norms, 
beliefs, relationships and communication patterns between system members.  As it 
will be discussed in sections 2.3 and 2.6, they are similar to the concept of formal 
and informal institutions (Bergek et al., 2008a).  Despite the importance of the social 
system in the diffusion of innovations, Rogers acknowledges that compared to 
other aspects of diffusion research: “there have been relatively few studies of how 
the social or communication structure of a system affects the diffusion and adoption 
of innovations in that system.” (Rogers, 2003. p.25). 
(v) Extent of change agents’ promotion efforts. Finally, promotion efforts of the change 
agent also affect the rate of innovation adoption. According to Rogers, the 
relationship between the rate of adoption and the change agents' efforts, is not 
always linear and direct, as different stages of the innovation process provide 
greater payoffs than others. Rogers suggests that the greatest responses occur 
when opinion leaders are adopting, that is, in the early phases of the adoption 
process.  
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Figure 2-2 Rogers’ DOI variables determining the rate of innovation adoption. (Rogers, 2003, p.222) 
2.2.2 Criticisms to Rogers’ diffusion of innovations theory 
 
As previously discussed, Rogers’ DOI is a seminal theory on innovation that has been applied to 
a large number of studies across different disciplines. According to Rogers (2003), major 
outcomes on Rogers’ DOI studies relate to adopters’ categorisation, opinion leadership, 
communication channels, decision process, perceived attributes and rate of adoption as 
represented in figure 2-2. 
However, diffusion models seem to be insufficient to explain the dynamics of BTIs 
during the formative phases.  As Rogers (2003) suggests, most of DOI studies focus on 
innovations once they’ve acquired critical mass. In this respect, Rogers reflects that future 
research should include the processes involved in shaping the innovation to its final form as: 
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“events and decisions occurring previous to this point have a considerable influence upon the 
diffusion process. The scope of future diffusion research should be broadened to include study of 
the entire process through which innovation is generated.” (Rogers, 2003, p. 166).  
In addition, and related to previous criticism, Rogers’ DOI theory provides vague insights 
about the social systems that develop and adopt an innovation or about the social structures, 
in the form of formal and informal norms, that regulate those social systems. Rogers’ DOI theory 
is guided by the assumption that the decisions triggering innovation diffusion, at individual or 
firm level,  occur in a social system where the beliefs, values and interests of the majority of its 
members converge. Therefore, diffusion is mainly a communication process in which change 
agents and early adopters persuade other system members.  Rogers defines this limitation as 
Pro-innovation bias: “Pro-innovation bias is the implication in diffusion research that an 
innovation should be diffused and adopted by all members of a social system.“ (Rogers, 2003, p. 
106). 
Rogers acknowledges that pro-innovation bias could be mitigated by studying the 
phenomenon beyond individual or firms’ decisions and covering the process from its early R&D 
stages: “One means of avoiding the pro-innovation bias might be to investigate the broader 
context of diffusion, such as the decision by a change agency to diffuse the innovation. A 
diffusion scholar might also study how the decision was made to begin R&D work to create the 
innovation, and how the innovation was shaped into its final form.” (Rogers, 2003, p. 114). 
Finally, Rogers defends that further research on the influence of social systems and social 
structures should also be conducted. However, the scholar recognises that: “it is a rather tricky 
business to untangle the effects of a system's structure on diffusion, independent from the 
effects of the characteristics of the individuals that make up the system.” (Rogers, 2003, p.25). 
Above discussed drawbacks suggest the need to further explore other theoretical 
approaches that look more in depth into the formative phases before BTIs acquire critical mass. 
Moreover, these new approaches should account on the influence of social systems and social 
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structures, and to a certain extent, to better explore and reconcile agency and structure. 
Therefore, in the search of this, the next sections discuss co-evolutionary approaches to 
innovation. 
2.3 Evolutionary approaches to innovation and technological change 
As discussed in the previous section, the topic of this research requires perspectives that analyse 
innovation beyond a decision process of firms or individuals based on perceived technology 
attributes.  Evolutionary perspectives of innovation and technological change analyse 
innovation as a change process in a wide network of actors and the institutions ruling them. 
Evolutionary theories have their grounding in evolutionary economics and studies of science, 
technology and society (STS) (Nelson, 1994; Nelson & Winter, 2002).  
Evolutionary economics are founded in the work of Joseph Schumpeter and his Theory 
of Economic Development (Schumpeter, 1934). Schumpeter positioned individual 
entrepreneurship and technology innovation as the leading forces behind socio economic 
development. In his later work  Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Schumpeter, 1962), 
capitalism is defined as a continuous evolutionary change driven by the creation of new 
markets, products, methods of production or new forms of industrial organisation that replace 
the existing ones.  This form of progress is defined by Schumpeter as Creative Destruction (ibid).  
Based on Schumpeter’s work, the studies of Nelson and Winter (1982) postulate that innovation 
is a collective social process where novelty is created in a process of selection among a variety 
of options. This process of variation, selection and creation, leads to technological trajectories 
(Dosi, 1982). In words of Dosi (1982) technological trajectories are the patterns in which 
organisations look for technological solutions to organisations’ problems. Whereas incremental 
innovations progress along an existing technological trajectory, discontinuities and 
breakthrough innovations usually imply the emergence of new ones. 
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Evolutionary perspectives have grounded a wide range of theories, models and 
frameworks around innovation. For a broader appraisal of all of them, Geels (2005a) and 
Markard et al. (2012) provide excellent reviews. For the purpose of this research, this literature 
review will only focus on relevant models looking into technological change and the formative 
phases of innovation.  As figure 2-3 shows, general evolutionary perspectives by Nelson and 
Winter (1977), Dosi (1982) or Freeman (1988) (left side of the figure) have led to different 
evolving constructs. The next sections examine those appearing in figure 2-3 as dotted-circled.  
In section 2.4, three different theories around Studies of Science, Technology and Society (STS) 
are examined. These include SCOT, ANT and LTS, all of them with a focus on the co-evolution of 
technology and society. On the other hand, Sections 2.5 and 2.6 analyse two similar and more 
recent constructs: Multilevel Perspective (MLP) and Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) 
respectively.  As figure 2-3 shows, MLP takes input from STS studies and previous works on 
strategic niche management by Rip and Kemp (1998). TIS is based on previous studies on 
systems of innovation (Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991; Edquist, 1997) and Large Technological 
Systems by Hughes (1987).  Both MLP and TIS, extend the analysis to the co-evolution of 
institutions and markets (Geels, 2005a) and are the most cited studies in the field of sustainable 
technological transitions (Markard et al., 2012). 
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Figure 2-3 Research strands on innovation evolutionary approaches. (Adapted from Markard et al., 2012) 
2.4 Studies of Science, Technology and Society (STS) 
Societal factors play an important role in the early phases of the innovation process (Geels, 
2005a). As a discipline, sociology is key to explain failed innovations (Mac Vaugh & Schiavone, 
2010).  The core of co-evolutionary studies of society and technology are the Studies of Science 
Technology and Society (STS). STS contemplate technological innovation as a phenomenon that 
fulfils a societal function like transportation, healthcare, supply of energy etc. (Geels, 2005a). 
This fulfilment is accomplished by socio-technical systems. As shown in figure 2-4. socio-
technical systems, the central concept on STS studies, consist of a cluster of elements that 
include technology, regulations, user practices, markets, values, cultural meanings, 
infrastructure and maintenance and supply networks (Geels, 2005b). The basic idea on STS 
studies is that technology (artefacts) on one hand, and social functions (like regulation, user 
practices and markets or cultural meaning) on the other, fulfil societal needs.  The notion of 
socio-technical systems was originally developed by Trist (1981) to study the relation of 
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technology and individuals at the workplace and has later played a critical role in co-
evolutionary models of innovation (Geels, 2005a; Bergek, 2008a).  
This section analyses the most relevant models in STS studies (Geels, 2005a). The 
analysis focuses on the early phases of the innovation process. The analysed models are Social 
Construction of Technology (SCOT) (Pinch & Bijker, 1987; Bijker, 1997), Actor- Network Theory 
(ANT) (Callon & Latour, 1981; Latour, 1987, 2005; Law, 2009) and Large Technological Systems 
(LTS) (Hughes, 1987).   
 
 
Figure 2-4 Socio Technical system for car transportation. (Geels, 2005b, p. 446) 
2.4.1 Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) 
 
Social construction of technology  (SCOT)  (Bijker, 1997; Pinch & Bijker, 1987), focuses on the 
role of relevant social groups to shape technology. In SCOT, the process of shaping technology 
is essentially a process of variation and selection of problems and solutions that translate, as a 
result, into new artefacts (Bijker, 1997). The dynamics can be explained through a conceptual 
framework of three components: interpretive flexibility, relevant social groups and 
closure/stabilisation (Bijker, 1997).  
The first component, interpretive flexibility, suggests that artefacts do not emerge with 
a closed design.  Technological artefacts present different designs that evolve over time until 
the final one is shaped by the negotiations of the involved social groups.  The second 
component, relevant social groups, represents the different groups where all the members 
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share the same set of meanings for a specific artefact. The development of the technology is 
then the process of negotiation between these different groups and their different meanings 
and views on the technology. As described in Bijker’s study on the evolution of bicycle designs, 
different meanings of the artefact for the different social groups, such as social or gender status 
or working/non-working machine, created a diversity of prototypes and models in the 18thand 
19th centuries. Finally, the third component, closure and stabilisation, represents the final stage 
where the artefact is accepted by all the relevant social groups and thus it presents its final 
layout. 
Bijker (1997), adds the concept of technological frame to structure the interactions 
among actors within a social group.  In the words of Bijker (1997): “technological frame is not 
an individual’s characteristic, nor a characteristic of systems or institutions; technological frames 
are located between actors, not in actors or above actors.” (Bijker, 1997, p. 123).  Technological 
frames incorporate as elements of interaction: goals, key problems, problem-solving strategies, 
requirements to be met by problem solutions, current theories, tacit knowledge, testing 
procedures, design methods and criteria.  A technological frame is built up when the members 
in a relevant social group move in the same direction and constitute meaning for the technology 
through their alignment around the elements of their technological frame.  
Bijker (1997) describes three different possible configurations attending to competing 
technological frames and relevant groups.  The first configuration occurs when there is not a 
dominant group. Under this context innovation will flourish smoothly if sufficient resources are 
available. The second configuration occurs when there is a dominant group capable of enforcing 
the definition of problems and appropriate solutions.  In this monopolistic situation, innovation 
is more likely to be conventional. Finally, the third configuration exposes two or more 
confronted groups with divergent technological frames. In this situation, the closure process 
can become erratic, and “arguments, criteria and considerations that are valid in one 
technological frame will not carry much weight in other frames.” (Bijker, 1997, p. 279).  External 
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factors will play an important role in this configuration. The confrontation of social groups with 
differing technological frames can lead to an “amalgamation of vested interests” in which none 
of the social groups wins a total victory. As a consequence, innovations will be doubly 
conventional as they need to satisfy all relevant social groups. 
  According to Klein and Kleinman (2002), SCOT configurations represent rather 
descriptive and insufficient constructs to explain why innovations succeed or fail. Firstly, SCOT 
assumes that all relevant groups contribute to shape technology, neglecting power differences 
between relevant social groups: “There are no actors or social groups that have special status. 
All relevant social groups contribute to the social construction of technology; all relevant 
artefacts contribute to the construction of social relations.” (Bijker, 1997, p.288). Consequently, 
technological frames should be better developed to include the role of institutions that account 
for power: “An adequate understanding of the limits of interpretive flexibility, stabilisation and 
closure requires attention to power asymmetry.” (Klein & Kleinman, 2002, p. 35).  
In summary, as it will be further discussed in section 2.4.4, the central criticism to SCOT  
relates to its myopia towards power and poor acknowledgment of the structures and 
institutions that contribute to develop or hamper innovation (Klein & Kleinman, 2002; Winner, 
1993).    
2.4.2 Actor- Network Theory (ANT)  
 
Actor- Network theory (ANT) (Callon & Latour, 1981; Latour, 1987, 2005; Law, 2009) can be 
viewed as a subset of SCOT (Winner, 1993; Meyer, 2006). While in SCOT relevant social groups 
shape technology, ANT states that artefacts and humans are mutually and symmetrically 
shaped.  In ANT stabilisation occurs through the linkages between actors and networks in a 
seamless web in which all human and non-human actors intervene at the same level to mutually 
shape the socio technical system.  In the words of Law: “the distinction between human and 
non-human is of little analytical importance.” (Law, 2009, p.147).  
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Law (2009) states that the Actor- Network approach is not a theory, but a toolkit that 
describes: “…the enactment of materiality and discursively heterogeneous relations that 
produce and reshuffle all kind of actors including objects, subjects, human beings, machines, 
animals, nature, ideas, organisations, inequalities, scales and sizes and geographical 
arrangements…” (Law, 2009).  
In the early phases of a new technology, networks are constituted by a small number of 
elements and linkages. The innovation succeeds as long as networks enrol sufficient allied 
bodies and align their interests in a process of enrolment and translation.  As a consequence, 
more linkages are created, leading to stabilised networks and closure. In ANT, closure results in 
black-box artefacts that are taken for granted and become irreversible. The irreversibility of an 
element in a network depends on the extent to which it is impossible to go back to a point where 
alternatives exist, and the extent to which the element shapes and determines future 
enrolments in the network (Callon, 1990). 
ANT has been applied in many empirical studies: see Walsham (1997) for a recollection 
or more recent studies on technology adoption in sectors like healthcare (Greenhalgh et 
al.,2010; Bleakley, 2012), education  (Fenwick et al., 2010) or urban research (Farías & Bender, 
2012). However, ANT has been also subject to strong criticism.  The focus of the main 
disapproval is  the indistinctness between human and non-human actors (Alcadipani & Hassard, 
2010). With this, power becomes an unresolved issue, as the social and technical spheres 
(human and non-human) account equally in the process of negotiation and translation.  
Additionally, Miettinen (1999) stresses that in an innovation network the number of potential 
elements become unlimited and impossible to manage, as ANT does not provide the tools to 
select who are the relevant actors and linkages. Moreover, Geels (2005a) states that while the 
focus in ANT is on the micro level linkages that lead to enrolment and translation, it fails to 
explain how that is transformed into new structures at meso and macro level.   ANT scholars 
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incline to not separate the micro and macro level  as: “the same relational logics apply at any 
scale.” (Law, 2009, p. 147).  
2.4.3 Large Technological Systems (LTS) 
 
Large Technological Systems (LTS) (Hughes, 1987), describe a system or “seamless web” 
network of big complexity that contains different problem-solving components. Components of 
a LTS include technological artefacts, key actors, firms, knowledge and legislative artefacts like 
scientific articles and regulatory laws respectively etc. LTS studies look at how the linkages 
between all the socio-technical components of the LTS provide stability and ultimately 
“momentum” (Hughes, 1987). System builders, like Edison in the case of electricity systems, are 
heterogenous engineers that work not only in the development of technical artefacts. They also 
persuade potential adopters, transfer knowledge through texts, conferences etc., participate in 
the development of regulations, attract experts and capital into the system and develop initial 
markets. Through the activity of system builders, the components of a LTS are articulated and 
aligned through linkages at different levels: between firms, regulatory bodies, educational 
institutions etc. Once linkages are aligned and established, LTS acquire momentum. The higher 
the momentum, the more likely that a LTS will continue along its trajectory. Together with 
momentum, Hughes (1987), defines different phases for the emergence and development of 
LTS. These are: (i) invention, (ii) development, (iii) innovation, (iv) growth, competition and 
consolidation, and as previously described, (v) momentum.  
Acquiring momentum, as discussed, is a consequence of the alignment of social and 
technical elements, which indicates that directionality in a LTS is aligned with the notion of 
technological regimes and trajectories postulated by evolutionary perspectives (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1982). According to Geels (2007, p.124), in LTS: “trajectories are not only 
stabilised by beliefs but also by social and technical linkages, vested interests, regulations, 
infrastructures, and so on…”.  
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The central criticism around LTS is its lack of attention to radical innovations that 
substitute previous well-established technologies (Summerton, 1994; Geels, 2007).  In other 
words, LTS does not account for technological replacement.  Moreover, LTS is an agency 
oriented perspective focused on the linkages created by system builders. Although it accounts 
for the effect of regulation, vested interests etc. in the creation of linkages and ultimately, 
technological trajectories, LTS does not provide a framework to analyse breakthrough 
innovations at its infant state. All the empirical studies relate to historical radical innovations 
like the electrification of the United States (Hughes, 1987), the development of the first ballistic 
missile, the ARPANET (precursor of Internet) and the SAGE air radar system (Hughes, 1998). 
A search on Google scholar suggests that over the last years, there hasn’t been many LTS 
empirical studies. However, as shown in figure 2-3, its contribution on system builders is much 
present in the technological innovation systems (TIS) literature. These links are further analysed 
in section 2.6. 
2.4.4 Criticisms to SCOT, ANT and LTS 
As described in sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.3, SCOT, ANT or LTS present several limitations for the 
analysis of the early phases of breakthrough technological innovations. Although SCOT 
conceptualises the interaction between the elements of the socio-technical system through the 
concept of technological frame, its operationalisation is insufficient to explain the emergence 
of innovations beyond three descriptive configurations (Winner, 1993). As Klein and Kleinman 
(2002) suggest, the institutions accounting for power should be further developed and included 
in the technological frame. ANT, is also criticised for its myopia towards power structures 
(Alcadipani & Hassard, 2010), as well as its micro level focus that fails to explain the large 
amount of linkages in an innovation network  ( Geels, 2005a; Miettinen, 1999). LTS, as discussed 
in section 2.4.3, presents two main criticisms: the first is that it is unable to account for 
technology replacement (Summerton, 1994; Geels, 2007). Secondly, it doesn’t provide 
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satisfactory tools to analyse in a non-retrospective manner the linkages occurring during the 
formative phases of the phenomenon. 
These criticisms, suggest that STS approaches to innovation such as SCOT, ANT or LTS 
require in addition, structural perspectives that embed the role of institutions and power. In the 
words of Winner:,“…they regularly succeed in tracking a great deal of intense activity around 
technological developments of various kinds. They also show us the fascinating dynamics of 
conflict, disagreement, and consensus formation that surround some choices of great 
importance. But as they survey the evidence, they offer no judgment on what it all means, other 
than to notice that some technological projects succeed and others fail, that new forms of power 
arise and other forms decline...” (Winner, 1993, p. 375). 
The next two sections analyse Multilevel perspective (MLP) and Technological Innovation 
Systems (TIS), two similar constructs that incorporate structure and institutional perspectives 
into the socio-technical system approach. 
2.5  Multilevel perspective (MLP) 
2.5.1 MLP overview 
Multi-level perspective (MLP) by Geels (2005a), is a mid-range theory grounded in the work of 
Rip and Kemp (1998) that integrates sociology, evolutionary economics, and innovation studies 
perspectives. MLP defines “system innovation” as the transition from one existing socio-
technical system to a new one. In MLP, “system innovation” 3is an innovation that produces not 
only a new product or process, but a whole new socio-technical system including: new 
productions systems, infrastructures, markets, user practices, regulation etc. (Geels, 2005a). In 
                                                          
3 “System innovation” (Geels, 2005a) is equivalent to breakthrough or architectural innovations. It is 
important to distinguish “system innovation” from “systems of innovation”. The latter, “systems of 
innovation” are theoretical constructs that include National systems of innovation or Technological 
innovation systems. They are discussed in section 2.6. 
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essence “system innovations” is comparable to the definition of BTI provided in section 1.1 
(Garcia & Cantalone, 2002). 
MLP distinguishes between three different levels of analysis to explain the transition 
between socio-technical systems: niches, socio-technical regimes and landscape. System 
innovations occur when niche technologies become new socio-technical regimes with the 
stimulus of favourable landscape conditions (figure 2-5). 
Niches define the environment where radical innovations emerge. Due to their novelty and low 
initial performance, these innovations cannot compete in mainstream markets, and some initial 
protection is required. Niches occur in two overlapping phases: technological niches and market 
niches. In technological niches, protection to the emergent innovation is provided by public 
organisations or investment firms. In market niches, protection is provided by incipient market 
transactions that sustain the niche.   
Regimes (or socio-technical regimes) define the coordination between the different groups of 
actors to define a web of rules, practices and standards that stabilise the system. Geels (2005a) 
defines five socio-technical regimes: technological, science, user/market, policy and socio- 
cultural. These regimes evolve dynamically and conform technological trajectories as defined by 
Dosi (1982): whereas socio-technical regimes are internally stabilised through incremental 
innovation along an existing technological trajectory, radical or system innovations, in contrast, 
create new technological trajectories by substituting the existing socio-technical system with a 
new one.  
Landscape refers to the external circumstances that stimulate certain technical trajectories and 
not others. Landscape factors include aspects such as economic growth, political agendas, 
cultural and normative values, public debates, resource scarcities, wars, etc. 
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Geels (2005a), establishes a generic set of contexts that can favour the transition of socio-
technical regimes. These are called windows of opportunity and include: internal problems or 
bottlenecks in the existing regime, negative externalities such as environmental impacts, change 
in user preferences not met by established technologies, strategic and competitive games 
between firms and availability of complementary technologies. These windows of opportunity 
facilitate the transformation of niches into new socio-technical regimes. 
In MLP, the evolution of niches into new regimes, occurs as a gradual process of niche 
accumulation. In the beginning, niches start serving a functionality in the existing regime and 
from there, niches expand their capabilities to new application domains until they become the 
new socio-technical regimes. In a later work, Geels and Schot (2007), refine the concept of 
trajectories of niche accumulation and identify five prototypical transition pathways from niche 
to regime according to the variations in timing and nature of the multi-level interactions. The 
disruptiveness of the change will mainly depend on the pressure from the landscape level and 
the maturity of the niche innovations. These pathways, that can take place sequentially in the 
event of high and enduring landscape pressures, are: reproduction, transformation, de-
alignment and re-alignment, technological substitution and reconfiguration. 
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Figure 2-5  Overview of Multi-level perspective. (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 401) 
 
Reproduction: In absence of external landscape pressures (like public debates against the 
existing regimes, change in economic or political agendas etc.), regimes remain stable and 
radical niche innovations have little chance to succeed. In these contexts of non landscape 
pressures, incremental innovations will increase the performance of the existing socio-technical 
regime. 
Transformation: Under moderate landscape pressure (see figure 2-5) at a moment when niche 
innovations are not yet mature, social actors in the regime will use their adaptive capacity to 
reorient development trajectories, changing the regime from inside through cumulative 
adjustments. Niche innovations will be embedded into the regime without disrupting it. 
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De-alignment and re-alignment: If landscape pressure is high and niche innovations are not 
sufficiently developed, the regime will be destabilised and the emergent niche innovations will 
co-evolve and compete for attention and resources until one becomes dominant and re-aligns 
the institutional framework of the new regime. 
Technological substitution: If landscape pressure is high and niche innovations are sufficiently 
developed, they will likely breakthrough and replace the existing regime. This path assumes that 
regime actors will pay little attention to innovations developed by outsider actors. 
Reconfiguration:   In this context, niche innovations fit well in the existing regime and can be 
easily adopted. They are accepted as they improve performance and do not significantly 
transform the rules of the game in the regime. This pathway is similar to the transformation 
pathway, but in the reconfiguration case, the niche innovations although incremental in their 
origin can open up the space for future major reconfigurations in case of landscape pressure. 
2.5.2 Criticisms to Multilevel perspective 
 
MLP is subject to several criticisms (Genus & Coles, 2008; Smith et al., 2005; Markard & Truffer, 
2008; Smith et al., 2010). These flaws can be summarised as:  
(i) Use of historical case studies with lack of systematic methods for data analysis. 
(ii) Overly functionalistic theory that neglects agency. 
(iii) Poor definition and operationalisation of MLP regime concept. As a consequence, MLP 
hinders the dynamics inside a regime that result in different groups of actors maintaining 
incumbent technologies or enabling radical innovations.  
(iv) Related to the previous criticism, power and politics at regime level not taken into account. 
(v) Lack of functional distinctions between the levels. For example, distinction between nests of 
niches and sectoral level.  
(vi) Focus on winning technologies.  
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 (vii) Landscape pressures are insufficient to solely explain regime destabilisation or acceptance 
of radical technologies. 
Geels (2011), responds to these criticisms and suggests that the main drawback on MLP 
relies on the definition and operationalisation of the concept of regime.  As defined in section 
2.1.5, a regime defines the coordination between the different groups of actors to define a web 
of rules, practices and standards that stabilise the system. However, as Geels (2011) contends: 
“I agree with the critics that empirical studies sometimes use ‘regime’ as shorthand for 
‘system’[…] The reason is probably that these empirical studies tend to be interested more in the 
macro-patterns of transitions than in the micro-sociological dynamics of innovation acceptance. 
[…] System then refers to tangible and measurable elements […] whereas regimes refer to 
intangible and underlying deep structures (such as engineering beliefs, heuristics, rules of thumb, 
routines, standardised ways of doing things, policy paradigms, visions, promises, social 
expectations and norms). So ‘regime’ is an interpretive analytical concept that invites the analyst 
to investigate what lies underneath the activities of actors.” (Geels, 2011, p.31).  
 Consequently, as suggested by Smith et al. (2010), a better definition and 
operationalisation of regimes, should account for politics and power in order to understand how 
certain regimes and not others are accepted. “How do entrenched regimes, upon which many 
of us are dependent, lose their economic and social legitimacy?” (Smith et al., 2010, p. 446). 
The next section analyses the systems of innovation strand, and in particular, 
technological innovation systems (TIS). TIS and MLP are closely related models in the study of 
innovation and technological change (Markard & Truffer, 2008).  As previously quoted by Geels 
(2011), whereas regime (in MLP), is an interpretative analytical concept to define intangible 
structures, TIS provides more tangible analytical frameworks to assess the interactions between 
key actors, networks and the institutions (formal and informal) ruling them. They are further 
discussed in sections 2.6.1 and 2.6.2.  
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2.6 Systems of Innovation and Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) 
 
Systems of innovation (SI) studies are built on general system theory and co-evolutionary 
perspectives of innovation (Nelson, 1982; Nelson & Winter, 2002). SI grounds on co-
evolutionary approaches are discussed in section 2.3 and represented in figure 2-3. As in any 
system, systems of innovation (SI) consist of two main parts: (i) components and (ii) the relations 
among them.  To function as a system, components need to form a coherent whole, fulfil a 
function and operate within delimited boundaries (Edquist, 2005).  
Systems of innovation operate at 3 different levels of analysis: National or Regional 
(Nelson, 1988), Sectoral (Breschi & Malerba, 1997), and Technological (Carlsson & Stankiewicz 
,1991; Hekkert, 2007; Bergek et al., 2008a).  National, regional and sectoral systems of 
innovation look for comparable indicators between systems. These indicators might include: 
sources of production of innovation, public and private research efforts, quality of educational 
systems, collaborations between public and private research centres, venture capital availability 
etc. (Adams et al., 2013;  Hekkert & Negro, 2009).  Studies conducted at national, regional or 
sectoral level typically involve large numbers  of actors,  institutions and complex relations 
among them,  making the dynamics of innovation and  technological change difficult to map ( 
Hekkert & Negro, 2009).  By contrary, studies conducted at the technology level, particularly 
TIS, entail a more manageable number of actors, institutions and relationship complexity 
offering a reliable framework for the analysis of technological change dynamics (Bergek et al., 
2008c;  Hekkert & Negro, 2009). 
As the overall focus of this research is to unfold the dynamics of the early phases of 
breakthrough technological innovations, the remainder of this section concentrates on the 
analysis of systems of innovation at technological level, that is, the analysis of technological 
innovation systems (TIS).   
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Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) can be defined as the set of actors, networks and 
institutions that contribute to the overall function of developing and diffusing new products and 
processes (Bergek et al., 2008a).  A TIS can be part of a sectoral innovation system or involve 
different sectors. Also, it can be tied to a geographical dimension or be international.  As 
previous innovation theories and models analysed in sections 2.4 and 2.5, TIS makes use of the 
socio-technical system concept, “…we focus on technological innovation systems (TIS) …, i.e. 
socio-technical systems focused on the development, diffusion and use of a particular technology 
(in terms of knowledge, product or both) …” (Bergek et al., 2008 a, p.408).   
In a TIS, the interactions between components (actors, networks and institutions) are 
grouped under a set of sub processes named functions.  Bergek et al.(2008a) define seven 
functions: entrepreneurial experimentation, knowledge development, development of positive 
externalities, market formation, resource mobilisation, guidance on the direction of the search 
and legitimation. The main purpose of the functions is to assess the performance of the TIS, its 
drivers and blocking mechanisms to set the basis for policy and strategic intervention (Bergek 
et al., 2008a; Hekkert et al., 2011).  
As Hekkert et al. (2011) summarises: “the structure presents insight in who is active in 
the system, the system functions present insight in what they are doing and whether this is 
sufficient to develop successful innovations.” ( Hekkert et al., 2011, p. 4). The next subsection 
provides a detailed analysis of the structural components and functions of a TIS. 
2.6.1 Structural components of a TIS 
The structural components of a TIS are actors, networks and the institutions ruling them (Bergek 
et al., 2008a). 
Actors are individuals, firms, and organisations that contribute to the development of the TIS. 
These can be universities, research institutes, public bodies, industrial associations, venture 
capitalists etc. Different TIS scholars (Hellsmark & Jacobsson, 2009; Musiolik et al., 2012; Kukk 
et al., 2016) have highlighted the relevance of system builders (Hughes, 1987) as a key subset of 
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TIS actors. As discussed in section 2.4.3, system builders are critical agents in the development 
of breakthrough innovations (Hughes, 1987). In a TIS, system builders can be prime mover firms, 
entrepreneurs, organisations or any other actors interested in developing the conditions for 
them or for others to start companies or for the incumbents to develop new business 
opportunities (Hellsmark, 2010) As Kukk et al. (2016) argue, system builders take the role of 
institutional entrepreneurs and are able to shape institutions in the best interests of the 
technology.  In highly institutionalised contexts or in the very early phases of the TIS, system 
building capabilities are most likely to be developed as a collective effort through networks 
(Musiolik et al., 2012). 
Networks in a TIS are developed to deal with the non-market relations between actors, typically 
in the form of exchange of information, values and knowledge (Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991). 
As a differentiated structure to firms and markets, networks can be formal or informal. They 
might include standardisation or professional networks, public–private partnerships, industry-
university links etc.  Political and knowledge networks are important for the legitimation of a TIS 
during its formative phase: they act as advocacy coalitions to develop system building 
capabilities and to create a favourable environment for the TIS (Bergek et al., 2008b) . However, 
Hellsmark (2010) states that during the early phases of a TIS, different networks advocating for 
different technological trajectories might undermine the development of the TIS: “ ...in a given 
TIS, there may be several advocacy coalitions, where each is typically associated with a specific 
technological trajectory. They consist of a range of actors with shared beliefs and compete to 
influence policy in line with these beliefs[…].However, the raging conflicts that characterise the 
early phase of a TIS typically undermine efforts to form advocacy coalitions and, therefore, the 
possibility of institutional alignment…” (Hellsmark, 2010, p. 25). 
 
Institutions include all the activities that rule the interactions between actors and networks. 
Institutions can be hard, like regulations controlled by juridical systems, or soft, like  beliefs, 
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values, norms and other cognitive rules controlled by social systems (Bergek et al., 2008b).  As 
explained in other perspectives analysed in this chapter,  see  section 2.4.1 for SCOT (Bijker, 
1997) or section 2.5 for Multilevel perspective (Geels, 2005a) , norms and cognitive rules 
influence the actions and decisions towards a specific closure process or trajectory. As North 
(1994, p.2) contends: “Institutions are created by humans to structure human interaction in 
order to reduce uncertainty in pursuit of their goals (of those making the rules) in social, political 
and economic exchange. I define institutions as the formal rules (constitutions, statute and 
common law, regulations, etc.), the informal constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions, and 
internally imposed codes of conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of each.” 
The alignment between the new technologies, organisations and surrounding 
institutions is called institutional alignment. Institutional alignment is key for TIS to acquire 
“momentum” (Hughes, 1987) and move from formative to growth phase (Bergek et al., 2008a; 
Hellsmark, 2010). However, the process of institutional alignment might result in complications 
for certain systems. As North (1994, p.361) contends, institutions are created: “… to serve the 
interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules…” For example, mature and 
large technical systems (such as energy, healthcare or transportation) are dominated by a few 
large incumbent actors with considerable bargaining power. In these systems, institutional 
alignment results in a complex process dominated by uncertainty and conflicting interests 
between incumbent and entrant players (Hellsmark, 2010).  Institutional alignment is tightly 
coupled with legitimation, a TIS function analysed in detailed in section 2.6.3.  
2.6.2 Functions of a TIS 
The functions of a TIS are a set of inter-related processes that measure the functioning and 
overall performance of the TIS: if the functions perform well, the TIS will successfully develop 
and in consequence, innovation will diffuse satisfactorily. Following on Bergek et al. (2008a) 
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framework4, TIS functions can be defined as: entrepreneurial experimentation, knowledge 
development, development of positive externalities, market formation, resource mobilisation, 
influence on the direction of the search and legitimation. Table 2- 1 provides a brief description 
of these functions.  
 
Table 2-1 Functions in a TIS. Adapted from Bergek et al. (2008a) 
TIS function What does it measure? 
Entrepreneurial 
experimentation 
 
Trial and error activities that contribute to reducing 
uncertainty in the TIS and unfolding the learning process. 
Knowledge development Knowledge base and diffusion over time within the TIS. It 
distinguishes between different types of knowledge and 
different sources of knowledge. 
Legitimation The dynamics on how the TIS gains acceptance from all the 
relevant actors and stakeholders, in a context where 
competition from adversaries and incumbent TIS defenders, 
can lead to different manipulation strategies to legitimate the 
new TIS. 
Market formation It distinguishes three different phases in the formation of a 
new market: nursing markets, bridging markets and mass 
market (only if the TIS succeeds). 
                                                          
4 See Bergek et al.  (2008a, p. 426) for a comparison of TIS functions respect to other authors and analytical 
frameworks. 
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Resource mobilisation 
 
The ability of the TIS to mobilise human and financial capital 
resources and complementary assets, such as complementary 
products or services, infrastructures etc. 
Development of positive 
externalities 
 
The collective dimension of the innovation and diffusion 
process. For instance, how investments by one firm can benefit 
others “free of charge”, or how the development of a priori 
competing technologies can have a positive influence in the 
development of the TIS in focus. Examples: emergence of 
pooled labour markets, emergence of specialised intermediate 
providers, information flows and spill-overs. 
Influence on the direction 
of search 
 
The combination of incentives and pressures that actors have 
when deciding to enter a TIS (visions, expectations, belief in 
potential growth…), mechanisms in terms of competing 
technologies or business models, and external factors like 
demographic or economic debates. 
 
Although the system nature of TIS might suggest that functions evolve as an 
orchestrated action, Bergek et al. (2008a) acknowledges that functions might emerge as 
unplanned and initial weak interactions, especially during the very early phases, when 
exogenous factors may dominate as the system components are still underdeveloped. As the 
TIS grows, the endogenous factors may gain strength, and strong interdependences between 
functions might be formed. Additionally, it can be expected that different actors might pursue 
different goals and have different conflicting interests in the development of a TIS. As Bergek et 
al. (2008a) suggest: “Moreover, interaction between components may be unplanned and 
unintentional rather than deliberate even in a more developed innovation system. Using the 
notion of an ’overall function’ does not imply that all actors in a particular system exist for the 
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purpose of serving that function or are directed by that function. Actors do not necessarily share 
the same goal, and even if they do, they do not have to be working together consciously towards 
it (although some may be). Indeed, conflicts and tensions are part and parcel of the dynamics of 
innovation systems.  Clearly, we do not see the system's components as directed or orchestrated 
by any specific actors.” (Bergek et al. , 2008a, p. 408). 
To facilitate the analysis of a TIS and its complex dynamics and dependencies, its 
development can be divided into different phases. Bergek et al. (2008) suggest two 
differentiated periods: formative and growth. In the formative phase, the structures supporting 
the TIS, especially the technologies and markets, are rudimentary as the whole system is subject 
to a great deal of uncertainty. On the contrary, during the growth phase, the diffusion of 
selected technologies starts and markets move from nursing to bridging and ultimately mass 
markets (Bergek et al., 2008a).  Hekkert et al. (2011) define, on the other hand, 5 phases in the 
development of a TIS: pre-development, development, take-off, acceleration and saturation. In 
the pre-development phase, prototypes are typically produced to evidence that technology 
works. Then, in the development phase, first commercial applications are sold. In the take-off 
phase, the technology diffuses on a larger extent, leading markets to the acceleration phase 
until saturation occurs, and diffusion is stabilised.  Figure 2- 6  plots a diffusion S-curve along the 
different TIS phases defined by Bergek et al. (2008) and Hekkert et al. (2011) together with  the 
critical TIS functions in each phase as stated by the scholars. 
Hekkert et al. (2011) suggest that in the early phases of development of a TIS, 
knowledge development and entrepreneurial experimentation are the critical functions 
(figure2- 6). Knowledge development is central to the evolution of a TIS: in particular, how it is 
created and employed over time by the actors. In addition, entrepreneurial experimentation 
contributes to reduce uncertainty through trial and error efforts in demonstrations, pilots etc. 
The rest of the functions are also important in this phase as they can influence negatively or 
positively the entrepreneurial efforts. (Hekkert et al., 2011).  For instance, influence on the 
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direction of the search guides the visions and expectations of the actors on the potential of the 
technology and in the adoption of competing designs, new business models or different 
markets. However, if the visions of the actors are contested or they do not perceive a clear 
incentive in the innovation, the whole TIS can be blocked (Bergek et al., 2008a).  Additionally, 
the development of positive externalities, in the form of complementarities offered even by a 
priori competing technologies, can play an important role in accelerating system growth (Bergek 
et al., 2008b).  However, the take-off of the TIS or, in other words, the transition from the 
formative phase to the growth phase (see figure 2-6), won’t succeed if the innovation is not 
legitimated (Bergek et al., 2008a; Bergek et al., 2008b; Hekkert et al., 2011). Legitimation, is 
therefore, the crucial TIS function to complete the formative phase of a TIS and move it to wider 
diffusion. The next section discusses in depth the insights of the legitimation function. 
 
Figure 2-6 Critical functions in TIS development. Adapted from Bergek et al. (2008a) and Hekkert et al. (2011) 
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2.6.3 Legitimation, a critical function in the formative phases of TIS 
 
Section 2.6.1 concluded highlighting the importance of institutional alignment for a TIS to gain 
momentum and succeed in its diffusion. Moreover, it was argued that institutional alignment is 
tightly coupled to the legitimation function. Section 2.6.2 presented the different functions of a 
TIS, and as shown in figure 2-6, it was argued that legitimation becomes a critical function for 
the take-off of an innovation (Hekkert et al., 2011), or as Bergek et al. (2008b) contend, critical 
to move the TIS from the formative to the growth phase.  As the overall  topic of this research 
is to unfold the early dynamics of BTIs leading to innovation success or failure, the rest of this 
section focuses on an in-depth analysis of the legitimation function. 
Legitimation, is defined as the process of acquiring social acceptance and compliance 
with the relevant actors and institutions such as norms, values, beliefs etc. (Bergek et al., 2008b).  
As contended by Stinchcombe and March (1965), acquiring legitimation is a necessary condition 
to overcome the ‘liability of newness’. TIS scholars argue that: “legitimation involves getting the 
technology accepted as a desirable and realistic alternative to incumbent substitutes. In essence, 
legitimation then becomes ‘the politics of shaping expectations and of defining desirability’ ” 
(Bergek et al., 2008b, p. 581).  In a TIS, legitimation is necessary to create demand and mobilise 
resources. Moreover, system builders gain political strength in the process of legitimating the 
TIS (ibid). However, surprisingly, despite  the importance of legitimation, TIS empirical research 
has not paid much attention to study its underlying dynamics (Bergek et al., 2008b; Bergek et 
al., 2015; Markard et al., 2016).  
Bergek et al. (2008b) suggest that technologies are typically legitimated by two different 
type of actions: (i) “expert” legitimation through technology assessments (TA), and  (ii) “trust 
and familiarity” legitimation. Technology assessments (TA) are oriented to demonstrate through 
rational arguments the feasibility and performance of the technology. However, TAs are usually 
perceived as serving the political goals and interests of different groups of actors, and in 
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consequence, they can create a negative effect among policy makers and investors (Bergek et 
al., 2008b). As an example, performance criteria and used methodologies are sometimes 
suspect of being adapted to promote certain technologies over others (ibid).  Therefore, 
legitimation, beyond rational assessments, is required to build “trust and familiarity”.  Bergek 
et al. (2008b) state “trust and familiarity” is built as other TIS functions are strengthened (like 
knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation, or influence on the direction of 
search) and advocate networks and coalitions in “packs” of entrepreneurs are created.  Through 
this, cumulative causation and virtuous cycles are created, leading to build the required 
legitimacy to transition the TIS from its formative phase to the growth phase (figure 2-6).   
However, the arguments presented by Bergek et al. (2008b) as how in practice TIS 
acquire legitimacy are vague and suffer from a number of shortcomings. First, the existence of 
networks or advocate coalitions in favour of the TIS, does not necessarily imply a contribution 
to legitimation.  As Hellsmark (2010) argues, other networks and advocate coalitions against the 
TIS can also be formed by TIS opponents. Second, the influence other functions on legitimation 
is not always explained. For example, although the dependency between legitimation and 
guidance on the direction of the search is recognised (Bergek et al., 2008b; Bergek et al., 2015), 
the mechanisms by which system builders and networks align visions and expectations of key 
actors, is still missing. Third, the influence of incumbent external institutional factors and 
structures (like predominant beliefs, values, regulation etc. across the different organisations, 
sectors or geographies where TISs needs to be legitimated) seems to be out of the TIS 
legitimation analysis.  This aspect, the circumstances by which different external institutional 
settings enhance or hamper legitimation, is a criticism acknowledged by TIS scholars (Bergek et 
al., 2015).  A more recent empirical study on TIS legitimation by Markard et al. (2016) suggests 
the influence of external factors like political agendas or societal debates in the legitimation of 
a TIS. However, none of the vast TIS research literature reviewed, tackles in depth the internal 
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TIS mechanisms that contribute to build legitimacy or the influence of the different external 
institutional settings where the innovation needs to be legitimated.  
As Markard et al. (2016) contend: “While legitimacy of organisations has received much 
attention in the literature (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008), comparably few scholars have looked 
into legitimacy at the level of an industry or technological field.” (Markard, 2016, p.330). 
Organisational studies, as argued by Markard et al. (2016), have largely studied how firms and 
industries acquire, maintain or build legitimacy. Suchman (1995), states that as in the creation 
of new markets and industries, legitimation is a prerequisite in the development of new 
technological innovations. While in organisations legitimacy is typically attained by adhering to 
existing norms and practices (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002), BTIs usually come with new rules of 
the game.  Suchman defines legitimacy as:” …a generalised perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions…” (Suchman,1995, p.574).  
Acquiring legitimacy involves alignment to a variety of institutional elements. Scholars 
classify legitimation according to different sources of legitimacy. As an example, Scott (1995) 
distinguishes between regulative, normative and cognitive legitimacy. Similarly, Aldrich and Fiol 
(1994) distinguish between socio-political regulative, socio- political normative and cognitive 
legitimacy. Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002), propose a framework around the three pillars of 
regulatory, normative and cognitive, and add a fourth dimension on industry legitimacy.  
Suchman (1995), classifies legitimacy into three main types based on three 
differentiated behavioural dynamics: pragmatic, moral and cognitive. Pragmatic legitimacy 
relates to self-interest and it is obtained if there is an appropriable interest for the organisation. 
Moral legitimacy reflects a positive evaluation of the organisation and on whether its activities 
are desirable or ‘the right thing to do’. Cognitive legitimacy reflects a dynamic in which 
organisations are legitimated because they provide routines, standards or models that are 
uncontestably taken for granted as they make the organisation meaningful and predictable.  
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Suchman (1995) suggests that legitimacy becomes more difficult to obtain, as one moves from 
the pragmatic to the moral to the cognitive. Aligned to this, Laïfi and Josserand (2016) found 
that cognitive legitimation represents the final stage, where the innovation is taken for granted 
and can be widely spread and diffused (Laïfi & Josserand, 2016).  
Suchman’s research on legitimacy has been largely cited in TIS studies (Bergek et al., 
2008a; Bergek et al., 2008b; Hekket et al., 2011; Bergek et al., 2015; Markard et al., 2016). As 
Bergek et al. (2008b, p.581) contend: “as (it) is widely acknowledged in previous research, 
legitimacy is a prerequisite for the formation of new industries and, we would add, new TIS.” 
However, whether the dynamics to build legitimacy in organisations apply in the same fashion 
to BTIs, it is something that will have to be demonstrated by empirical research.   
With the aim of identifying what type of actions can contribute to gain legitimacy, 
Suchman (1995) proposes three different strategies: (i) conform to existing institutions and 
audiences, (ii) selection of audiences that will support the new practices or (iii) manipulation of 
audiences and environments to create new legitimating beliefs.  In addition to these three 
strategies, Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) add a fourth one: creation of new institutional contexts 
that did not exist. Conforming to existing beliefs, norms and practices are the more convenient 
ways to gain legitimacy (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002), but paradoxically, some BTIs bring with 
them new rules of the game.  As (Suchman, 1995, p. 591) argues: “innovators who depart 
substantially from prior practice must often intervene pre-emptively in the cultural environment 
in order to develop bases of support specifically tailored to their distinctive needs.” The strategy 
of selecting specific audiences where the innovation can be developed more easily presents 
some analogies to what in Multilevel perspective (section 2.5) referred to as niche management 
(Geels, 2005a; Rip & Kemp, 1998). Finally, manipulating audiences and creating new legitimating 
beliefs is the ideal of innovators, but might not be easily applicable if existing institutions have 
prevailed for a long time in the system (Hellsmark, 2010). As Tushman and Anderson (1990) 
postulated, discontinuities that destroy existing know-hows are more complex and take a long 
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time to succeed. The different types of legitimation strategies postulated by Suchman (1995), if 
applied to BTIs and TIS, might suggest that audiences with different institutional settings will 
require different legitimation actions.  
Following on the previous arguments, Suchman’s (1995) postulations constitute an 
avenue to explore and deepen in the underlying mechanism of TIS legitimation.  
The next section discusses the interplay of the TIS structural processes analysed in 
section 2.1.6 and the TIS functions analysed in section 2.6.2. The discussion puts a special focus 
on the legitimation function and the dynamics moving TIS from the formative phase to the 
growth phase (Bergek et al., 2008b).  
2.6.4 TIS dynamics 
 
TIS scholars have developed different analytical frameworks around TIS functions (Bergek et al., 
2008a; Hekkert et al., 2007; Markard & Truffer, 2008; Jacbosson & Hellsmark, 2009). As 
discussed in the introduction of section 2.6, the purpose of these frameworks is to understand 
the evolution of TIS over time, to identify the pain points in the system, and ultimately, to 
provide guidance to policy makers. As analytical tools focused in the development and 
performance of TIS functions, TIS frameworks took originally a meso-level perspective.  
However, some researchers have more recently expressed their concern for the overlook of 
system builders’ deliberate actions in the development of TIS. To amend this, different TIS 
studies have included in the analysis a more micro level perspective around the role of system 
builders (Hughes, 1987) in the development of innovation systems.  Kukk et al., (2016) provide 
a comprehensive review of TIS studies accounting for the role of system builders in the 
development of TISs. 
Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2009), for example, have developed a framework for TIS 
analysis that encompasses both the role of TIS system functions (Bergek et al., 2008a) and 
system builders. In a later refinement, Hellsmark (2010) operationalises the framework for the 
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analysis of the formative phases of the TIS: that is, the main focus of this research. The rest of 
this section focuses on Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2009), and Hellsmark (2010) TIS framework.  
As previously discussed, TIS consist of structural components (actors, networks and 
institutions) and a set of key processes or functions as shown in figure 2-7. In addition to these, 
exogenous factors, like political agendas or the development of related technologies, can also 
influence its development. Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2009) contend, that the dynamics in a TIS 
can be explained through 4 main set of interactions (represented by the arrows 1 to 4 in figure 
2-7). 
 
Figure 2-7 Overview of TIS dynamics. Adapted from Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2009) and Hellsmark (2010) 
 
Interactions within the structural components (Arrow 1 in figure 2-7).  
Actors and networks, are governed through institutions like: regulations, beliefs, culture, 
practices or routines.  During the formative phase of breakthrough innovations, new institutions 
may need to be created and legitimated, as prevailing rules might not fit for the new 
technological innovations. As Hellsmark (2010) argues, the definition of a new institutional 
order might raise tension and conflict among the actors in the TIS. As defined in section 2.6.1, 
system builders, as institutional entrepreneurs (Kukk et al., 2016), are critical to align and shape 
48 
 
institutions in the best interest of the technology. Moreover, Hellsmark (2010) contends that 
during the formative phase of a TIS, system builders are key agents in the development of the 4 
structural processes (represented by arrow 1 in figure 2-7). These are: 
(i) accumulation of knowledge and artefacts 
(ii) entry of firms and other organisations 
(iii) formation of alliances and networks  
(iv) institutional alignment 
Interactions between structural components and functions (Arrow 2 in figure 2-7).   
System building activities enhance not only institutions and networks, but also other functions 
in the TIS (arrow 2) such as knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation, 
resource mobilisation and legitimation (Hellsmark & Jacobsson, 2009). As an example, new firms 
(acting as system builders) bring resources and knowledge to the TIS that strengthen 
entrepreneurial experimentation. They can also contribute to enhance legitimation if they have 
a good reputation and devote part of their resources to promote legitimacy.  Interactions 
between structural components and TIS functions occur in both directions (double arrow).  
Following on previous example, if legitimacy is built, institutional alignment, in return, will be 
further enhanced (Hellsmark, 2010). Additionally, the strengthening of TIS functions such as 
entrepreneurial experimentation or resource mobilisation will also result in new actors entering 
the TIS and new networks being formed.  
Interactions between functions (Arrow 3 in figure 2-7). 
 The functions in a TIS are not independent from each other. TIS functions can be mutually 
reinforced leading to positive feedbacks and the creation of “virtuous cycles” that make the 
system resilient to external negative forces (Bergek et al., 2008b). Hekkert et al. (2007) names 
“motors” to this dynamic of mutually reinforced functions. For example, legitimation requires 
the strength of other functions such as knowledge development and entrepreneurial 
experimentation (Hekkert et al., 2011). Additionally, visions and expectations, play a crucial role 
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in building legitimacy. Visions and expectations are part of the function “influence on the 
direction of the search”. Although it is not expected that all actors in the system share the same 
views on its potential, contested visions and expectations can block the strength of the 
legitimation process (Bergek et al., 2008b; Bergek et al., 2015). 
Interactions with exogenous factors (Arrow 4in figure 2-7).  
External factors, also contribute to the development of a TIS (Bergek et al., 2015; Markard et al., 
2016) . External factors can manifest in different forms like: public debates addressing societal 
problems, changes in political agendas, economic crisis etc. As discussed in section 2.5.1, Geels 
(2005a) denominates these landscape factors. In addition to global or landscape factors, the 
development of complementarian or initially competing TIS, can also contribute to develop and 
legitimate the TIS in focus (Bergek et al., 2008b). This process, known in TIS literature as 
development of positive externalities or development of external economies, is critical too for 
the formative phases of TIS (Bergek et al., 2008a; Bergek et al., 2008b).  
2.6.5 Criticisms to systems of innovation and TIS 
Systems of innovation and in particular the TIS approach as described in the previous section, 
represent an important pillar of innovation research and policy since the early 1990s (Markard 
et al., 2015). One of its advantages in respect to other models, is that TIS contemplates the 
innovation phenomena as a dynamic and non-equilibrium process, where actors, networks and 
the institutions ruling them, shape the technological trajectories of innovation (Weber & 
Truffer, 2017).  As a consequence, TIS has been extensively used by academics and policy makers 
who reject market factors as the sole basis for innovation failure (Bleda & del Rio, 2013). In 
particular, its adoption by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
has motivated a lot of resonance among policy makers (Weber & Truffer, 2017).  However, 
despite success, different scholars, some of them in the TIS field, have raised a number of 
criticisms. These criticisms can be grouped around three main themes: (i) the TIS myopia 
towards external context structures (Bergek et al., 2015; Markard et al., 2015), (ii) its validity as 
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an adequate tool to explain technological transitions (Geels, 2005a) and (iii) its lack of emphasis 
on politics. The rest of the section provides an analysis on the status and recommendations for 
these criticisms. 
Myopia towards external context structures 
Markard et al. (2015) identify as a recurring issue the critics to the inward orientation of the TIS 
approach: as a system, its performance relies mainly on the internal structures and the dynamics 
within the system, whereas the external structures and processes such as sectoral, landscape 
factors or related TIS developments are largely ignored (Smith & Raven, 2012; Geels, 2005a; 
Geeels, 2011).  This limitation is also well acknowledged by scholars in systems of innovation 
(Markard & Truffer, 2008; Markard et al., 2015; Bergek et al., 2015). As Bergek et al. (2015)  
state: “structures and processes inside a focal TIS are generally well conceptualised in the 
literature. […] What happens outside and across the system boundary has been less 
systematically worked out.” (Bergek et al., 2015, p. 54). As a response to this, they suggest 
further research under the consideration of four contextual structures: technological, sectorial, 
geographical and political. Technological structures define the positive or negative influence in 
the TIS in focus of other related TIS developments. This interaction is partially covered under 
the function development of positive externalities (Bergek et al., 2008b). Sectorial structures 
refer to the institutional context (cognitive frames, regulations etc.) and physical infrastructures 
that operate in the sector of which the TIS is a part.   Geographical contexts refer to the spatial 
boundaries in the TIS of analysis.  As suggested by Bergek et al.(2008a), delineating the 
boundaries in a TIS require at least three analytical decisions: (i) the breath of the technological 
field (broad or narrow), (ii) the spatial focus (local, regional, national or global) and (iii) the 
product versus knowledge field decision.  Markard et al. (2015) suggest that these choices need 
to be guided by the research questions and the purpose of the study and adjusted during the 
course of the analysis by the accumulated empirical insights.  Finally, the political context 
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structures reflect the political dimension in which a “battle over institutions” takes place among 
the proponents and opponents of the TIS.  
Markard et al. (2015), highlight the importance of further research on external context 
structures to understand how they influence legitimation and technological trajectories: “ If we 
regarded the context just as a background for TIS development, made up of barriers and driving 
factors, we would miss, for example, context dynamics that unfold both independently and as a 
consequence of TIS development. We would also miss institutional coherences in context 
structures, which tells us much about the resistance proponents of the new technology will face 
in their quest for broader institutional change. A further reason for a more differentiated context 
analysis is to understand how variation in context structures affects variations in TIS 
development, including different applications, designs, or pathways of a novel technology.” 
(Markard et al., 2016, p. 78).  
 
Validity to explain technological transitions 
 
The lack of conceptualisation of contextual structures in TIS analysis has led to question whether 
it is a valid tool to explain technological transitions. Smith and Raven (2012), for example, 
criticise the lack of interaction between the TIS in focus and other socio-technical regimes.  
Authors like Geels (2005a, 2011) or Kern (2015), on the other hand, question its validity by 
arguing that it does not explain how the rigidity and inertia of incumbent socio- technical 
regimes is overcome by the new technological regime.  In the words of Kern (2015, p.68): “While 
many of the TIS functions of a variety of renewable energy technologies in several countries are 
now quite well developed, we see little evidence of processes of Schumpeter’s ‘creative 
destruction’ in which these new technological systems replace incumbent ones […]. How can the 
TIS approach explain this finding? For me, part of the answer are the structural rigidities in 
sectors such as energy, mobility, agriculture or health, their embedding within society and the 
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powerful agency of incumbents trying to protect their status. It is not clear to me that currently 
the TIS approach has much to say about these issues…” 
Markard et al. (2015, p.81) agree that further research needs to be conducted to 
understand how rigidity is overcome, as it: “certainly deserves further theoretical elaboration 
within the TIS framework.” 
Politics 
The lack of explanation about the politics involved in technological transitions has been 
criticised as a drawback of TIS approach. As previously discussed in sections 2.4 and 2.5, politics 
remains a criticism for all co-evolutionary approaches.  In the case of TIS, the debate on the 
incorporation of politics is long and has been repeatedly suggested by many of TIS proponents 
as well as by other scholars in the innovation field (Jacobsson & Bergek,2011; Meadowcroft, 
2011; Kern, 2011; Kern, 2015; Bergek et al., 2015; Markard et al., 2016). Politics in TIS are 
typically associated with the legitimation process (Bergek et al., 2008b). However, TIS 
frameworks lack a conceptualisation of politics over legitimation and institutional alignment. 
Markard et al. (2015) suggest that politics should be systematically incorporated in the TIS 
analysis in order to better explain the dynamics of technological transitions: “We agree that the 
political dimension is of great importance and deserves more attention than is often given to it. 
We also agree that the concepts for dealing with struggles over institutional change are under-
developed in the TIS framework.” (Markard et al., 2015, p. 81). 
Kern (2015, p.68) suggests as a future research avenue: “the analysis of actors and actor 
strategies should go beyond firms focussing on market entry, generating knowledge etc. and 
should much more closely investigate the political agency of a diverse set of actors and how they 
shape the selection environment in which they operate. This needs to include activities like 
coalition building, lobbying, creating narratives and counter-narratives, etc.” 
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2.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has analysed different innovation models with the aim of identifying the theoretical 
and analytical starting points that could better serve to answer the initial overall aim of this 
thesis: to explore the main dynamics in the early phases of development of breakthrough 
technological innovations (BTIs) that lead to success or failure. The analysis starts with a review 
of the theory of diffusion of innovations by Rogers (Rogers, 2003). Diffusion of innovations has 
been largely used to analyse BTI’s like internet, e-commerce, mobile technologies etc. (Gerrard 
& Barton Cunningham, 2003; Hsu, Lu & Hsu, 2007; Lee, 2004). However, in this theory, the 
process of acquiring critical mass is dominated by the action of change agents in a social system 
where the beliefs, values or interests of main actors do not represent any conflict. In the words 
of Rogers, this bias, called pro-innovation bias is: “the implication in diffusion research that an 
innovation should be diffused and adopted by all members of a social system.“ (Rogers, 2003, p. 
106).  As Rogers argues: “…the scope of future diffusion research should be broadened to include 
study of the entire process through which innovation is generated…” (Rogers, 2003, p. 166). 
Following Rogers’ recommendation to analyse more in depth the dynamics prior to diffusion, 
this literature review has looked into evolutionary approaches to innovation.  
Evolutionary approaches to innovation analyse innovation and technological change in 
a wider system of users, organisations and institutions. They have their groundings in 
evolutionary economics (Nelson, 1994; Nelson & Winter, 2002) and the socio-technical system 
concept proposed by studies of science technology and society (STS). As shown in figure 2-4, 
socio-technical systems are formed by a cluster of elements that include technology (artefacts), 
regulations, user practices, markets, values, cultural meanings, infrastructure and maintenance 
and supply networks (figure 2-4). The analysed models: SCOT, ANT, LTS, MLP and TIS, 
operationalise the relations between the elements of the socio-technical system in different 
manners. Whereas SCOT and ANT are eminently social constructivist approaches that describe 
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the closure process of innovation acceptance as a negotiation between the actors in the socio-
technical system, LTS, MLP and TIS consider, to a certain extent and with some differences, the 
implications of the institutional context and the potential conflicts between different groups of 
actors.  
2.7.1 Theoretical and analytical starting points 
 
This research will take technological innovation systems (TIS) as the theoretical starting point, 
and more specifically the analytical framework by Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2009) as described 
in section 2.6.4.  The rationale for choosing TIS in preference to the other models analysed is 
twofold. The first reason is related to epistemological considerations. As postulated by Hughes 
(1994), the innovation process starts as a socially constructed phenomenon that later on evolves 
into a more technological deterministic one, as long as technology is legitimated and 
consequently, the innovation is able to transform firms and markets. This suggests that although 
sociological factors are very important in the very early phases of BTIs, other forces like 
institutions, market, power or politics should be taken into account too. With this, co-
evolutionary approaches of technology, society, firms and institutions seem more appropriate 
constructs rather than purely social constructivist’s approaches like ANT or SCOT. As Winner 
(1993) suggests, artefacts have politics. The second reason relates to the balance between 
structure and agency and the level of analysis:  ANT, SCOT and LTS are eminently agency-
oriented models. As largely discussed in this chapter, innovation perspectives benefit from 
approaches that also include a more structuralist analysis, like MLP and TIS.   MLP and TIS draw 
on common theoretical roots and use similar concepts to explain innovation and technological 
transitions. Whereas the former builds on the notion of regime, an interpretative analytical 
concept to describe intangible deep structures and dynamics, the latter grounds on the concept 
of system to describe more tangible components and relations (Markard & Truffer, 2008). From 
a level of analysis perspective, MLP focusses on describing the macro patterns of transitions 
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(Geels, 2011). TIS, and particularly Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2009) framework, provide more 
level of detail on the dynamics occurring at meso (system) level, as well as at micro level, 
through the analysis of system builders’ contributions.  
From all of the above, the researcher considers TIS approach an optimal starting point 
to further unfold the early dynamics of BTIs.   
2.7.2 Identified gaps and refined research questions 
 
The previous section concluded that TIS approach (Hekkert et al., 2007; Bergek et al., 2008a; 
Hellsmark & Jacobsson, 2009) represents an optimal starting point to analyse the early dynamics 
of BTIs. As discussed in section 2.6.3, legitimation, the process of acquiring acceptance among 
relevant institutions and actors, is critical to transition TIS from the formative phase into the 
growth phase. (Bergek et al., 2008b; Hekkert et al., 2011).  Legitimation is necessary for the TIS 
to form demand, to mobilise resources and for system builders to gain political strength and 
shape institutional alignment (Bergek et al., 2008b; Hellsmark, 2010). However, despite its 
importance, there is a paucity of research on legitimation in systems of innovation literature 
(Bergek et al., 2008b; Markard, 2016). 
 As discussed in section 1.3, this thesis aims to contribute to unfold the mechanisms that 
lead to BTIs successful trajectories. Consequently, research aim can be achieved by conducting 
novel empirical research of the legitimation function in the formative phases of TISs. As Edquist 
(2005) suggests: “Making the systems of innovations approach more theory-like does not require 
that all components and all relations among them must be specified. Such an ambition would 
certainly be unrealistic. […] Even the much more modest objective of specifying the main function 
of SIs, the activities and components in them and some important relations among these, would 
represent a considerable advance in the field of innovation studies. Used in this way, the SI 
approach can be useful for the creation of theories about relations between specific variables 
within the approach.”(Edquist, 2005 p.111). 
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In addition to the lack of empirical research on legitimation, some scholars, as discussed 
in section 2.6.5,  have pointed to the poor knowledge of external contexts and power structures 
in TIS and the lack of a conceptualisation of the effects of power and politics over legitimation 
and institutional change (Meadowcroft, 2011; Kern, 2011; Kern, 2015; Bergek et al., 2015; 
Markard et al., 2015). Although politics and conflict are much present in TIS literature, TIS 
scholars agree that the conflicts over institutional change in the TIS should be further developed 
(Markard et al., 2015). As an example, Hellsmark (2010), describes three typical conflicts 
affecting legitimation: (i) different networks might advocate for different innovation trajectories 
according to divergent beliefs and solutions, (ii) incumbent firms entering a new TIS might force 
to preserve part of the existing rules structure to keep their business models and (iii) a conflict 
might arise between advocates of the emerging TIS and other competing emerging or mature 
TIS. However, despite recognising the existence of political conflict, TIS studies do not inform 
much on the strategic actions that system builders can put in place to overcome such conflicts. 
Kern (2015) suggests that in future research avenues: “… the analysis of actors and actor 
strategies should go beyond firms focussing on market entry, generating knowledge etc. and 
should much more closely investigate the political agency of a diverse set of actors and how they 
shape the selection environment in which they operate. This needs to include activities like 
coalition building, lobbying, creating narratives and counter-narratives, etc.” 
From above discussion, this research will attempt to address the main legitimation gaps in 
TIS literature. These gaps can be summarised as follows:  
(i) The need for empirical studies on legitimation as a key function to move TISs from 
the formative phase to the growth phase.  (Bergek et al., 2008; Markard, 2016). 
(ii) Further analysis on the influence of external context structures, conflicts and 
politics over legitimation and institutional change (Markard et al., 2015).  
(iii) Empirical research on strategies followed by system builders to develop legitimacy 
and build institutional alignment (Kern, 2015). 
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Therefore, the initial broad topic of this research: to unfold the mechanisms that lead BTIs 
to successful diffusion trajectories, can be narrowed down into a set of research questions 
addressing the identified gaps in TIS literature. These research questions are: 
R.Q.1: how do and the extent to which system builders contribute to establishing legitimacy 
within a TIS? 
R.Q.2: what are the principal mechanisms aiding the legitimation of a TIS? 
R.Q.3: what are the key legitimation strategies capable of overcoming the ’liability of 
newness’? 
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Chapter 3 - Methodology 
3.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter recognised technological innovation systems (TIS) as an appropriate 
theoretical and analytical framework to analyse the early phases of breakthrough technological 
innovations (BTIs). In particular, legitimation was identified as a critical process for BTIs to move 
into market growth phase. Within legitimation, three research gaps were highlighted: 
(i) the paucity of empirical studies on TIS legitimation (Bergek et al., 2008; Markard, 2016).  
(ii) the necessity to further develop how external context structures, conflicts and politics 
influence legitimation and institutional change (Markard et al., 2015). 
(iii)  the recommendation to analyse system builders’ strategies more closely to the 
mechanisms that they develop to shape the environment (Kern, 2015). 
In order to address those gaps, an empirical research on two different breakthrough 
technological innovations (BTIs) were undertaken.  The first BTI analysed is Computational Fluid 
Dynamics (CFD). CFD is a technology developed during the 1970s-80s that has transformed a 
number of industries and has created a multibillion-dollar market in software sales and services 
(Hanna, 2015).  The second BTI is mobile Health (mHealth). mHealth is a technological field that 
despite its great transformational potential, hasn’t been widely adopted todate (Labrique et al., 
2013; WHO, 2106). Both studies, CFD and mHealth, aim to contribute to TIS theory by exploring 
the mechanisms and strategies that system builders have developed to legitimate these BTIs.  
This chapter covers the main methodological aspects of the research.  In the next section 
(3.2), the underpinning ontological and epistemological considerations of the study are 
described. Section 3.3, discusses the research approach and methods. In section 3.4, the 
research parameters for the two BTIs under analysis are extensively illustrated, (e.g. rationale 
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for the research context and unit of analysis, choice of interviewees, etc.). Sections 3.5 and 3.6 
detail respectively the methods for data gathering and data analysis. Section 3.7 provides the 
reader with a detailed discussion concerning data validity and reliability. Finally, the last section 
of the chapter (3.8), covers the details regarding the research ethics of the study.  
3.2  Philosophical considerations  
The assumptions and views of a researcher about the nature of the social phenomena studied, 
impacts the research strategy and method used.  Therefore, the researcher should be aware of 
the potential biases derived from the philosophical standpoints adopted while conducting the 
investigation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  As Bryman (2012) points out, the assumptions and views 
are mainly influenced by two philosophical stances: ontology and epistemology.   
Ontology is the study of the nature of the social entities constituting a certain social 
phenomenon. It addresses the questions of what reality is and what is the nature of the world 
and its causal relationships (Saunders et al., 2007).  Bryman (2012) indicates that the central 
point about ontology is the question of whether social entities should be considered objective 
and external to social actors or on the contrary, should be interpreted as social constructions 
built up from the perceptions and actions of involved social actors.  Within this distinction, two 
main ontological perspectives serve to characterise social science studies: objectivism and 
constructionism. Objectivism asserts that social phenomena have an existence independent of 
social actors. Therefore, this perspective recognises that reality is objectively observed and 
analysed by the researcher (Bryman, 2012). Constructionism, also known as constructivism, is 
an alternative ontological position that asserts that “Social phenomena and their meanings are 
continually being accomplished by social actors. It implies that social phenomena and categories 
are not only produced through social interaction but that they are in constant state of revision.” 
(Bryman, 2012, p. 33). Reality, in a constructionist approach, is subjective and constructed by 
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the actors participating in the study rather than by objective and external factors (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985).  
Epistemology, on the other hand, refers to the grounds of knowledge. It asks: what is, 
or should be, regarded as acceptable knowledge? In particular, the epistemological stand 
questions whether knowledge in social science can be acquired through the same principles, 
methods and ethos as natural sciences (Bryman, 2012).  Therefore, explaining the researcher’s 
epistemological assumptions is critical to clarify and justify the research design, the methods 
that are suitable and the way the empirical evidence is gathered and interpreted (Gray, 2013).   
Bryman (2012) classifies epistemological perspectives into two main categories: 
positivism and interpretivism. A positivist stance, states that social science should imitate natural 
science principles and methods. The researcher following a positivist orientation will most likely 
use a structured methodology on quantifiable data to facilitate the replicability of the research 
(Saunders et al., 2007). Therefore, a positivist approach seeks facts to generate hypotheses that 
can be tested and can generate theory.  
Interpretivism, is a contrasting epistemology to positivism. An interpretivist approach 
states that the object of research in social sciences is fundamentally different from that of 
natural sciences, and therefore, the study of the social world “…requires a different logic of 
research procedure, one that reflects the distinctiveness of humans as against the natural order.” 
(Bryman, 2012, p.28). In an interpretivist approach, the researcher needs to get involved in the 
social world under study to interpret and understand it (Saunders et al., 2007). As Weber (1947) 
proposed, social science should attempt to understand social action in an interpretative manner 
in order to arrive at causal explanations. Research methods in interpretivist approaches are 
mainly qualitative (Bryman, 2012). 
  Realism, and in particular critical realism (CR) (Bhaskar, 1989), can be considered as a 
middle way between positivism and interpretivism (Zachariadis et al., 2013).  Unlike positivism, 
critical realism recognises researcher’s conceptualisation of reality as a way to understand it 
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(Bryman, 2012). Therefore, the comprehension of reality and the generation of knowledge 
requires the identification of structures that generate the events and discourses in the social 
world. In the words of Bhaskar: “These structures are not spontaneously apparent in the 
observable pattern of events: they can only be identified through the practical and theoretical 
work of the social science.” (Bhaskar, 1989, p.2).   
The ontological grounds of critical realism share with objectivism the notion of a reality 
that exists independently of the researcher’s perceptions and beliefs (Bhaskar, 1989).  However, 
reality is divided in three different domains as shown in figure 3-1: the real, the actual and the 
empirical (Bhaskar, 1989). The domain of the real consist of all objects and structures that create 
the causal powers and generative mechanisms that determine the world. These mechanisms 
might not always be visible in the actual world, but the events they generate are the visible 
phenomena we observe in the empirical world. As Zachariadis et al. (2013, p.3) summarise: 
“Structured things [physical objects or social processes] possess causal [or emergent] powers 
which, when triggered or released, act as generative mechanisms to determine the actual 
phenomena of the world. While generative mechanisms are not necessarily constantly 
empirically observable, their potentialities may still exist whether they are exercised or 
unexercised.” Following on these nested domains of reality (real, actual and empirical), the 
overall goal of critical realistic research is the identification of the mechanisms that generate 
the observable perceptions and events (Bryman, 2012; Zachariadis et al., 2013, p.3).  In other 
words: “… as a result, the critical realist view on causality should not be about a relationship 
among distinct events (e.g. the fact that event “A” by and large has been followed by event “B”) 
but about realising the process and conditions under which “A” causes “B”, if at all. “  
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Figure 3-1 Overview of the different levels in critical realism ontology. (Zachariadis et al., 2013,p.4) 
 
As Bryman (2012) argues, the critical realist reasoning to identify generative mechanism 
from events and observed phenomena, is neither inductive or deductive.  It has been defined 
as a retroductive analysis (Blaikie, 1993). Retroductive analysis “…entails making an inference 
about the causal mechanism that lies behind and is responsible for regularities that are observed 
in the social world.” (Bryman, 2012, p. 29). 
This research will adopt critical realism as its philosophical position. The choice reflects 
the aim of this study, which is to investigate the mechanisms of legitimation in the formative 
phases of BTIs.  As a result of the investigation, system builders and policy makers will be better 
informed to develop strategies for the legitimation of BTIs.  Therefore, the research goal is also 
coherent with the critical realist approach, as the recognition of the generative mechanisms, 
“…offer the prospect of introducing changes that can transform the status quo.” (Bryman, 2012, 
p. 29). 
The next section discusses in depth, the consistency of critical realism with TIS as the 
theoretical starting point of the research. 
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3.2.1 Critical realism as an appropriate philosophical orientation for this 
research 
While the literature on technology and information systems has been traditionally dominated 
by the two antagonist epistemologies of positivism and interpretivism, the interest on critical 
realism (CR) as a more appropriate stance to guide research in the technological field, has 
increasingly grown over the last years (Mingers, 2004; Dobson, 2001; Smith, 2006; Easton, 
2010).  As Smith (2006, pp. 199, 206) points out: “This growing popularity stems in part from its 
ability to transcend some of the classic dualisms in the social sciences such as positivism vs. 
interpretivism, and structure vs. agency. […] the critical realist notion of tendencies makes 
possible the reconceptualisation of the technological determinism vs. the social construction of 
technology debate, effectively dissolving it.” The transcendence of the positivist vs. interpretivist 
epistemologies or the technological determinism vs. social constructionism debate, is also of 
critical importance for the theoretical and analytical starting points of this research: TIS. As 
discussed in the section 2.6, TIS encompasses different theoretical perspectives to explain 
innovation phenomena like evolutionary economics, institutional theory or socio-technical 
systems.  The affinity of these theoretical perspectives with the critical realist stance has been 
substantially discussed in the literature (Foss, 1994; Hughes, 1994; Vega & Brown, 2011; Wynn 
& Williams, 2012). For example, Foss (1994) argues that the critical realist orientation of 
evolutionary economics is what  sets it apart from the neoclassical approach. Additionally, 
Hughes (1994) theorises that the development of socio-technical systems is both a socially 
constructed and determinist process.  Moreover, as the goal of critical realism is to explain the 
underlying mechanisms that generate a certain event, this philosophical approach is adequate 
to provide more in-depth causal explanations to innovation system approaches.  As Wynn and 
Williams (2012, p.787) point out, this can be accomplished by identifying the mechanisms that 
connect events and complex interactions in the analysis of the technological, organisational, 
environmental and social aspects of a socio-technical system: “ …(critical realism) allows 
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researchers to develop and support in-depth causal explanations for the outcomes of specific 
socio-technical phenomena that take into account the breadth of information technology, social, 
organisational, and environmental factors which may have played a causal role in their 
occurrence.”  
The critical realist essence of TIS is also present in the reflections of many of its 
proponents. In response to some criticisms of TIS, Markard et al. (2015, p.79) state that: “Finally, 
we want to add that the debate about analytical and empirical boundary setting also touches 
upon the issue whether to regard the TIS as a purely analytical construct or model or as an object 
that exists ‘out there’ and can be identified and described empirically. In our view, a TIS is neither 
purely abstract nor objectively identifiable in empirical terms but a combination of both. In that 
regard it is similar to concepts such as sector, industry, technology, or firm.” Moreover, Vega 
and Brown (2011, p.253) defend that as compatible as critical realism and systems of innovation 
are, a more systematic approach of critical realism should be put in place to reduce weaknesses 
and criticisms over the systems of innovation field:  “While the commitment to methodological 
pluralism is positive, it has a negative connotation if we consider that the conceptual base of the 
SIA (systems of innovation approach)  is still evolving and confusion exists about some of its 
components […]. For instance, it is up to the researcher to decide the boundaries of a system, 
which could be as diverse as the country, the region, the sector, the technology or a mix of them 
(e.g. Edquist, 1997, 2005). Another example is multiple definitions of institutions […]. As a result, 
SIA researchers have been presenting very different, too descriptive, and superficial accounts of 
the systems […] Against this situation, the adoption of the CR paradigm allows the reconciliation 
of a variety of systems given the identification of the underlying causal mechanisms that 
generate and integrate them […]. For this reason, the focus of research should be on deeper 
structures and mechanisms using multiple methodologies more than accounting the visible and 
discrete factors that directly affect innovation processes.” 
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The discussions printed above suggest that critical realism offers a rational philosophical 
stance, enabling the researcher to unfold the mechanisms of legitimation in the formative 
phases of technological innovation systems. The next section presents the research design and 
methodology derived from this stance. 
3.3 Research approach and method  
The aim of this section is to describe in greater detail, the decisions about research approach 
and method, that follow from the ontological and epistemological strand discussed in section 
3.2.  The section is divided into two separate subsections that provide the rationale for the main 
research approach and method considered for the study.  
3.3.1 Research approach- qualitative methodology 
 
In critical realism, the selection of methods is determined by the nature of the research problem. 
Therefore, the question is not whether a particular methodological approach  (quantitative, 
qualitative or mixed methods)  is relevant and utilised, but how they are applied (McEvoy & 
Richards, 2006).    
This research has adopted a qualitive approach. The decision is twofold: on one hand, 
the research questions posed in section 2.7.2 suggest to adopt qualitative research to unfold 
events and understand actors’ actions (Bryman, 2012). On the other hand, TIS empirical studies 
and frameworks imply also a qualitative research (Bergek, 2008b; Hellsmark & Jacobsson, 2009; 
Hellsmark, 2010; Hekkert et al., 2011; Markard et al., 2015).  
As previously stated, qualitative research analysis aims to unfold events and to 
understand the interconnections between the actions of participants of social settings. In 
contrast, quantitative studies focus on the causal relationships between two or more variables 
(Bryman, 2012).  In qualitative analysis, the researcher develops concepts and insights from the 
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observed patterns in the data, instead of using collected data to assess preconceived models or 
theories (Taylor et al., 2015). This type of theorising in qualitative research, known as “emergent 
analysis”, is compatible with the critical realist stance. As McEvoy and Richards (2006) point out: 
“The key strength of qualitative methods, from a critical realist perspective, is that they are open 
ended. This may allow themes to emerge during the course of an inquiry that could not have 
been anticipated in advance. Qualitative methods can help to illuminate complex concepts and 
relationships that are unlikely to be captured by predetermined response categories or 
standardised quantitative measures.” (McEvoy & Richards, 2006, p. 71). 
 
3.3.2 Research method- multiple-case design   
 
Yin (2003) defines a case study as: “… an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” (Yin, 2003, p. 13). In the words of Eisenhardt 
(1989), the case study is a research strategy: “… which focuses on understanding the dynamics 
present within single settings.” (Eisenhardt, 1989).  This research utilised a multiple-case design, 
which is a variation of a single case design within the same methodological framework (Yin, 
2003). The purpose of multiple-case study design is to enhance validity as compared to a single 
case study (Herriott & Firestone, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989).   
The two selected case studies for this research: (i) the origins of Computational Fluid 
Dynamics (CFD) and  (ii) mobile Health technologies (mHealth) for diagnostics and chronic 
disease management, represent two BTIs with very different legitimation dynamics: while CFD 
was smoothly accepted as a new industrial practice across many sectors in the 1980s (Runchal, 
2009), mHealth technologies, on the other hand, are still struggling to overcome important 
acceptance barriers (Labrique et al., 2013; WHO, 2016) to transitioning from niche or nursing 
markets (Geels, 2005a; Bergek et al., 2008a)  to growth or mass markets.. Therefore, the 
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selection of contrasting cases in this research is not unintentional. As Eisenhardt (1989) states, 
as the number of cases that can be studied are limited, it makes sense to select contrasting 
cases.  
The choice of a multiple-case study strategy is consistent with the critical realist paradigm 
adopted in this research. Although critical realism is flexible with research methodologies and 
does not recommend any in particular, numerous critical realist scholars recognise the case 
study as the best approach to explain causal mechanism through the analysis of interactions in 
structure, events and context (Wynn &Williams, 2012; Ackroyd, 2009; Easton, 2010; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Mingers, 2004). In particular, Wynn and Williams (2012, p.795) point out that: 
“For the purpose of studying contemporary socio-technical phenomenon to uncover the causal 
mechanisms and contextual factors that combined to generate them, case study research is well-
suited to conduct critical realist research.”  
 Finally, the choice of multiple- case study method is also consistent with TIS approach 
and the research questions posed in section 2.7.2.  As main proponents of TIS point out,  
Markard et al. (2012),  the big majority of empirical studies in the TIS field have adopted case 
study as the research method. Additionally, as Yin (2003) argues, case studies are the preferred 
method when dealing with ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions, and when the research focus is on a 
phenomenon present in a real-life context. As Gillham (2000) points out, the impact of a case 
study can be greater than any other form of research: case studies have the power to lead major 
policy and organisational changes. 
3.4 Research parameters  
Once the rationale for the overall research approach and method has been provided, this 
section specifies the research parameters of the study. The section starts providing the reader 
with an overview of the context of the research (subsection 3.4.1). Then, it presents the 
justification for the choice of the case studies, the unit of analysis, and the selection of 
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interviewees (subsections 3.4.2 to 3.4.4). Finally, the last subsection (3.4.5) details the details 
involving data access. 
3.4.1 Choice of research context 
As repeatedly argued (see for example sections 1.3 and 2.7), this research has adopted TIS 
(Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991; Hekkert et al., 2007; Bergek et al., 2008a; Hellsmark &Jacobsson, 
2009) as an appropriate approach to study the mechanisms that lead BTIs to successful 
legitimation trajectories.    
As discussed in section 2.6, a TIS consists, as in any system, of two main parts: (i) 
components and (ii) the relations among them.  The components of a TIS are the actors, 
networks and institutions,  both formal and informal, that rule them. The interactions in a TIS 
are grouped under a set of sub processes named functions.  Bergek et al. (2008a) identifies seven 
different functions or processes that help to identify inducing and blocking mechanisms in the 
development of a TIS.  Legitimation, defined as the process of acquiring social acceptance and 
compliance with the relevant institutions,  is a critical function for the successful transition of 
technological innovation systems (TIS) from the formative phase to the growth phase (Bergek 
et al., 2008b; Hekkert et al., 2011).  
Therefore, the research context of this study is the legitimation process of TISs in their 
transition from the formative phase to the growth phase. The choice is justified by the following 
considerations: 
(i) The role of legitimation as the critical process to move TIS from the formative phase 
to wider diffusion, as previously discussed. 
(ii) The lack of empirical research on TIS legitimation. In particular, as discussed in 
section 2.6.5, both TIS proponents and critics call for the need of more systematic 
research on the role of system builders, and on the influence of politics and external 
contexts (political, institutional, geographical or technological) in the legitimation 
process.  
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(iii) The possibility of using organisational and institutional studies on legitimation, like 
Suchman (1995), to understand the different strategies used by system builders to 
build legitimacy. 
 
3.4.2 Choice of CFD and mHealth as case studies  
 
As Ghauri (2004) argues, deciding how to select the cases is probably the most important issue 
in this type of research. As the scholar suggests, the selection of the case(s) should be based on 
criteria that are consistent with the aim of the research, the theoretical framework and the 
concepts under analysis. As previously, discussed, the aim of the present study is to unfold the 
mechanisms of legitimation of BTIs, using TIS as a theoretical framework.  Eisenhardt (1989), 
contends that when the purpose of the research is to extend existing theory or fill theoretical 
gaps, as is the aim of this research, the selection of cases should be based in theoretical sampling 
instead of statistical reasons. This implies, that random selection is not the preferable option for 
case study selection. Instead, and due to the limitation in the number of cases that a researcher 
can incorporate, “It makes sense to choose cases such as extreme situations and polar types in 
which the process of interest is ’transparently observable’. Thus, the goal of theoretical sampling 
is to choose cases which are likely to replicate or extend the emergent theory.” (Esienhardt, 1989. 
p. 537). 
Following Eisenhardt’s recommendation, this research selected two extreme case 
studies in relation to the legitimation dynamics of their respective technologies: while in the 
first case study CFD,  the technology was widely accepted and legitimated as a new industrial 
paradigm, in the second case study,  mHealth  is still in its formative phase, striving to overcome 
a number of different barriers (Labrique et al., 2013; WHO, 2016).   
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The next two subsections present an overview on the particularities of each case study. The 
commonalities can be summarised as follows: 
• They both represent breakthrough technological innovations (BTIs) with the capability 
to create new technological trajectories and transform organisational and industrial 
structures (Garcia & Calantone, 2002; Dosi, 1982; Anderson & Tushman, 1990). 
• The boundaries for the analysis can be defined as further detailed in the next 
subsections. 
• The researcher has the means to access relevant participants.  
• As far as the researcher is able to ascertain, the technologies selected for the case 
studies have not been analysed from the TIS perspective previously.  Whereas most of 
the TIS empirical research is circumscribed to the field of sustainable energy transitions 
(Markard et al., 2012; Markard et al., 2016), this research offers the opportunity to 
expand the TIS field into other technological areas. 
3.4.2.1 Choice of the origins of CFD a case study 
 
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) can be defined as “ …a set of numerical methods applied 
to obtain approximate solutions of problems of fluid dynamics and heat transfer.”  (Zikanov, 
2010).  As an industrial discipline, it entitles the use of computational software tools to solve 
complex flow problems for which analytical solutions are not available.  CFD provides predictive 
“what if scenarios” on how a liquid or gas will flow under different conditions, and how this flow 
will affect the surrounding objects.   
The development of CFD over the last four decades is considered pivotal for many 
radical advances in industries like the nuclear, automotive and aerospace. (Gerard & Runchal, 
2013; Harlow, 2004; Runchal, 2013). According to Hanna and Parry (2001), at least half of 
engineering design problems presented in the industry are flow related.  The emergence of CFD 
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in the 1970s and 1980s brought the possibility to simulate precise industrial prototypes at a 
much faster pace and significantly lower costs. CFD substituted expensive prototyping 
techniques, like wind tunnel or water tank, by computer simulations. Therefore, CFD is 
considered by many as a paradigm shift that led to the advent of cheaper, safer and greener 
industrial designs (Johnson, Tinoco et al., 2005; Hanna & Parry, 2011; Economist, 2015).  Figure 
3-2 shows aerodynamic simulation using CFD software in the design of a Tesla Roadster vehicle. 
 
Figure 3-2 CFD simulation for Tesla Roadster design. (Johnston, 2010) 
As shown in figure 3-3, CFD is nowadays a market with estimated annual revenues 
beyond USD 1 billion only in software sales. A combination of automotive and 
military/aerospace accounts for about 50% of the total revenue, while electronics, power 
generation, chemical processes, materials and manufacturing account for the rest. (Hanna, 
2015). 
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Figure 3-3 Estimated Revenues  of CFD. (1984 – 2014) (Hanna, 2015) 
Another relevant reason to choose CFD as a case study, is the fact that the technology 
was developed simultaneously at 2 different research centres: one was the National Lab at Los 
Alamos (USA), and the other, the department of mechanical engineering at Imperial College 
(UK). For a long period of time, both centres worked on the same physical problems without 
being aware of each other’s research (Runchal, 2009).  Moreover, whereas the researchers at 
Los Alamos were pioneers in the development of theoretical knowledge, the group at Imperial 
College was recognised for being the one that legitimated the use of CFD in the industry, and in 
consequence, for the creation of the multibillion market previously discussed.  
Therefore, analysing the differences between the two centres (Los Alamos and Imperial 
College), makes  CFD a unique choice to explore the transformative capacity of system builders 
to legitimate BTIs.   
 
3.4.2.2 Choice of mHealth for diagnostics and chronic disease management as a 
case study 
 
Mobile Health (mHealth) is a term originally coined to describe “…mobile computing, medical 
sensor and communications technologies for healthcare.”(Istepanian, Jovanov & Zhang, 2004).  
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Nowadays, mHealth includes any medical and public healthcare practice supported by mobile 
devices such as mobile and smartphones, wireless portable medical devices or computers, 
tablets etc. (WHO, 2011).  
The idea of providing healthcare through technological artefacts is not new. In fact, 
mHealth is considered to be the evolution of telemedicine and electronic healthcare (eHealth) 
technologies. mHealth poses an important advantage in respect to telemedicine and eHealth, 
as it can make use of standard mobile devices capabilities without the need of additional 
technological infrastructure. As a consequence, healthcare access can be put in the hands of 
any individual with a connected device (ibid).  The potential of mHealth to transform healthcare 
has attracted an extraordinary amount of attention from public and private institutions over the 
last years.  For example, the World Health Organisation, see in mHealth, the enabler towards 
universal healthcare “mHealth has the potential to transform the face of health service delivery 
across the globe. […] If implemented strategically and systematically, mHealth can revolutionise 
health outcomes, providing virtually anyone with a mobile phone with medical expertise and 
knowledge in real-time.” (WHO, 2011).  Aligned to this, the European Commission argues that 
mHealth can contribute to empowering citizens by helping to create a more patient-oriented 
healthcare, while at the same time tackling global challenges such as ageing of the population 
or budgetary pressures (European Commission, 2014).  On the industrial side, mHealth 
represents an attractive emerging market, expected to reach a global value of USD 49.12 billion 
by 2020, with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 47.6% in the 2013 to 2020 period  
(Grand View Research, 2015). Within this context of public institutional interest plus remarkable 
market prospects, mHealth has drawn the interest of many entrants in the ICT industry.  
However, despite  its claimed potential,  after more than a decade since its 
commencement, mHealth remains primarily in the pilot sphere, with very low levels of large 
scale adoption (Labrique et al., 2013; WHO, 2016). The extant literature has already identified 
significant barriers. The green paper on mHealth by the European Commission (2014) collected 
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the main perceived barriers across different mHealth stakeholders. These barriers include: data 
privacy and security concerns, interoperability issues, lack of evidence in cost and clinical 
efficiency, unclear regulatory framework or lack of reimbursable mechanisms (ibid). More 
recently, Gagnon et al. (2016) conducted a systematic literature review on reported barriers of 
mHealth from the point of view of healthcare professionals. These include individual barriers 
like time issues or not welcome attitude, organisational barriers like lack of training and 
managerial support or concerns about the quality of the provided service.  
From the above discussion, mHealth represents an excellent choice to analyse the underlying 
mechanisms in the sometimes “painful”, uncertain and conflicting process of legitimation and 
institutional alignment (Hellsmark, 2010).  
3.4.3 Choice of unit of analysis 
 The unit of analysis in a research can be defined as “…the kind of case to which the variables or 
phenomena under study and the research problem refer, and about which data is collected and 
analysed.” (Collis & Hussey, 2003, p. 68).  The choice of unit of analysis is usually driven by the 
nature of research, the research questions and the research focus (Sekeran, 2003). The unit of 
analysis can be artefacts (such as software, books, photos etc.), individuals, groups, geographical 
items (such as town, country,) and social interactions, (e.g. relations, divorces, arrests, etc.) 
(Trochim & Donnelly, 2001).  
Bergek et al. (2008a) point out that the criticality of defining an adequate unit of analysis 
for a TIS is twofold: on one hand, the choice of the unit of analysis is key to focus the purpose 
and outcomes of the study. On the other hand, it is a requisite to obtain consistent and 
comparable results in respect to other TIS empirical analysis. The authors suggest three types 
of choices to be considered by the researcher: (1) the choice of a knowledge field or product(s) 
as a focusing device, (2) the choice between the breadth and the depth and (3) the choice of the 
spatial domain. In a first instance, they suggest that depending on the focus of the study and 
the questions raised, the researcher should choose between the analysis of a specific product, 
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a group of products, or a technological knowledge field.  Having decided this, a second related 
choice needs to be made to define the breath of the research. For this, it is important to set an 
appropriate level of aggregation of the study when the researcher has chosen a group of 
products or a technological knowledge field. In this case, the researcher needs to determine the 
range of technologies that are relevant and decide whether to include a vast range of 
technologies to get a holistic picture (e.g. IT), or on the contrary, be more specific in order to 
get more level of detail (e.g. 3D printing). Finally, the researcher should also consider the spatial 
focus of the research. However, the authors recommend to make it as international as possible, 
because TIS in concept is global and “…a spatially limited part of a global TIS can neither be 
understood, nor assessed, without a thorough understanding of the global context.” (Bergek et 
al., 2008a, p.413). 
3.4.3.1  Unit of analysis for case study 1: CFD 
 
Based on Bergek et al. (2008a) previous recommendations, the unit of analysis for the CFD case 
study is the field of knowledge of CFD. The breath of the research extends to main CFD general 
purpose codes developed during the 1980s like PHOENICS, Fluent, Flow-3D, StarCD as well as 
the developed norms, standards, practices for knowledge diffusion etc. The spatial domain 
encompasses two geographical sites: Los Alamos in USA and Imperial College in UK.   
The justification for this choice is based on the following arguments:  
(i) The overall aim of the study implies that the focal TIS needs to meet the criteria of 
BTIs. As defined by Garcia and Cantalone (2002), BTIs are radical technological 
innovations that result in new market infrastructures.   CFD general purpose codes 
meet BTIs principles as they created a completely new market and transformed 
many existing industries such as automotive, aeronautic or nuclear (Hanna, 2015).  
(ii) The boundaries of CFD can be easily delimited. Moreover, the number of main CFD 
firms providing general purpose codes during the 1980s is relatively small (5 to 6). 
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Therefore, the breath of the unit of analysis permits not only a holistic view on how 
CFD legitimated across different sectors, but also a more detailed analysis on the 
legitimation activities and strategies of each involved firm.  
(iii) The decision on the spatial domain of the unit of analysis (Los Alamos and Imperial 
College research centres) encompasses the two main research centres where CFD 
knowledge was primarily developed. (Runchal, 2009; Hanna, 2015). 
 
3.4.3.2 Unit of analysis for case study2: mHealth  
 
The term mHealth encompasses a vast number of technologies that provide a wide range of 
healthcare services.  As shown in figure 3-5, these vary from online health campaigns to self-
diagnose disease kits. To narrow down the boundaries of the research, the unit of analysis for 
the mHealth case study is the field of knowledge of mHealth technologies for diagnostics and 
chronic disease management across the EU region.  
The justification for this choice is based on the following arguments:  
(i) In order to accomplish the BTI criteria (see the discussion for CFD in the previous 
section), the mHealth technologies included in the study (those for diagnostics and 
chronic disease management) are the ones with higher potential to disrupt the 
existing healthcare landscape (Steinhubl, 2015). Therefore, other applications like 
wellbeing and fitness, prevention, informational campaigns or administrative are 
out of the scope. Nevertheless, their influence as positive externalities in the 
legitimation process of the ones in scope,  diagnostic and chronic disease 
management,   will be analysed.   
(ii) As in the case of CFD, the unit of analysis is not limited to a particular technology or 
firm. The decision on selecting a broader unit of analysis corresponds to the aim of 
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the study in understanding the underlying mechanisms that are hampering the 
diffusion of mHealth technologies for chronic disease management and diagnostics.  
(iii) The spatial domain includes the European Union (EU) region as its market is 
expected to be the largest regional market by 2020. (Grand View Research, 2015), 
and within Europe, the EU members states are the most active in the development 
of mHealth initiatives (WHO, 2016). Additionally, they possess important 
commonalities such as comparable public healthcare systems, shared overarching 
healthcare strategies and regulatory frameworks or similar societal challenges like 
aging of population (WHO, 2016). 
 
 
.  
Figure 3-4 Classification of mHealth applications. (Kumar et al., 2013, p.229) 
 
3.4.4 Choice of interviewees 
Following Bergek et al. (2008a) recommendation to interview field experts in TIS analysis, this 
research has taken experts’ interviews as the main source of data for both mHealth and CFD 
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case studies.  Together with the proven expertise of participants, the selection criteria have also 
followed the principle of ensuring that all groups of actors are represented.  
The next two sections discuss in detail the rational for the choice of subject matter 
experts for both CFD and mHealth case studies. 
3.4.4.1 Rationale for the choice of Interviewees - CFD case study 
  
For the CFD case study, the researcher conducted thirteen in-depth interviews with top system 
builders and experts during the early years of CFD. The interviews gathered their motivations, 
impressions and reflections on how CFD legitimated as a new industrial paradigm.  The experts 
were located in the United States and in the United Kingdom. As it was discussed in sections 
3.4.2.1 and 3.4.3.2, the two main CFD centres emerged in these two countries: the T3 Lab in Los 
Alamos, and the CFD group at Imperial College, London. 
As shown in table 3-1, participants from both sites, Los Alamos and Imperial College, 
can be classified in four main groups. The first group, includes the founders of one of the top 
five CFD companies in the 1980s (Hanna, 2015). All of them had an academic background on 
CFD and a majority were directly involved in the development of the first general purpose codes. 
Similarly, the second group represents those CFD experts who were also involved in the 
development of CFD and founded a CFD company of small or medium size. The third group, 
includes experts closely involved in the development of CFD who didn’t take an entrepreneurial 
stake. In addition, three of the participants of these groups hold managerial positions at Los 
Alamos or Imperial College. Finally, the fourth group incorporates the voice of the early CFD 
adopters through the testimonies of a CFD customer and the manager of customer relations in 
one of the top pioneer CFD companies. 
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List of CFD interviewees (13) 
Stakeholder group Los Alamos (USA) Imperial College (UK) Other UK location 
CFD pioneer and founder of 
top CFD company (Hanna, 
2015) 
1 2 1 
CFD pioneer and founder of 
CFD, SME size company 
0 2 0 
CFD pioneer – Academic 
profile 
3 1 1 
Early CFD customer and 
customer mgr. 
0 2 0 
Table 3-1 Profile of participants in the CFD case study. 
  
 
3.4.4.2 Rationale for the choice of interviewees- mHealth case study 
  
For the mHealth case study, the researcher conducted twenty in-depth interviews with top 
mHealth experts. The interviews gathered their experience, motivations and reflections on the 
current status and plausible future of mHealth as a new healthcare paradigm.  The experts were 
located across different European countries like: United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain, Germany, 
Italy and Greece. 
As shown in table 3-2, the participants represent main stakeholders’ groups like 
entrepreneurs, ICT entrants, incumbent pharma reps, EU regulators and policy makers, 
presidents of patients, practitioners and mHealth associations etc. 
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The criteria for selecting the participants varied depending on the stakeholder group: 
o For mHealth entrepreneurs, participants had to have at least two years of experience 
developing a mHealth product or service, with a real registered company and at least 
one productive pilot. 
o The representatives of ICT entrant and incumbent healthcare companies were required 
to be in charge of the mHealth division in their respective corporations or be responsible 
for the mHealth projects pipeline.  
o The independent mHealth strategists were required to have a proven solid background 
as experts in the field. This was measured through their professional resume, 
participation as speakers in congresses, publications etc. 
o Policy makers had to be responsible or actively involved in the top EU digital healthcare 
initiatives, such as the development of regulation for medical devices, the mHealth code 
of conduct, the EU healthcare digital agenda etc. 
o Finally, for the healthcare practitioners, patients and mHealth associations, the criteria 
was to engage executive or high ranked profiles,  like president or vice president, to 
ensure that only the right spokesman was brought onboard. 
Stakeholder group # of experts Expertise criteria 
mHealth 
entrepreneurs 
6 -+ 2 years in mHealth 
field 
- 1 productive pilot or 
mHealth innovation 
award 
ICT entrant companies 3 mHealth division 
mHealth pipeline 
Incumbent healthcare 
companies 
3 mHealth division 
mHealth pipeline 
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 Independent 
mHealth strategists 
2 Publications 
Public speakers 
Congress attendance 
Policy makers from 
European institutions  
3 Responsible or 
involved in EU digital 
healthcare programs 
President of patients’ 
associations 
1 Seniority 
President of European 
healthcare 
practitioners 
association 
1 Seniority 
Vice president of 
mHealth association  
1 Seniority 
Table 3-2 Profile of participants in mHealth case study. 
3.4.5 Access 
Accessing the experts for the two case studies, resulted in an intensive and time-consuming task 
that lasted for almost two years (from January 2015 to July 2016).  
For the mHealth case study, in the first stage, access was gained through the use of LinkedIn 
groups and professional contacts of the researcher. Additionally, the attendance at different 
mHealth events as observer, propitiated new contacts with different authorities and subject 
matter experts.  Over two hundred  potential participants were screened, more than 80 emails 
were sent and dozens of telephone calls were made to those experts meeting the criteria 
referred to in the previous section. In very few cases, some of the experts pointed to more 
experts, following a “snowballing” method.  
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For the CFD case study, the initial access was gained through the professional contacts 
of Professor Abby Ghobadian with the CFD group at Imperial College (UK).  The first participants 
in the Los Alamos group (USA) were contacted through LinkedIn and email. From that initial 
stage, participants from both sites pointed to additional experts through the “snowballing” 
method.   Some of the main CFD pioneers in Los Alamos were retired, suffered from bad health 
conditions or had passed away, making it very difficult to count on a bigger group of participants. 
The majority of interviews were conducted via telephone and video Skype. When 
possible, face to face interviews were held.  Additionally, one of the participants in the CFD case 
study, requested to submit a written response to the interview questions. 
Table 3-3 Type of media used for research interviews. 
 CFD case study (13 interviews) mHealth case study (20 
interviews) 
Video Skype 3 3 
Telephone 6 16 
Face to face 3 1 
Written 
questionnaire 
1 0 
 
3.5 Data collection  
This section provides the reader with the details on the three sources of data utilised in the 
research: interviews, participant observation and documents. First, section 3.5.1, presents the 
rationale and guidelines for the 33 semi-structured interviews conducted in the two case 
studies. Then, section 3.5.2 provides the details on the professional events where the researcher 
participated as an observer. Finally, section 3.5.3 discusses the documents used as a 
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complementary data source for the research, together with the qualitative context analysis 
approach taken.  
3.5.1 Interviews 
The majority of the primary data was collected through 33 semi-structured and in-depth 
interviews that lasted between 45 minutes and an hour and a half.  Semi-structured interviews 
combine specific and open-ended questions with the double objective of gathering foreseen 
and unexpected types of information (Hove & Anda, 2005).  
Before the interviews, all participants received in advance a briefing with the research 
purpose and main topics for the interview, and when requested, a more detailed set of 
questions was also sent so they could familiarise themselves with the questions and recollect 
any relevant information (Gubrium & Holstein, 2002). The interviews were semi-structured as 
this interviewing approach minimises variations among participants, without compromising the 
emergence of new concepts and themes as a result of the interview process (Moyser, 1988).  
As Hertz et al. (1995) suggest, phone calls and video conferences are appropriate media for 
“elite interviewing” as they offer high levels of flexibility and convenience in terms of time and 
location. Additionally, as a large number of the participants were located outside the UK (Europe 
and USA), the logistics counted against face-to-face interviews.  Therefore, interviews occurred 
principally through phone calls and Skype video calls.  
  The researcher conducted the interviews in an open and relaxed manner, acting as a 
“participating listener” (Davies, 1997). At the beginning of each interview, the researcher 
reminded the interviewee the purpose of the study and the anonymity of the interview to avoid 
self-report bias by the interviewees (Maxwell, 1996). Also, a few informal questions were asked, 
to help the participant feel comfortable and “break the ice” (Davies, 1997). During the course 
of the interviews, new themes emerged leading to the introduction of new questions (Bryman, 
2012). Moreover, the interview questions were not completely fixed from the beginning. As 
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recommended by Seale et al. (2004), the researcher updated and refined the interview guide 
with the observations of previous interviews as she moved from one interviewee to another.  
Finally, in order to facilitate the transcription process, all interviews were voice recorded 
through appropriate software for face-to-face meetings, Skype and telephone calls.  
  
3.5.1.1 Preparation and structure of the interview guide 
During the preparation phase of the interviews, the professional information about the 
interviewees (their role, position, published papers and books, company information etc.) was 
collected and used to adapt and personalise the interview (Moyser, 1988). Additionally, and as 
previously discussed, the semi-structured interview guide was refined from one interview to the 
other (Seale et al., 2004). The interview guide was organised around the set of topics that 
needed to be covered to answer the research question: legitimation as the core theme, plus the 
role of system builders, the influence of other functions and relevant factors as suggested in TIS 
literature (Bergek et al., 2008a; Bergek et al., 2008b; Hellsmark & Jacobsson, 2009; Hekkert et 
al., 2011).  Following Bryman’s (2012) recommendations, the researcher avoided  directly 
formulating the research question in order to prevent the premature close off of alternative 
avenues.  Additionally, the proposed questions followed the principle of being as simple as 
possible, avoiding double barrelled questions or questions with academic or unfamiliar terms 
(Bryman, 2012). 
As Charmaz et al. (2012) point out, the different stages of the interview lead to different 
types of questions:  at the beginning of the interview, initial open-ended questions were asked 
in order to gather as much information as possible and to give the interviewee an opportunity 
to recall from his or her personal experience.  As the interview advanced, more specific or 
intermediate questions were asked.  Finally, the interview was typically closed with an ending 
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question, where the interviewee could summarise his or her views and feel free to talk on any 
important aspect not yet covered. 
As previously discussed, the research guide was structured around legitimation and the 
core functions and factors suggested by TIS literature (Bergek et al., 2008a; Bergek et al., 2008b; 
Hellsmark & Jacobsson, 2009; Hekkert et al., 2011). Following this, the interviews first focussed 
on the visions and expectations of participants (function guidance on the direction of the 
search).  Then, the discussion moved into exploring how knowledge creation and 
entrepreneurial activities were conceived and how they contributed to reinforcing legitimation.  
After this, the discussion moved to acceptance and legitimation of the innovation: whereas in 
the CFD case study, these discussions were more explorative (how resistance was overcome, 
why do you think customers adopted CFD?), in the mHealth case study, they evolved into more 
specific enquiries (reasons behind reported barriers, type of actions contributing most to the 
acceptance of their products, regulatory/cultural barriers and actions to overcome them etc.).  
After the legitimation block, the discussion centred on the extent of individual and collective 
system building capabilities. Finally, a closing question was asked to ensure that no relevant 
accounts from interviewees were missing.   
Following on from the discussed interview guide, the next two sections discuss the 
particularities of the questionnaires for the CFD and mHealth case studies. 
3.5.1.1.1.1 Interview guidelines for the CFD case study 
The main purpose of the CFD interviews ,was to gather information on how CFD legitimated and 
created a new unintended market that provides breakthrough solutions to different industries 
such as automotive, aerospace or nuclear. To do so, the main actors involved in the 
development of CFD were asked a set of common questions around their motivations to move 
from theoretical to applied CFD, the avenues they took to diffuse knowledge across different 
industries or the adopted strategies to overcome resistance and scepticism. Additionally, and 
depending on the role of the participant, further more specific questions were formulated. The 
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table below shows examples of interview questions organised by topic according to the 
interview guide. 
 
Table 3-4 Interview guidelines for CFD case study. 
Topic Question examples Objectives 
Introduction ▪ I’ve heard you founded (the first/one of 
the first) CFD companies in (USA/UK) 
(silence) 
▪ I’m very pleased that you accepted this 
interview as you are considered by 
many as one of the top contributors to 
the development of CFD (silence) 
▪ Do you remember any other key 
players? 
▪ Break the ice 
▪ Complete actors and 
networks map for CFD 
▪ Get the contact of 
additional participants 
 
 
Visions and 
expectations 
(influence in the 
direction of 
search function) 
▪ What were your motivations to 
develop CFD as an applied discipline  or 
found a CFD company? 
▪ Did you have any breakthrough or 
‘Aha!’ in terms of…” this is going to be 
something big”? 
▪ What made you change from a 
business model based on consultancy 
to a business model based on 
proprietary software? 
 
▪ Contrast different visions, 
expectations and 
appropriable conditions 
around the innovation 
 
 
Knowledge 
development 
and 
entrepreneurial 
activities 
▪ I’ve heard that Los Alamos and Imperial 
College were working on the same 
solutions without knowing  each 
other… 
▪ What avenues did you take to show the 
industry the capabilities of your code? 
 
▪ Understand how theoretical 
knowledge moved into 
applied knowledge  
Legitimation ▪ Was there any resistance or scepticism 
about CFD? From who? 
▪ How was resistance overcome? 
▪ What industries accepted it first and 
why?  
▪ Who were the laggards? Why? 
▪ Looking back, it seems that there hasn’t 
been much innovation on CFD since the 
first commercial products 40 years 
ago…why do you think this happened? 
▪ Understand legitimation 
barriers and inducement 
factors 
▪ Unfold legitimation 
mechanisms and 
legitimation strategies 
▪ Understand why after 
technological closure in the 
1980s, no major 
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breakthroughs have 
occurred 
System builders ▪ How important do you think Spalding’s 
vision and leadership was for the 
development of commercial CFD? 
▪ Why do you think the T3 group was not 
interested in applied CFD? 
▪ Analyse the extent of 
system building capabilities 
Closing ▪ In your opinion, what were the key 
drivers that contributed most to the 
success of CFD? 
 
▪ Gather additional relevant 
information  
 
 
 
3.5.1.1.1.2 Interview guidelines for the mHealth case study 
The great variety of roles in the mHealth case study resulted in a number of different guidelines 
created for the different profiles (entrepreneurs, incumbents, practitioners, regulators, ICT 
entrants etc.). As one of the purposes was to contrast their visions and expectations on mHealth, 
most of the questions regarding this topic were formulated to all participants. Regarding the 
questions on legitimation, a set of more specific questions were formulated to entrants and 
entrepreneurs. These included aspects like: collaboration with third parties, activities and 
strategies to get products acceptance, compliance with existing regulations, cultural barriers, 
the use of clinical trial and evidence base protocols, involvement of practitioners in the product 
development etc. The table below shows examples of some of the formulated questions 
organised by topic according to the interview guide. 
 
Table 3-5 Interview guidelines for mHealth case study. 
Topic Question examples Objectives 
Introduction ▪ What are - in your opinion - the main 
benefits that mHealth can bring? 
▪  Many voices, including the WHO claim 
that mHealth will be a revolution in 
healthcare. Do you agree with this 
statement? (Why?) 
 
▪ Break the ice 
▪ Allow interviewee to 
provide his overall position 
on mHealth as an 
innovation 
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Visions and 
expectations 
(influence in the 
direction of 
search function) 
▪ What were your motivations to enter in 
the mHealth arena? 
▪  When do you estimate 
that mHealth will become part of the 
mainstream healthcare practice? 
▪  Who,  in your opinion,  will lead the 
change?  
▪ Do you foresee a big bang change, or on 
the contrary, more of a slow and 
gradual change?   
▪ In what manner do you believe  
mHealth will transform the role of 
healthcare practitioners?  
▪    In what manner you 
think  mHealth will transform the 
landscape of the healthcare industry?  
 
▪ Contrast different visions, 
expectations and 
appropriable conditions 
around the innovation 
 
Knowledge 
development 
and 
entrepreneurial 
activities 
▪ What avenues do you take to show to 
your potential customers the benefits 
of your product? 
▪ Do you involve practitioners or patients 
in the development of your product? 
▪ Healthcare is an evidence-based 
practice.  What type of studies do you 
conduct to probe the efficiency and 
reliability of your products? 
 
▪ Understand the 
contribution of knowledge 
creation and 
entrepreneurial activities 
into legitimation   
Legitimation ▪ What are,  in your opinion,  the main 
barriers that are preventing a wider 
acceptance of mHealth? 
▪ Where is resistance coming from?    
▪ What are the main barriers you face to 
put your product in the market? 
▪  From your experience, what 
activities/strategies contribute most to 
get your products accepted? 
▪ Do your products represent a big 
change in respect to current 
practitioners’ and patients’ routines? 
▪  Are your products compliant with 
existing regulation?  
 
▪ Understand current 
legitimation barriers and 
inducement factors 
▪ Unfold legitimation 
mechanisms  
▪ Analyse different strategies 
by different groups of 
stakeholders 
(entrepreneurs, 
incumbents, big entrants 
etc.) 
System builders ▪ As an expert, how likely do you 
consider that entrepreneurs can 
succeed in a complex innovation 
ecosystem such as healthcare?  
▪ Are you associated to any other 
entrepreneurs, SMEs or big 
companies? 
▪ Analyse the extent of 
system building capabilities 
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▪ How useful do you find the mHealth 
networks such as HIMMS, mHealth 
alliance etc.? 
Closing ▪ In your view as an expert, is there any 
particular strategy that mHealth 
entrepreneurs should take to get their 
products in the market? 
▪ What missing policies, would in your 
opinion, foster a more rapid adoption 
of mHealth? 
▪ If you (as an entrepreneur) could have 
your time again, would you change 
anything in respect to what you’ve 
done so far? 
▪ Gather additional relevant 
information  
 
 
 
3.5.2 Participant observation  
Participant observation refers to a data collection method in which the observer gets involved 
in the daily life of the actors under study (Spradley, 2016). The researcher’s participation can be 
either open in her researcher’s role or secret in a masked role. Additionally, her involvement 
can vary from being a full member of the group under research, to being a participating observer 
(where she participates in the activities of the group) or even to being a non-participant 
observer (where the interaction with the group members is minimal)  (Bryman, 2012). 
For the mHealth case study, together with the 20 semi- structured interviews, the 
researcher took a participant observer role in 3 different congresses: the European mHealth 
Summit 2015 in Riga (Latvia) and the UK eHealth weeks 2016 and 2017 in London. The degree 
of participation varied across the different events. In the European mHealth Summit in Riga, the 
researcher was accepted by the organisers as a volunteer, which gave her access to the speakers 
and exhibitors as well as attendance at sessions, workshops and stakeholders meetings. The 
researcher informed them about the scope and content of the study and the organisation 
granted the researcher permission to record the sessions and conduct informal interviews.  As 
an example, the researcher was allowed to record an important stakeholders’ meeting with top 
EU regulators, healthcare practitioners and ICT and pharma industry lobbyists discussing the 
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mHealth code of conduct.  In the UK eHealth weeks in London, the role of the researcher was 
more as a non-participating observer (Bryman, 2012), with interaction limited to attendance at 
different sessions of interest and informal conversations with speakers and exhibitors. 
All the field notes from the observations were written in a diary and the sessions of 
interest were recorded and incorporated to the data analysis.  
 
3.5.3 Documents  
 
The term “documents” includes a wide variety of different type of sources like personal 
documents, official public and private documents, mass- media-outputs, Internet resources etc. 
(Bryman, 2012). For the present research several documentary sources like market reports, 
institutional position papers, regulations, commercial presentations, books or academic papers 
related to the technologies under study etc. were analysed.  All documents mentioned and 
scrutinised were produced without the researcher’s intervention and for different purposes 
other than the present research.  
 
The objective of incorporating documents in the research was to count on a 
complementary source of data.  As Bowen (2009) states: “Documents provide background and 
context, additional questions to be asked, supplementary data, a means of tracking change and 
development, and verification from other data sources. Moreover, documents may be the most 
effective means of gathering data when events can no longer be observed or when informants 
have forgotten the details.” (Bowen, 2009. p.36). 
The documents were analysed using qualitative context analysis, a method that refers to 
the search of underlying themes from the documentary sources (Bryman, 2012).  In order to do 
so, a hermeneutic perspective was adopted.  As Atkinson and Coffey (2004) argue, documents 
should not be taken as ‘transparent representations’ of reality. They should be examined in the 
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context in which they are produced and taking into account the purpose for which they were 
created. Therefore, document content analysis in this research followed a hermeneutic 
approach, as in the words of Bryman (2012): “…a qualitative content analysis can be 
hermeneutic when it is sensitive to the context within which the texts were produced.” (Bryman, 
2012. p. 560). 
3.6 Data analysis  
The overall objective of data analysis was to generate themes around the topics related to the 
main research question: the legitimation of BTIs. In particular, the researcher looked for 
patterns, processes, shared and divergent views present in participants’ responses, 
observations and analysed documents. Consequently, data analysis was conducted using 
thematic analysis. Thematic analysis is an approach that focuses on extracting key themes from 
data. It is widely used in most of the qualitative strategies including grounded theory, critical 
discourse analysis, qualitative content analysis or narrative analysis (Bryman, 2012).  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, this research took a critical realist approach aimed 
at explaining causal mechanisms through the analysis of events, interactions and perceptions of 
actors involved in the TIS (Wynn &Williams, 2012; Ackroyd, 2009; Easton, 2010; Mingers, 2004). 
Therefore, thematic analysis constitutes an appropriate technique to identify the underlying 
mechanisms in the legitimation of BTIs. 
As Yin (2003) recommends, data in multiple-case study needs to be analysed fully and 
separated before performing any comparative analysis. In consequence, each case study was 
initially analysed independently from each other. Following the same principle, the interviews, 
field notes and documents of each case study were also analysed separately. All the pieces of 
data were transcribed and uploaded into NVIVO 10, producing an initial set of codes that were 
grouped into 4 pre-defined areas of investigation.   
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As previously discussed in section 2.6.4 of the literature review chapter and illustrated in figure 
2-7, legitimation  (the focus of this research)  does not occur as an isolated phenomenon, but 
through the influence of the following main dynamics:  
(i) the capabilities of system builders to create structural processes like accumulation 
of knowledge and artefacts, entry of firms and other organisations, formation of 
alliances and networks and institutional alignment (Hellsmark & Jacobsson, 2009; 
Hellsmark, 2010). 
(ii) the positive (or negative) influence of other TIS functions such as guidance in the 
direction of search, knowledge development or entrepreneurial activities (Bergek 
et al., 2008b; Hekkert et al., 2011; Hellsmark & Jacobsson, 2009; Bergek et al., 2015). 
(iii)  external factors like landscape factors or the development of related TIS (Bergek et 
al., 2008b; Hellsmark & Jabobsson, 2009; Hekkert et al., 2011; Markard et al., 2016).   
 
In consequence with the above discussion, and as figure 3-5 shows, the areas of 
investigation in the research were: area of investigation1: system building capabilities; area 
of investigation 2: TIS functions; and area of investigation 3: external factors. In addition to 
these, a 4th area of investigation named legitimation, was added. This 4th area of 
investigation collects participants’ accounts on perceived legitimation barriers and drivers 
and developed strategies to build legitimacy.  In a first and second read of all collected data, 
information was coded around these four areas of investigation. 
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Figure 3-5 Research areas of investigation. 
 Once the initial codes were added to the areas of investigation, codes were added to more than 
one area of investigation when pertinent, a second and third round of analysis led to the 
categorisation and identification of emergent themes. Following Bryman’s (2012) definition of 
a theme, the ones identified in the research met the following criteria: “(i) [it is] a category 
identified by the analyst through his/her data, (ii) that relates to his/her research focus […] and 
(iii) that provides the researcher with the basis for a theoretical understanding of his or her data 
that can make a theoretical contribution to the literature relating to the research in 
focus.”(Bryman, 2012, p. 580). 
 As figure 3-6 shows, the fourth and subsequent readings led to a nested theme structure with 
1st, 2nd and 3rd level themes organised from broader (1st level) to more specific (2nd and 3rd level). 
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Figure 3-6 Representation of code structure for an area of investigation. 
The data analysis phase concluded once saturation was reached. As Lincoln & Guba (1985) 
pointed out, saturation refers to “the point of redundancy” where no new findings are obtained 
or no new themes or categories can be identified or reorganised.   
 
3.7 Reliability and validity 
According to Bryman (2012), reliability and validity constitute the two main criteria to evaluate 
social research. Reliability refers to the consistency of the measures that are devised to gauge a 
concept and on whether the obtained results are repeatable at a different point in time. Validity, 
on the other hand, refers to the integrity of the conclusions of the research. Bryman (2012) 
distinguishes 3 different types of validity: measurement validity (also known as construct 
validity) that reflects whether the defined measures reflect the concepts they are measuring, 
internal validity that relates to the issue of whether the causal relations between variables are 
sustained or not, and external validity that deals with the question of whether the results of a 
study are generalisable beyond its research context. 
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Reliability, validity and external validity in particular, are important issues for the case 
study method since data is generated in a limited sample within a specific context (Gray, 2013). 
As a consequence, the case study method has been criticised as a method to generate theory 
(Tellis, 1997). Conversely, case study scholars like Yin (2003) and Williams (2000) consider that 
validity and reliability criteria are met as the aim in a case study methodology is to engage in a 
theoretical analysis from rich and in-depth data examination.  Moreover, Eisenhardt (2007) 
argues that case studies that build theory are among the most cited pieces in Academy of 
Management Journal with “impact disproportionate to their numbers.” (Eisenhardt, 2007, p. 
25).  
Nevertheless, the aim of the present research is not to generate new theory from a 
multiple case study design, as much as to contribute to TIS literature by unfolding the 
mechanisms and strategies that lead to the legitimation of BTIs. For that purpose, validity and 
reliability have been enhanced by using TIS as a starting point for data analysis, as well as by 
binding emergent themes to additional literature. As Eisenhardt (1989) contends: “…overall, 
tying the emergent theory to existing literature enhances the internal validity, generalisability 
and theoretical level."(Eisenhardt, 1989. p.545). 
Additionally, as Yin (2003) argues, multiple data sources contribute to provide research 
validity. This approach of using multiple data sources is known as triangulation. Although 
triangulation is mainly associated with a quantitative research strategy, it can also take place in 
qualitative research (Bryman, 2012).  As previously discussed in the data collection section, this 
research made use of interviews, participant observation and document analysis to enrich data 
validity.  
Data reliability, related to the consistency between the concepts under research and the 
measures used to gauge these concepts, requires the accurate description of concepts under 
examination to ensure that the results can be accepted as valid representations of the data 
(Maxwell, 1996). This was achieved through providing an in-depth description of the context of 
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the two case studies (that will be presented in the next two chapters) through a number of 
different data sources. Additionally, the technique of member checks (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) 
was applied. This technique is based on asking feedback to the people being studied about 
collected data and conclusions (Maxwell, 1996). This was accomplished during the interviews 
and further post-interview communications. 
3.8 Research ethics  
This research complies with the ethical procedure of the University of Reading, and all required 
measures were taken during the data collection phase to guarantee the participants’ consent, 
confidentiality and data protection.  
In the first place, and regarding informed consent, all interviewees were presented with 
a summary of the study that included the scope and purposes of the study. Also, it was explicitly 
mentioned that their identities and company names would remain totally anonymous. In the 
case of Brian Spalding, internationally known as the father of commercial CFD (Runchal, 2009), 
the researcher got approval from the interviewee to disclose his name. As the figure of Brian 
Spalding is of high relevance to understand how CFD legitimated, his name appears several 
times in data analysis and discussion. Secondly, the interviewees were asked before each 
interview if they agreed to being recorded. Additionally, the interviewees were also asked for a 
verbal consent to take part in the research during the interview that was recorded. For the 
sessions in the European mHealth Summits in Riga and London, the researcher requested verbal 
permission from the HIMMS Organisation and speakers to record the sessions. All collected data 
(including recordings, notes and transcriptions) was kept locked at all times and did not circulate 
in accordance with the ethical guidance of the University of Reading. 
Finally, confidentiality in the present document was guaranteed as the participants’ 
names were totally anonymised by the use of generic titles referring to the quotes used in the 
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data analysis chapter (i.e. entrepreneur, pharmaceutical company rep., European institution 
rep. etc.). 
3.9 Conclusions 
This chapter has detailed the methodological choices and research design made by the 
researcher to explore the legitimation dynamics of BTIs. As discussed in section 3.2.1, the 
theoretical grounds of the study and the nature of the research questions suggest a critical 
realist approach (Bhaskar, 1989).  
The proposed method is a multiple case study for two different BTIs: CFD and mHealth. 
The research parameters for both case studies were discussed in section 3.4. A thematic analysis 
on three different sources of data (elite interviews, participant observation and document 
analysis) was proposed to enhance validity of qualitative data (Yin, 2003).  Data analysis tools 
and strategy were also detailed in section 3.6. 
The next two chapters, chapters 4 and 5, present respectively the results of the thematic 
analysis for each case study together with a discussion in relation to relevant literature. 
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Chapter 4 - Case study 1: The origins of Computational Fluid Dynamics 
(CFD) 
4.1  Introduction  
This chapter presents the analysis of the data collected for the first case study of the research. 
The first section provides the reader with an overview of the historical evolution of 
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD), the technological field under research, from its origins in 
the 1960s to today.  From this, and with a focus on the legitimation dynamics in the formative 
phase, CFD is analysed as a TIS (Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991; Hekkert et al., 2007; Bergek et al., 
2008a) following Hellsmark and Jacobson (2009) framework on TIS dynamics. Firstly, section 4.3 
discusses the content and limits of system builders in the development of TIS structural 
processes (Hellsmark, 2010). More specifically, section 3.4.3 presents a set of technological, 
organisational, institutional and leadership factors extrapolated from the data analysis. 
Secondly, section 4.4 analyses the dynamic interplay of TIS functions and its influence to 
legitimate and develop CFD as a successful TIS. The third area of investigation, section 4.5, 
studies how external factors and related TIS impacted on the development of CFD. After that, 
in section 4.6, the study centres on legitimation, the key topic of the study. The analysis presents 
the drivers that contributed to create pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy (Suchman, 
1995). In addition, legitimation strategies are discussed. Finally, section 4.7 provides a summary 
of the main points emerging from the analysis.  
4.2 Overview of CFD: historical evolution and TIS considerations. 
As introduced in section 3.4.2.1, Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) encompasses a variety of 
software tools used to solve complex flow and heat related problems.  CFD tools are able to 
predict “what if scenarios” on how a liquid or gas will flow and how surrounding objects will be 
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affected.  Consequently, they can be used to model a diverse range of scientific and engineering 
phenomena of interest such as: turbulences, liquid and gas flows in a pipe, air flow around 
wings, ocean currents, weather, pollution, blood flow etc. (Zikanov, 2010). 
The predictive capabilities of CFD bring the possibility to develop more efficient and 
accurate engineering designs. Moreover, production costs and time to market are significantly 
reduced, as computer simulations substitute former expensive prototyping techniques like wind 
tunnel or water tank (Hanna & Parry, 2011). Therefore, the adoption of CFD gave rise to many 
radical advances that have resulted in safer, greener and cheaper products in a range of 
industries like automotive, nuclear or aerospace sectors (Johnson, Tinoco et al., 2005; Hanna & 
Parry, 2011; Gerard & Runchal, 2013; Economist, 2015).   
This section expands the context for the case study outlined in section 3.4.2.1. It 
provides the reader with a historical analysis of the evolution of CFD and a review of key 
considerations for its analysis under TIS lenses. The chronology is divided into 3 phases. The first 
phase covers the birth and early years of CFD, where two main research groups were formed 
and the first primitive ad hoc codes were developed. The second phase, starts with the 
emergence of CFD multipurpose software and the foundation of CFD companies. Finally, the 
third phase, focuses on analysing the evolution of CFD from the 1990s to present time.   
4.2.1  The formation of the main development centres and first CFD 
codes 
The science of fluid flows, dates from the 19th century when Claude Navier and George Stokes 
postulated the Navier-Stokes equations to describe fluid motion.  However, the complexity of 
the Navier-Stokes equations, makes them impractical to provide analytical solutions for most of 
flow related problems, especially when high Reynolds numbers are involved, as it is in the case 
of turbulences (Hanna & Parry, 2011).   
During the second half of the 20th century, the arrival of computers propitiated that 
different groups of researchers started to work on numerical solutions to address the Navier-
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Stokes equations. The pioneers in addressing them through numerical methods were placed at 
two distant locations, not only geographically, but also in their scientific approach, as it will be 
later explained. These groups were the T3 group in Los Alamos National Laboratory (USA) led 
by Dr Francis Harlow, and the Imperial College group (UK) led by Professor Brian Spalding.   
4.2.1.1 Los Alamos T3 lab group 
 
Los Alamos T3 lab was the first group that developed numerical codes to solve flow related 
problems (Harlow, 2004; Runchal, 2009). The first code was named PIC and produced by Dr 
Francis Harlow in 1957. The success of PIC in the lab paved the way for the formation, in 1958, 
of a dedicated fluid dynamics group with Dr Francis Harlow as the group leader.  
 The group was located in the former secret National Weapons Research Laboratory (aka 
Project Y) where the Manhattan project had been terminated a decade ago5. Hence, Harlow’s 
group was funded by the weapons research division, and as such, their initial orientation was to 
solve problems related to national defence (Harlow, 2004).  They counted with the most 
advanced computer resources at that time and produced a variety of codes  to solve specific 
physics problems as shown in figure 4-1 (Johnson, 1996). 
 
                                                          
5 See https://www.atomicheritage.org/location/los-alamos-nm 
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Figure 4-1 Main CFD codes and projects developed at Los Alamos. (Johnson, 1996, p.4) 
 During the first decade, the codes produced in the lab remained confined. The group in 
those days was primarily focused in the resolution of theoretical problems through innovative 
numeric methods. However, in 1969, the weapon funding that was supporting the lab was cut 
and the group took the decision to move from theoretical to applied CFD. With this change of 
orientation, the T3 Lab obtained new ways of funding by developing projects for different 
governmental agencies.  After a short period of time, in 1973, Tony Hirt replaced Francis Harlow 
as the lab manager. As one of the core scientists in those days, summarises: “Everything 
changed in 1969, when funding was cut. Harlow came and said to the team: ‘We have to decide 
whether we move to applied CFD or not. We will all vote: you are twelve and I have 13 votes 
(laughs).’  […] At that time, we started looking into other forms of funds. We started to 
collaborate with government agencies. Collaboration was for many years only with other 
governmental agencies. No private companies. […] We moved from experimental CFD to applied 
CFD as a matter of necessity.” (T3 Researcher). 
 The public distribution of the codes developed at the T3 group, started in the mid 1970s, 
through the US National Energy Software Centre (Runchal ,2009). However, the codes were not 
very popular at the beginning. The T3 lab manager in that period reflects the complexity of the 
codes and the difficulties that end users faced: “They weren't user friendly codes. There were 
lots of nice software but they (the users) didn't have pre-processors or big post processors, so 
they were hard to use.  They sought of an expert.  No graphical interfaces…” (T3 Lab manager).  
Aligned to that, Runchal (2009) suggests that the fact that T3 codes were developed using the 
most advanced computing capabilities at that  time, made them unaffordable for the large 
majority, who in the early days of computers, had very limited access to big and expensive 
equipment.   
 In summary, Francis Harlow and Los Alamos pioneered the development of codes for 
what it later was coined as Computational Fluid Dynamics. During more than one decade, their 
102 
 
interest remained in the realm of scientific innovation, keeping their discoveries within the 
weapon’s national lab. Later, and as a matter of necessity, they shifted their focus to applied 
CFD, looking for governmental funds to different areas other than the national defence.  As it 
will be discussed in the next sections, it wasn’t until the late 80s and early 90s, that they got in 
touch with different industries. Moreover, as a T3 lab scientist argues, it was the industry who 
looked for them:  
“Los Alamos is isolated, in the middle of nowhere. It had its own rich funding […] We lived in a 
very self-contained huge system. By the time we published more around the world, we were 
already well known. People just came…” (T3 Lab scientist).  
4.2.1.2 The thermofluids group at Imperial College  
The group at Imperial College was led by Brian Spalding, Professor of Heat Transfer and Head of 
the Thermofluids section, later renamed as Computational Fluid Dynamics Unit.  At the 
beginning of the 1960s the group consisted of Spalding plus two faculty members. However, by 
the end of the decade, the group had grown up to 30 researchers, which became the largest 
CFD research group at that time (Runchal, 2009).  During the initial years, the group worked on 
the same problems and developed similar ideas as the Los Alamos group but without knowing 
about each other.  It wasn’t until 1969 that they got in contact and shared their discoveries. 
Some of the innovations first explored by Harlow’s team were incorporated in the early codes 
developed at Imperial College (Runchal, 2009). 
 “There was Francis Harlow in Los Alamos, New Mexico…I didn’t know him. I discovered 
years later we were doing the same things, same ideas, but quite unconnected to each other.” 
(Brian Spalding). 
Despite the fact that the two groups were working on similar types of problems, the 
orientation at the Imperial College was very much applied from the beginning. They had a strong 
focus on engineering problems as Spalding envisioned that numerical methods could contribute 
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to addressing important industrial challenges, even when the results obtained were 
approximate and rough.  His scientific approach was less rigorous than Harlow’s and his group 
at the T3 Lab (Runchal, 2009).  As it will be further analysed in section 4.6, Spalding’s view of 
developing approximated solutions to solve complex problems was severely criticised in many 
academic circles.  
The Imperial College received the first IBM mainframe around 1963, almost a decade 
later than Los Alamos. In the period between 1963 and 1969, the group developed two codes: 
ANSWER and SIMPLE. Although the term CFD was not formally coined until 1972 by (Roache), 
Runchal (2009), places the birth of CFD in 1969. By that year, 1969, Spalding and his 
collaborators had already published two books with the codes (Spalding & Patankar, 1967; 
Gosman  et al., 1969) and organised a Post-Experience Course inviting both academic and 
industrialist groups.  Additionally, in the same year, 1969, Spalding founded the first CFD 
consulting company named CHAM, standing for Combustion, Heat and Mass Transfer. The 
original CHAM was superseded by Spalding in 1974 with a new CHAM standing for 
Concentration, Heat and Mass Transfer Ltd (Runchal, 2009).  
During the first years of CHAM, Spalding developed customised CFD codes for his first 
customers in the automotive and nuclear industry. By the end of the 1970s, he and his 
collaborators in CHAM developed PHOENICS, the first general purpose CFD commercial 
software, that was launched to the market in 1981. PHOENICS could predict a large range of 
scenarios involving fluid flow such as: problems on engines, fire propagation in buildings, human 
fluids, pollution distribution, rivers and ocean currents etc.6 
                                                          
6 Source: What PHOENICS is (2005) at  
http://www.cham.co.uk/phoenics/d_polis/d_docs/tr001/tr001.htm#what 
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4.2.2 General purpose codes and market take off  
In the years right after the introduction of PHOENICS by CHAM, a number of CFD companies 
were created, launching different variants of CFD software to the market.  
 
Figure 4-2 Ranking of CFD companies in the period 1984-2014. (Hanna, 2015) 
 As shown in figure 4-2, PHOENICS by CHAM, the company founded by Brian Spalding, 
was the leader in the incipient market of 1984. In the second position was FIDAP, a CFD company 
based in Illinois (USA). The researcher hasn’t found any link between FIDAP and the 
developments carried out at Los Alamos. A different case is Flow-3D, the fourth company in the 
ranking. Flow-3D was founded by Tony Hirt, the successor of Francis Harlow as lab manager in 
T3 Los Alamos. Moving up one position in the ranking, the third software, FLUENT, was launched 
in 1983 by Professor Jim Swithenbank from Sheffield University (UK). Professor Swithenbank 
adapted the main bulk of PHOENICS code and sold it to Creare Ltd., later Fluent Ltd.  (Runchal, 
2009).  Finally, a Japanese company based in Tokyo, software Cradle, occupied the fifth position 
on the list.  
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 The ranking in figure 4-2, shows that CHAM led the emerging CFD market in the 1980s.  
However, its advantage as a first mover (Kerin et al., 1992), didn’t last long. As it will be discussed 
over the next sections, CHAM (which exists today and at the time of data collection was still run 
by Professor Spalding), was the only CFD pioneer company that didn’t partner with incumbent 
engineering companies. On the contrary, the rest of the firms in figure 4-2 established different 
partnerships, went through processes of merges and acquisitions and led the growth market of 
CFD.  A good example of this, is CD-Adapco: in 1986, David Gosman and Raad Isa, two Spalding 
disciples’, founded Computational Dynamics Ltd, (CD) later acquired by Adapco Ltd to become 
CD-Adapco.  The CFD software developed by Gosman and Isa - called StarCD - presented an 
innovative methodology known as unstructured meshes, which became very popular in the 
automotive industry to solve engine combustion problems. By 1994, they were already the third 
CFD company as figure 4-2 shows. More recently, in 2016, Siemens acquired CD- Adapco for 
$970 million7.  
 Apart from CHAM and CD-Adapco, different CFD companies mushroomed out of 
Imperial College. Flomerics, as an example (see figure 4-2), was founded by Harvey Rosten and 
David Tatchell, Spalding’s disciples and former managers at CHAM.  Some other companies 
focused on niche applications like electronics and HVAC (heating, ventilation and air-
conditioning). 
4.2.3 Current status of CFD field 
 Nowadays, CFD is a market surpassing the billion dollars per year in software sales (Hanna, 
2015), with an estimated rate of average growth (CAGR) of more than 9% until 2020 (Technavio, 
2016). The principal market drivers for CFD, are the need to reduce time and costs in product 
                                                          
7 
https://www.plm.automation.siemens.com/en_gb/about_us/newsroom/press/press_release.cfm?Com
ponent=244055&ComponentTemplate=822 
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development. Aerospace and defence are the sectors contributing most to CFD revenue with 
approximately a 40% of the total market share (Technavio, 2016). These sectors are highly 
dependent on CFD as manufacturers are facing elevated levels of competition and pressure to 
reduce product development cycles. Additionally, another important sector for CFD, the 
automotive,  is making use of CFD simulations to improve engine CO2 emissions and developing 
the next generation of hybrid/electric cars (The Economist, 2015; Technavio, 2016).  Finally, the 
use of CFD in the electrical and electronics industry is increasing because of the growth in R&D, 
especially in Asian countries like China and South Korea. 
The CFD market landscape shows a high degree of fragmentation. The leading providers, 
Ansys, CD-Adapco8 and Mentor Graphics,9  coexist with a plethora of small and medium CFD 
companies primarily focused in niche solutions like HVAC, for data centres cooling (Technavio, 
2016). The market leaders, as explained in the previous section, have their origins as companies 
created close to Imperial College: CD-Adapco was initially founded by two scientists from 
Spalding’s group and Ansys, an American engineering company, acquired Fluent which is a 
version of Imperial College software distributed from Sheffield University.  
Moreover, the software and methods used today in CFD don’t differ much from those 
developed during the 80s (Runchal, 2012; Hanna & Weinhold, 2017).  As Hanna and Weinhold 
contend: “The traditional process for doing CFD has not really changed in 30 years, and the bulk 
of CFD done today (as much as 80% we estimate) complies with this accepted norm of creating 
a geometry in CAD, exporting it to a meshing tool, meshing it, setting up and running a CFD 
solver, post-processing results, going back into the geometry, altering it and continuing to do 
these design loops again and again.” (Hanna & Weinhold, 2017, p.4).   
                                                          
8 CD-Adapco was acquired by Siemens in January 2016 
9 Mentor Graphics was acquired by Siemens in November 2016 
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Following on from this, a co-founder of one of today’s CFD market leaders, argues that there 
hasn’t been any disruption since the 80s in terms of new capabilities provided by CFD: 
“I think that even the unstructured mesh has all been incremental […] some increments have 
bigger impact than others, but since then I would say that the big jump[…] the big jump secured 
the place of (CFD software). There had been a lot of new developments like a new language 
instead of using FORTRAN, people use C++, but that is not really an innovation that creates a 
revolution in application or in capability.” (Co-founder CFD leader company). 
Therefore, as Abernathy and Utterback (1975) postulated in their model of cyclical 
innovation, following  the lock-in of CFD in the 1980s, there has been a long ferment phase of 
incremental innovations as no new breakthroughs had succeeded over the last three decades. 
This stagnation in the innovation path for CFD, appeared as an emergent theme during the data 
analysis phase and it will be further developed over the next sections of this chapter. As the 
experts participating in the study reflected, different root causes contributed to it. These include 
the complexity of the physics involved in flow dynamics, the consequent difficulty to change 
established practices, or the elimination of the knowledge networks between academics and 
industry.   
As an example, Brian Spalding, recurrently emphasised how inertia in securing adopted 
practices hindered the introduction of new innovations, and how adopters, at the same time, 
take established practices as an unquestionable given for granted: 
“Yes, that's when innovation came and it is still going (in the 1970-80s).  I'm hoping for a new 
kind of CFD, a new practice of CFD because this success of CFD is in my mind a rather fraudulent 
success, and I see it happening here in my own company. Young people come in, they learn how 
to use the computer code and they do the calculations and they believe the results! […] People 
now, they expect the answers to be as accurate as they are used to on the solid side.” (Spalding). 
In a later excerpt of the interview, Spalding suggested that leading CFD firms do not show much 
interest in new breakthroughs.  In the same direction, the creator of one of the first prominent 
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CFD codes, argued that the advent of commercial CFD transformed the relations between 
academy and industry and made knowledge exchange more difficult.   
 “CFD research made great strides in the 1970s. After the 1980s, there has not been significant 
advance in CFD. In my opinion, the root cause is the availability of commercial CFD products.  
[…]. Before the products came on the scene, CFD was a cottage industry. With the advent of 
commercial CFD, the cottage industry community became much smaller. Now an innovator could 
not take his/her invention directly to the users.  The innovator could publish the new idea, but it 
remained unused and largely ignored. The immediate applause was not available. This 
drastically reduced the motivation for innovation […] If most of the world is going to use CFD 
through commercial products, the innovations will have to come only from the people who work 
in the CFD software companies. Whether these people are qualified to come up with the required 
advances and whether such work makes business sense for them will determine the progress of 
CFD. “(IC researcher and founder of a CFD SME). 
The stagnation of knowledge and breakthroughs’ developments once incumbent firms 
take control and the market is stabilised, represent an interesting avenue for future research. 
Although the topic is slightly out of the scope of this research (legitimation in the formative 
phase), it opens a good opportunity to study the impact on innovation of the “asymmetric 
power relationships” (Kukk, 2016; Gulati & Stych, 2007) between system builders and big firms.  
This is further discussed in section 6.6 of the conclusions chapter. 
4.2.4 TIS considerations 
As discussed in section 3.4.3, the definition of the technological boundaries of a TIS is the 
starting point of its analysis. As discussed in section 3.4.3, the researcher needs to consider three 
types of choices: (1) the choice between a knowledge field or a product as a focusing device, (2) 
the choice between breadth and depth, and (3) the choice of spatial domain. 
The focus of this research is to analyse how CFD legitimated as a new practice across 
different industries. Therefore, the knowledge field of CFD is considered, as the study is not 
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limited to a particular code. Different products like PHOENICS, Fluent, Flow-3D or Star-CD have 
been analysed. Moreover, the research is not restricted to any particular target industry and all 
sectors that adopted CFD have been considered for the analysis. Finally, the spatial domain is 
primarily focused around the two main CFD research centres: the T3 Laboratory at Los Alamos 
(USA) and the Heat Transfer Unit at the Imperial College (UK). 
Once the boundaries of the technology in scope are defined, Bergek et al. (2008), 
propose to identify the main structural components of the TIS. As described in section 2.6, the 
structural components of a TIS are: actors, networks and institutions.  
Actors include individuals, firms and organisations that contribute to the development of the 
TIS such as universities, research institutes, public bodies, industrial associations, venture 
capitalists etc. As discussed in section 2.6.1, system builders (Hughes, 1987) are a critical subset 
of actors that contribute most to developing TISs and building legitimacy: they create new 
sources of capital, work with regulators and incumbents, persuade adopters or solve problems 
when one part of the system does not develop in step with the rest (Palm &Fallde, 2016). System 
builders can develop their capabilities individually or collectively.  As Musiolik et al. (2012) 
contend, in the very early phases of the innovation process or in highly institutionalised 
contexts, system building will most likely succeed as a collective effort.  
Networks are constituted by the non-market relations between actors. They include 
formal and informal associations, like standardisation networks, professional networks, public–
private partnerships, industry-university links etc. Networks can have different purposes like the 
development and diffusion of knowledge, market formation or the development of system 
building capabilities to influence and change the prevailing institutional framework (its norms, 
regulations, practices etc.).  
Institutions, regulate the relations between actors, networks and firms (Hekkert et al., 
2011). They can be formal like: regulation, laws, policies, business models etc. and informal like: 
culture, beliefs, norms, routines and practices. 
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Table 4-1 presents the main TIS structural components considered for this study. The 
actors column, lists the profiles of the main actors including, key researchers and group leaders 
at Los Alamos and Imperial College, scientists involved at Cambridge and Sheffield Universities, 
founders and key staff at pioneer and incumbent companies like CHAM, Fluent, Star-CD and 
Flow Sciences,  early industrial adopters, such as the UK National Nuclear Corporation, General 
Motors, Canon etc.  The networks column, shows the different formal and informal associations 
like NAFEMS and ERCOFTAC, organisations oriented to the development of CFD best practices 
and standards, the links between the development centres and the industry including post-
experience courses, conferences etc. Finally, the institutions column, presents the main formal 
and informal institutions taken into account. These include culture, norms and regulations at 
the main research centres, software patents norms, business models etc.  
Actors Networks Institutions 
• T3 National lab researchers 
• Imperial College researchers 
• Sheffield University 
researchers 
• Cambridge University 
researchers 
• T3 group leaders 
• Imperial College leader  
• CFD firm founders and key 
staff (CHAM, Fluent, Star-
CD, Flow Sciences) 
• University – industry 
networks 
•  Intra academic 
networks 
• Post-experience 
courses 
• T3 National lab links 
• NAFEMS 
• ERCOFTAC 
 
 
• T3 Laboratory norms, 
culture, US National Labs 
regulation 
• Imperial College norms, 
culture and regulation 
• Sheffield norms, culture 
and regulation 
• Software patents 
• Business models 
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• Incumbent engineering 
firms (Creare, Adapco, 
Ansys) 
• Early industrial adopters 
Table 4-1 Structural components of CFD as a TIS. 
4.3 Area of investigation 1: System building capabilities and 
development of TIS structural processes  
This area of investigation addresses the extent and limits of system builders in the development 
of TIS structural processes.  As defined in section 2.6, system builders are a key class of actors 
that play a critical role in the formative phases of a TIS. System builders act as institutional 
entrepreneurs and with their transformative capacity, they align institutional forces such as 
norms, culture or regulations in the best interest of the innovation (Kukk et al., 2016).  As 
Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2009) argue, the role of system builders in the formative phase is 
twofold. First, they contribute to create four main structural processes in the TIS: (i) 
accumulation of knowledge and artefacts, (ii) entry of firms and other organisations, (iii) 
formation of alliances and networks, and (iv) institutional alignment. Second, and as a 
consequence of the development of the TIS structural processes, system builders also 
strengthen TIS functions like knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation, 
legitimation etc.   
As discussed, this section focuses on the analysis of the development of the four TIS 
structural processes defined by Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2009). Its impact in the development 
and performance of TIS functions is analysed in section 4.4.  
4.3.1 System building capabilities at Los Alamos 
Los Alamos National Laboratory was very advanced in accumulation of knowledge and 
technology.  They counted on cutting-edge computing resources, and Frank Harlow and his 
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group are credited for being the first scientists who developed algorithms and codes to solve 
turbulences and other complex flow related problems (Johnson, 1996). Moreover, some of their 
findings were later incorporated in the first commercial codes produced at Imperial College 
(Runchal, 2013). However, data suggests that the T3 Lab at Los Alamos, as a group, didn’t act as 
system builders during the formative phase of CFD. The lab remained for many years as an 
isolated and self-contained research centre oriented to solving complex theoretical problems. 
As it will be presented in this section, participant’s accounts point to a combination of 
organisational, cultural and legal factors leading to their isolation and lack of interest in 
developing a commercial use for CFD, at least during its formative phase (1970s and early 
1980s). 
As discussed in section 4.1, the Los Alamos T3 Lab was founded as a spin-off of the 
Manhattan project, probably one of the most secret projects in contemporary history.  As the 
Atomic Heritage Foundation explains: “Los Alamos, New Mexico was the site of Project Y, or the 
top-secret atomic weapons laboratory directed by J. Robert Oppenheimer. The site was so secret 
that one mailbox, PO Box 1663, served as the mailing address for the entire town. The mountains 
allowed the scientists ample opportunity to relax by skiing, swimming and hiking. But they spent 
most of their time in laboratories, overcoming challenge after challenge to develop the Little Boy 
(gun-type) and Fat Man (implosion) atomic bombs.”10 
As one of the T3 researchers declares, after separating from the weapons division in the 
1960s, the lab maintained their orientation as a theoretical research centre focused in finding 
innovative paths to solve complex physical problems. They still benefited from generous funds 
and didn’t perceive the need to guide their research towards applied research. 
“We were at Los Alamos and it is a weapons laboratory, you know, the theoretical division 
started as a one of the main divisions, and it was actually where the first atomic bomb was 
                                                          
10 Source: https://www.atomicheritage.org/location/los-alamos-nm 
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designed and even though  [...]But then in the probably 60s, the weapons division separated, so 
T3 division became just scientist and really not fully tighten with the weapons program […] but 
still benefited from the money flow. And that is maybe what did Los Alamos very different from 
Imperial College […] (We) had lots of money.  The funding issues only came in the last maybe 
decade or so, and apart to that there was infinite computer resources to try things and funding.” 
(T3 Lab researcher). 
The above sentiment is shared by another researcher: 
“At the beginning there was no interest in going to the industry. We were a funded lab.  Spalding 
went to the industry but we didn't.” (T3 Lab researcher). 
 However, later on, in 1969, the weapons fund was cut and Francis Harlow took the 
decision to shift into applied CFD to provide financial support for the lab. As the researchers 
indicated, they only were allowed to be involved in governmental projects.  Any engagement in 
private or commercial activity was forbidden by law.  The Federal Technology Transfer Act, 
allowing US government agencies and universities to work with private companies, was not 
approved until 1986. As the manager of the T3 Lab in those days declared: 
“We were not allowed, as a government laboratory, to do any work for private companies, only 
with government agencies.” (T3 Lab manager). 
 Another T3 scientist suggested that even after the Federal Technology Transfer Act, 
they had limitations in the type of companies they could be involved with: “Our relationships 
with the industry were always very careful to work with industries that had nothing to do with 
weapons or other countries that were purely American countries.” (T3 Lab researcher). 
 The collaboration of the T3 Lab with other academic and research centres was also 
unusual in the early days.  An interesting exception, is the travel that Brian Spalding and some 
of his collaborators from Imperial College did around 1968-1969.  Both groups had been working 
on the same problems for some years without knowing about each other. According to Runchal 
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(2013), one of the IC scientists, Brian Spalding incorporated some of the algorithms learnt at Los 
Alamos into PHOENICS, the first CFD commercial code. 
  Related to this, all the participants from the T3 Lab, mentioned that a more proactive 
collaboration with other research centres or a higher visibility of T3 discoveries were probably 
hampered by the fact that the group leader, Francis Harlow, didn’t travel:    
“Brian Spalding said at one time that he gave Harlow the credit for having first developed the 
turbulence transport, but I think his reputation is based on that. I mean, he is identified with 
those equations and I think Frank is much less visible to people and the reason is that Frank never 
travels. He never leaves Los Alamos: he didn't go to meetings, he doesn't give talks [...]You know, 
people comes to Los Alamos to talk to him. He doesn't travel.” (T3 Lab researcher). 
“Frank Harlow and Brian Spalding hit upon the same kind of thing including the critical 
phenomena of turbulence into the computation. […] But Harlow did not travel. So, Brian Spalding 
came to Los Alamos, and spent time and shared with all T3 […] and you know, through David 
Gosman who was at that time very close friend with Tony Hirt, we kept that connection up. It 
was...you know....it was competition, but it was stimulating as well.” (T3 Lab manager).  
 The first reported collaboration of the T3 Lab with the industry happened around the 
mid 1980s. General Motors requested the participation of the T3 Lab in an automobile 
consortium, that later would be named USCAR11.  KIVA,  the T3 Lab code for reactive flow and 
combustion modelling,  had just been presented in a contest organised by the National Science 
Foundation. By that time, as explained in section 3.2, the CFD market had already taken off, with 
several CFD companies selling software and services, few of them in partnership with 
incumbents like Creare and Adapco. 
                                                          
11 According to USCAR website ( http://www.uscar.org/guest/about),  its origins date back to 1984 when 
Chrysler Group, Ford and General Motors acknowledged the need of collaboration as their competitors 
overseas (Japan and Europe) were doing. 
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“About that time, the company was realising what the National Labs could bring. […] They were 
trying to encourage the National Labs to work with industry. […] They formed a consortium 
between the National Labs and the car companies called USCAR (*). And USCAR was formed by 
General Motors and the big three (companies) in the automotive sector and they were doing 
business with the labs and the labs brought various thundering novel things to the automotive 
industry.  We brought the Computational Fluid Dynamics. […] I think it was General Motors 
maybe being the first one. They could work on our computing codes, and they could do it 
themselves…” (T3 Lab manager). 
 In summary, despite their seminal contribution to knowledge, the Los Alamos T3 Lab 
didn’t act as system builders during the formative phase of CFD. Table 4-2 summarises their 
level of achievement in the creation of the four structural processes as defined by Hellsmark 
and Jacobson (2009).  Evidence shows that despite their relevant role in knowledge 
accumulation, they didn’t significantly contribute to create networks, establish alliances, attract 
firms or align the institutional environment.  
 
Processes developed by 
system builders 
(Hellsmark & Jacobsson, 
2009) 
Degree of accomplishment 
at Los Alamos 
Data evidence 
Accumulation of 
knowledge and artefacts 
 High ▪ Highly skilled scientists  
▪ Cutting-edge computing resources  
▪ First pre -CFD codes developed at 
Los Alamos 
▪ Algorithms of commercial CFD 
codes developed at Los Alamos 
 
Entry of firms and other 
organisations 
Low ▪ Theoretical lab: no interest in 
industrial problems 
▪ Self-contained environment: lab 
originally funded as part of a secret 
project 
▪ Legal constrains: National labs not 
allowed to be involved in 
commercial activities before 1986 
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Formation of alliances 
and networks 
Low ▪ Self-contained environment: lab 
originally funded as part of a secret 
project  
▪ Group’s leader didn’t travel  
Institutional alignment Low ▪ Lack of interest in industrial 
problems 
▪ Legal constrains: National labs not 
allowed to be involved in 
commercial activities before 1986 
Table 4-2 Development of system building structural processes at T3 Lab. Adapted from (Hellsmark &Jacobsson, 
2009). 
 As previously discussed , evidence points to a combination of factors that involve 
organisational, insitutional (norms, culture etc.) and leader’s preferences. The organisational 
factors include the orientation of the T3 Lab, as a theoretical laboratory dedicated to solving 
complex theoretical problems or the culture of working in an isolated and self-contained 
environment. Institutional factors refer to the legal limitations of the lab to be involved in 
commercial activities12. As an example reported by one of the participants, entrepreneurial 
activities were prohibited and scientists had to leave the lab before they could start any 
entrepreneurial venture. This was the case of the lab manager in the early 1980s, who  left his 
position in the lab and founded a CFD company named Flow-3D. Finally, as participants pointed 
out, leaders’ preferences, like the fact that Francis Harlow didn’t travel, also influenced their 
low contribution  as system builders.  These factors are further analysed in section 4.3.3 once 
the data analysis for Imperial College is discussed in the next section. 
4.3.2 System building capabilities at Imperial College 
Brian Spalding and his group at Imperial College are recognised as key system builders in the 
development of CFD as a novel industrial practice.  As it is presented in this section, they were 
key agents in the development of the four main structural processes that enhanced the strength 
of CFD as a technological innovation system: accumulation of knowledge and artefacts, entry of 
                                                          
12 The Federal Technology Transfer Act allowing US government agencies and universities to work 
collaboratively with private companies was approved in 1986. 
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firms and other organisations, formation of alliances and networks, and institutional alignment 
(Hellsmark  & Jacbsson, 2009). 
 As one of Spalding’s collaborators and founder of one of the big CFD companies argues, 
the starting point as system builders was Spalding’s vision on how numerical codes could help 
the industry to solve important design problems: 
“I think Spalding is, a lot of people would credit him to be the father of industrial CFD. He started 
in this department in fact, developing a numerical methodology to solve fluid problems and he 
pioneered this field in targeting it at industrial applications. He didn’t invent CFD, there were 
other groups as in Los Alamos in the United States articulating it, who started developing 
numerical techniques before […]those were primarily driven by applications to the defence and 
nuclear explosions[…]but it was Spalding who saw the opportunity in developing or applying 
these numerical techniques to solving industrial problems.” (Spalding’s disciple and CFD 
company founder). 
 The participant’s statement is aligned to the reflection of Runchal (2009, p.4072) 
regarding Spalding’s role in the development of CFD. 
“In my view it will be true to say that Brian did not invent the ‘‘science” of CFD but he is still the 
person who honed the ‘‘art” and ‘‘technology” of CFD for engineering design and practice. In 
Newton’s words: ‘Spalding stood on the shoulder of giants and saw farther than his peers. He 
foresaw that unifying flow, heat and mass transport will lead to practical tools for engineers. He 
foresaw that looking at the physics rather than the mathematics will lead to wider acceptance 
of CFD tools. He foresaw that CFD,  once turned into to a design tool,  would revolutionise 
engineering. He foresaw that there were commercial opportunities in CFD. ‘ […] He simply found 
a way to devise a practical solution to deal with the essence of the problem.”  
 Spalding also confirms how it all started with his desire to explain the potential of 
numerical methods for industrial purposes: 
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“I saw the future approaching to express that, but not a great moment I think I would say. […] In 
any particular scientific topic, I've always seen it as: what is the use that it matters...to whom 
does it matter to solve the problem? So that's always been...to look for an interesting utility. […] 
I wanted to know, then it became that that knowledge was useful knowledge, and then I 
explained it so people could use it […] Computers came on the scene and made possible to solve 
mathematical problems that we've done with difficulty in the former way. […] I recently had to 
look at some old papers, and I’ve seen that in the conclusions I had drawn: Yes, this could be 
applied to industrial purposes.” (Brian Spalding). 
To pursue his vision, Spalding and his collaborators undertook a number of activities to 
demonstrate the possibilities of CFD. Chief among them was the publication of two books with 
two relevant CFD codes for industrial engineering : SIMPLE and ANSWER (Spalding & Patankar, 
1967; Gosman et al., 1969).  These books drew the attention of many academics and 
industrialists.  As Spalding pointed out, the publications were critical to demonstrate the 
capabilities of CFD codes and consequently, to attract more actors into CFD: 
 “The most important was to get published problems in a book, because that means others could 
do what we’ve been doing. So I think that was.... probably the most important thing.... People 
point to me as an innovator, I think we all innovated too...but they didn't spread the word around 
[…] People could buy the book and copy the program, so they could start doing themselves. […] 
I think that spread the word a lot, because they could copy it and get the same results...so that's 
an important way of communication, I think.”  (Brian Spalding).  
 Additionally, in 1969, Spalding organised a Post-Experience Course involving academics 
and industrialists.  This course was the seed for the creation of a network of academics and 
industrialists around CFD.   
“By the end of 1968, Brian had realized the potential of the developments that had taken place. 
He decided to organize a Post-Experience Course at Imperial College in 1969 targeted at both 
academic and industrial communities. The Post-Experience Course at IC in 1969 reached a large 
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number of researchers in the UK and later abroad through a series of courses and seminars at 
various universities in the US and Europe. It should also be noted that the first conference with 
CFD as its theme was held at Monterey in 1968.”(Runchal, 2013. p.4). 
The academy-industry network had a critical influence in the dissemination of 
knowledge. In the succeeding conferences, standards were developed and new ideas and 
algorithms presented.  As one of the participants reflects, the network facilitated the creation, 
refinement and adoption of new ideas between academics and final users in the industry: 
“Professors, graduate students, and even researchers in industry wrote their own computer 
programs. There was a free and vigorous exchange of ideas among the members of this cottage-
industry community. If an innovator described or published an improved algorithm or a new 
mathematical model, the others were quickly able to implement those ideas in their programs 
and get benefits.” (IC researcher and SME CFD founder). 
 In parallel to the creation of a network of academic and practitioners, Spalding founded 
CHAM in 1969. CHAM, standing for Combustion, Heat and Mass Transfer, was the first CFD 
company  (Runchal, 2009). Through CHAM, Spalding attracted firms and other organisations into 
CFD. CHAM developed ad-hoc codes and provided consultancy services. As Spalding stated, the 
automotive industry and nuclear governmental organisation were among the early adopters:  
“It was Rolls Royce and other engine companies the first to apply the technology, and nuclear 
industry of course and by now CFD is widely used elsewhere... At that time, we had the Atomic 
Energy Authority...they had no numerical capabilities, so that's how they came to us. We were 
quite big in the nuclear industry. Yes, nuclear industry was an important area.” (Brian Spalding). 
  The normative and legal framework at Imperial College, was less rigid than in the T3 
Lab. Although academic’s involvement in private activities was disliked, Spalding got permission 
to set up his company: 
120 
 
“There was certain hostility in some parts at Imperial College […] At that time I had to get 
permission to setup a company and it was Lord Penney13 who was director at that time and he 
was in favour of it and he said:’ Go ahead.’ Later on, others came who were not so approving …” 
(Brian Spalding). 
 When participants were asked about the drivers for the rapid creation of the structural 
processes around CFD, they argued that they could demonstrate the usefulness of the 
technology to solve industry problems:  
“It happened quite fast. Once people could see what the codes can do for different industries, 
aerospace were the first one, but other industries: the glass industry, the nuclear industry was 
also another user…so people began to see the uses…so I think the main catalyst was one, that 
specially our group, but also Harlow’s group later, that the industrial penetration became very 
high…our group worked forefront with the industry in getting industry realise how we could solve 
some of their problems. […] But, nonetheless one of the main factors was that the industry saw 
the usefulness of that.” (SME CFD founder). 
 In addition to proving evidence on CFD capabilities, Spalding points to the lack of 
alternatives for many industries, as another important factor for the rapid formation of CFD 
structures. In the words of Spalding:  
“It was easier in those days because there wasn’t any competition […] There was nothing […] so 
that early ideas were quickly accepted and spread out. The most important was to get published 
problems in a book, because that means others could do what we’ve been doing.” (Brian 
Spalding). 
 The participants from Imperial College reported that the alignment of CFD into existing 
industrial practices and norms occurred smoothly for most industries. As the initial codes were 
                                                          
13 Lord Penney was Rector of Imperial College in the period 1967-1973. He was a mathematician who took 
part in the Manhattan project. This research wasn’t able to verify whether his professional connections 
or expertise in related fields to CFD favoured his decision (Sources: IC website and Wikipedia) 
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developed in conjunction with industrialists to solve their specific problems, industrial qualified 
procedures and other standards and regulations were integrated into the routines of the code. 
As one CFD expert in CHAM contends: 
“I think the procedures were around since we started developing code...so you linked it to those 
basically.”  (CFD developer). 
 Finally, it is interesting to highlight the influence of Spalding’s personality and leadership 
in the formation of the TIS structural processes. As argued at the beginning of this section, his 
vision was key to lead the group towards developing applied knowledge, attracting industrialists 
and forming with them collaborative networks.  However, Spalding refused to form alliances 
with incumbent engineering companies, as other CFD companies did later. Interestingly enough, 
some of these later companies were founded by Spalding’s disciples who abandoned CHAM to 
establish their own ventures. As it will be discussed in section 4.4.5 (market formation), CFD 
startups that established alliances with incumbent engineering companies succeeded and 
became market leaders.  
 The statement below from one of Spalding’s most notorious collaborators summarises 
how his personality influenced the development of CFD: 
“Brian Spalding was certainly a man of great vision and ambition, and certainly his role was very 
important in getting things started. He had the vision on what was needed. I think from the 
bifurcation that occurred within his group, though you'll recognise, that he didn't...I mean, on 
matters of procedure and details and so on, it had to be done his way and consequently the 
group broke up with different people...David Gosman was I guess specially the person who in a 
sense benefited most in that...he formed what was the most successful company than Brian 
Spalding.” (IC researcher). 
 In summary, Brian Spalding and his team at Imperial College were key system builders, 
and as such, the group was critical in the development of the structural processes during the 
formative phase of CFD. As table 4-3 shows, they made important efforts to communicate and 
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demonstrate the capabilities of CFD to solve industrial problems. With this, more actors got into 
the TIS and networks of academics and practitioners were formed. The alignment to industrial 
practices or norms occurred smoothly as codes were developed taking into account each 
industry norm. 
 
Processes developed by 
system builders 
(Hellsmark & Jacobsson, 
2009) 
Degree of 
accomplishment at 
Imperial College 
Evidence and contributing factors 
Accumulation of 
knowledge and artefacts 
 High ▪ Large group of highly skilled 
scientists  
▪ Development of first codes 
solving engineering problems: 
ANSWER and SIMPLE (1968-
1969) 
▪ Launch of first general-purpose 
code 
Entry of firms and other 
organisations 
High ▪ Publication of books containing 
SIMPLE and ANSWER codes 
▪ Evidence on usefulness 
▪ Lack of substitution products 
▪ Post-experience courses from 
1969 onwards 
▪ Consulting and customised 
codes for early adopters 
 
Formation of alliances 
and networks 
High ▪ Post-experience courses from 
1969 onwards  
▪ Creation of a research 
community between academy 
and industry 
 
Institutional alignment High ▪ Spalding’s leadership to change 
academic norms 
▪ Collaboration in the 
development of standards 
(ERCOFTAC) 
▪ Customisation of CFD codes to 
adapt them to industrial 
procedures  
Table 4-3 Development of system building structural processes at Imperial College. Adapted from Hellsmark  and 
Jacobsson (2009) 
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4.3.3 Contributing factors to the development of system building 
capabilities 
 
The previous two subsections (4.3.1 and 4.3.2) provided the reader with evidence on the extent 
(and lack of) system building capabilities at Imperial College and Los Alamos respectively. For 
example, tables 4-2 and 4-3 outlined the degree of accomplishment in the development of TIS 
structural processes at each research centre. Therefore, whereas the previous two sections 
focussed on the “what” did system builders achieve, this section analyses the “how”, that is, it 
looks for the factors contributing to develop system building capabilities. Data analysis suggests 
that contributing factors can be grouped into four categories: (i) technological and knowledge 
driven factors, (ii) organisational factors, (iii) institutional factors and (iv) leadership factors.  
Technological and knowledge factors 
Data analysis suggests that the early and active collaboration between academics and 
industrialists was critical for the success of CFD.  As discussed, during the formative phase (1969 
onwards), there was a vigorous exchange of knowledge through the academy-industry 
networks. Additionally, establishment of CHAM by Spalding offering consulting services, 
resulted in a set of ad-hoc codes that were developed in close collaboration with industrialists. 
Interviewees pointed to the involvement of early adopters in the knowledge development 
process as a key contributor to the success of CFD. This form of actively involving customers as 
collaborators early in the innovation process is often called co-creation of knowledge. The 
extant literature on co-creation of knowledge (Lusch et al., 2007; Kristensson et al., 2008) 
suggests that involving users as co-creators produces innovations that are more easily 
implemented and perceived as of higher value by adopters. Co-creation of knowledge allows 
flexibility to adapt the innovation to customer needs, norms etc. As Ram (1987) argues, allowing 
the possibility to modify an innovation to better satisfy adopter’s needs, reduces risk and 
consequently adopter’s resistance. Therefore, co-creation of knowledge contributed directly to 
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the formation of two structural processes (Hellsmark & Jacobsson, 2009): on one hand it 
enhanced the accumulation of applied knowledge, and on the other, it contributed to build 
legitimation (as it will be further analysed in section 4.6.1) and align technology to industrial 
norms, practices and standards (institutional alignment).  
Another important contributing factor relating to the co-creation of knowledge, points 
to the fact that CFD system builders could provide evidence from the very early phases on the 
capabilities of CFD. This fact, attracted interest from industrialists, and contributed to 
strengthening the development of the other structural processes. As discussed in the literature 
review chapter, Rogers (2003), establishes 5 attributes on how an innovation is perceived by 
users. Roger’s attributes are: relative advantage, compatibility, perceived risk, trialability and 
communicability. Through the co-creation of knowledge and providing evidence on CFD 
capabilities, system builders enhanced at least three of Roger’s attributes: firstly, trialability was 
improved as potential adopters were able to test the codes themselves (for example, executing 
the codes published in books). Additionally, they could assess whether the codes were solving 
their existing problems (relative advantage). Finally, as they participated in the development of 
the methodologies, the codes proved compatible with the existing industrial practices 
(compatibility). 
Finally, another important technological factor emerging from data analysis, suggests 
that the lack of substitute products contributed to create industrial interest on CFD across 
different sectors.   
Organisational factors 
The analysis presented previously points to the critical role of organisational factors in the 
development of system building capabilities. Particularly when both groups, Los Alamos and 
Imperial College, are compared. As previously discussed, although both groups had the 
necessary resources to develop knowledge, data suggests that these were not sufficient to 
support the transformation of knowledge into innovation.  Los Alamos acted as an isolated 
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organisation, with a formal structure, rigid procedures and poor communication networks with 
other organisations. Literature suggests that these conditions obstruct the development of 
breakthrough innovations (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Utterback, 1994). In contrast, organisations 
with more flexible structures, procedures and collaboration channels are recognised for being 
more innovative (Chesbrough, 2006).  
Together with organisational structure, organisational culture is also important to 
guide the innovation process (Pinto & Prescott, 1988). Organisational culture refers to 
organisational values that are communicated through norms, artefacts, and observed in 
behavioural patterns (Hogan & Coote, 2014). The Imperial College group culture was shaped by 
Spalding’s vision: “…always think who can benefit from this knowledge, to whom it can be 
useful…”. This, in turn, translated into artefacts and behavioural patterns oriented to 
communicate knowledge (books with codes, consultancy services, post-experience courses etc.) 
and solve industrial problems creating innovative momentum. These patterns of 
communication contributed to the development of CFD structural processes, as they attracted 
more actors into the TIS resulting in the creation of academy-industry networks as was pointed 
out previously. 
Organisational factors such as organisational structure and organisational culture are closely 
related to the next two categories of contributing factors: institutional and leadership.  
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Institutional factors 
As defined in the literature review chapter, institutions refer to both formal and 
informal rules such as regulations, beliefs, values, practices, business models etc. (Bergek et al., 
2008a). Institutional rules operate at different levels: geographical, sectoral, organisational etc. 
Data analysis suggests that the institutional environments in which system builders and 
adopters are embedded play an important role in the successful or unsuccessful development 
of TIS structural processes during the formative phases of the innovation process.  Moreover, 
as it will be further analysed in sections 4.6, 5.5.3 and 6.3.1, this research evidences the 
dependency between innovation legitimation and the different institutional contexts that 
surround system builders and adopters. 
Regarding the institutional context or institutional environment in which system 
builders are embedded, data evidences, as previously discussed, that the institutional 
environment at Imperial College was less rigid than at Los Alamos. Whereas in the former there 
were no impediments to cooperate with industrial organisations or even creating startup 
ventures, in the latter it was prohibited by law until 1986. As Edquist (2001, p.6) contends, 
organisational and institutional factors are interrelated and mutually shaped: “…organisations 
can be said to be ‘embedded’ in an institutional environment or set of rules, which include the 
legal system, norms, standards, etc. But institutions are also ‘embedded’ in organisations. […] a 
lot of institutions develop inside firms. Hence, there is a complicated two-way relationship of 
mutual embeddedness between institutions and organisations, and this relationship influences 
innovation processes. “  
 Previous discussion confirms the concept of system builders “general structure” 
proposed by Hellsmark (2010).  Following on Giddens’ (1984) structuration postulates of actors 
embedded in structures, Hellsmark (2010) contends that system builders are embedded in a 
structure named general structure that enables or constrains their capabilities to address 
weaknesses and strengthen the TIS. Data analysis evidences that Los Alamos’ rigid general 
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structure had a negative impact in the transformative capacities of system builders, whereas, 
on the contrary, the more flexible general structure at Imperial College, enhanced system 
builders’ transformative capacity. 
On the adopters’ side, data analysis suggests that CFD adoption succeeded as a smooth 
process for the majority of sectors. According to data analysis, CFD early adopters were firms 
that had previously worked with Imperial College and were familiarised with the use of numeric 
solutions for the resolution of engineering problems.  Contributing factors to institutional 
alignment, point to the co-development of standards between academics and industrialists and 
the adaptation of CFD codes to fulfil organisations’ norms and practices. However, Spalding and 
other system builders indicated that they didn’t succeed in those sectors with substitutive 
products to CFD. This topic is analysed in the next section 3.3.4: limitations to system building 
capabilities.   
 
Leadership factors 
Data analysis suggests that system building capabilities are intrinsically related to leadership. 
Using a close concept to system builder, scholars like Waldman and Bass (1991) or Kanter (2006) 
highlight the importance of leaders as innovation champions.  According to Waldman and Bass 
(1991) transformational leadership is key during the initial phases of the innovation process. 
Transformational leadership is exerted if leaders accomplish four characteristics towards their 
teams: (1) individualised consideration, (2) intellectual stimulation, (3) charisma and (4) 
inspirational leadership (Bass, 1990). Participants in the study reflect that both Harlow and 
Spalding were charismatic leaders.  
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Figure 4-3 Transformational and transactional leaders. From Bass (1990, p.22) 
In consequence, data analysis suggests that leadership differences between Los Alamos 
and Imperial College relate more to leaders’ vision than to leadership style. Data analysis 
suggests that Spalding’s personal vision of applying numerical methods to solve industrial 
problems, influenced an innovative culture at the Thermofluids group, while at the same time, 
the flexible culture at Imperial College allowed Spalding to pursue his vision.  As Bass and Avolio 
(1993) argue: “the organisation's culture develops in large part from its leadership while the 
culture of an organisation can also affect the development of its leadership.” (Bass & Avolio, 
1993. p.112). 
Another interesting topic regarding leadership, relates to the influence of leaders’ 
reputation to attract actors in the TIS and create knowledge networks. Data analysis suggests 
that Spalding’s reputation in the industry was a contributing factor to the development of CFD 
structural processes. System builders’ reputation, as an aspect of personal legitimacy, is 
analysed in more depth in section 4.7. 
Figure 4-4 summarises the discussed contributing factors to the development of system 
building capabilities and CFD structural processes. 
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Figure 4-4  Contributing factors to the development of system builders’ capabilities. Developed by the author 
4.3.4 Limitations to system building capabilities 
The previous section has analysed the factors contributing to the development of system 
building capabilities and structural processes in the formative phases of a TIS. As a part of the 
discussion, it was argued that system builders embedded in rigid general structures (Hellsmark, 
2010) are less likely to exploit system building capabilities and develop TIS structural processes. 
Additionally, it was contended that co-creating knowledge and co-development of norms and 
standards, lead to a smooth institutional alignment, particularly in industries with no substitute 
products for CFD.   
However, data suggests that system builders didn’t succeed in industries where 
substitute products (primitive numeric methods), were already established. According to 
Spalding, industries like chemicals or heat exchangers haven’t yet transitioned to CFD and are 
still using much less accurate methods:  
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“There is an enormous population of heat straightening industries in the world. They are very 
important because that's where the fuel goes, that's how global warming comes and it is very 
important for the whole of us. Very interestingly, heat exchangers are to this day designed on 
what they call Pre-CFD methods. They went before into methods, bought the computers and they 
took approximatively a design of eight figures. Then, when the computers came along, those 
persons who were being using the PL methods, said: ’Ok, we can write computer programs which 
will express those results and we then decide to change heaters.’ Those who went a little bit 
more deeply into what happened inside the exchanger, derived numerical methods still not used 
to this day. It's a story...but the fact is that to this day, heat exchangers are designed in pre CFD 
methods and therefore are either too big or they are excessing someway. They are not efficient 
enough and therefore, they are heating the atmosphere […]”  (Brian Spalding). 
Spalding suggests a combination of organisational inertia and conflicting interests with 
incumbent manufacturers as the factors hampering the adoption of CFD in this sector:   
“Those who manufacture heat exchangers are smaller companies. […] There is certain inertia 
also. Things happen as they've happened before. […] I had visited them for education and they 
said: ’Yes, yes, yes... CFD is good, we should use it’, but they still don't. It is inertia. They are 
seeing it inertially. They are selling it, they wouldn't like some CFD coming and taking their 
business, so they just continue. ...why to do something different like CFD if we have something 
that it works?”  (Brian Spalding). 
The factors argued by Spalding are consistent with those described in TIS literature. 
Following on Barbalet’s (1985) work, Hellsmark (2010) points out that the transformative 
capacity of system builders in a TIS is limited by three main obstacles: (i) frictional resistance, 
(ii) intentional resistance and (iii) lack of interest in the technology. Frictional resistance refers 
to system-internal problems like inadequate networks or biases towards incumbent 
technologies into existing institutions. Intentional resistance relates to obstacles that come out 
as the intentional actions of actors with opposing interests. Finally, other barriers might come 
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not by resistance, but due to the lack of interest of actors in the technology.   Spalding’s account 
with respect to his limitations as system builder in the heat exchange industry reflects a 
combination of frictional resistance and intentional resistance.  The former comes as 
organisational inertia to maintain the use of incumbent technologies. As discussed in section 
4.2.3, CFD requires highly skilled experts to define problem’s boundary conditions and interpret 
results. This leads to difficult learning curves that could explain frictional resistance towards 
adoption if substitute products are already in place.  The latter comes by manufacturers, who 
have been exploiting incumbent technologies and perceive the entrance of new actors in their 
business as a threat. As a consequence of the difficult learning curves, CFD is a knowledge-based 
industry, where consultancy is an important part of the total revenue (Hanna, 2015).   
 To avoid intentional and frictional barriers in the heat exchanger industry, Spalding 
proposed to lower down the difficulty of CFD simulations and put technology in the hands of 
industrialists: 
“… So, there is a task as such getting done in transforming the way in which heat exchangers are 
designed and that's active on now, and it depends on making the CFD simulations easier to use…” 
(Brian Spalding). 
In summary, data suggests that in presence of substitutive products, system building 
capabilities are much more limited, and strategies that worked in industries with no substitutive 
products, for example providing evidence on technical superiority of CFD, didn’t work where 
primitive numeric methods were already established.  Data points to two main types of 
resistance: frictional (in the form of organisational inertia) and intentional (incumbents 
perceiving CFD as a threat to their businesses).   
4.4 Area of investigation 2: TIS functions  
The previous section has shown the extent and limits of system builders to develop structural 
processes during the formative phase of CFD as a TIS.  As discussed, Brian Spalding and his team 
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at Imperial College played a critical role by co-developing knowledge with industrialists, 
attracting new actors into the TIS, forming academy-industry networks and developing 
standards to align CFD codes with industry norms and practices. As a consequence of the 
development of these structural processes, TIS functions like knowledge development, 
entrepreneurial experimentation, influence on the direction of search or legitimation were also 
strengthened.  Therefore, this second area of investigation focuses on the dynamic interplay of 
the TIS functions, and in particular, how they influenced the legitimation of CFD. Aligned to the 
TIS functions discussed in section 2.6.2, this area of investigation analyses the following: 
knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation, influence on the direction of 
search, resource mobilisation, development of positive externalities and market formation.   
Legitimation, as a key topic of this research, is analysed in-depth in a separate area of 
investigation (section 4.6, area of investigation 4). 
4.4.1 Knowledge development  
Knowledge development function captures the breadth and depth of the knowledge base in the 
TIS and its evolution over time: how it is developed, diffused and combined (Bergek et al., 
2008a). This function is typically placed at the core of the TIS. Its development during the 
formative phase is a pre-requisite for legitimation (Hekkert et al., 2011). 
Bergek et al. (2008a) distinguish between different types of knowledge: scientific, 
technological, production, market, logistics, design etc. As previously outlined in sections 4.3.1 
and 4.3.2, the T3 Lab and the Imperial College group, made significant contributions to 
knowledge but in very different manners. 
The T3 Lab was key in the development of scientific knowledge. The T3 Lab started in 
1958 with 7 core members. In 1970 they grew to 15 and by 1990 there were 25 researchers 
(Johnson, 1996). A search in Google scholar yields more than 60 published articles by Harlow 
and his team in the period 1960-1970. However, as Runchal (2009) points out, the knowledge 
developed in the T3 Lab was scientific knowledge oriented towards understanding the physics 
133 
 
of the problem rather than finding solutions to complex engineering challenges.  Moreover, for 
many years, they only published their achievements in scientific journals. It was not until the 
mid-70s that the group started to distribute their codes to other research centres and 
universities. 
“Harlow made little attempt to distribute them (the codes) to outside researchers. He was more 
interested in innovative research than in disseminating his technology or spending his time 
teaching others how to use it. The excellent and path-breaking work done at Los Alamos was not 
widely used outside a select research community. It was not till Tony Hirt became leader of the 
T3 Group, around 1973, that computer programs developed at Los Alamos became generally 
available to outside researchers though the US Department of Energy distribution sites.” 
(Runchal, 2009, p. 4068). 
On the other hand, data analysis suggests that the group at Imperial College, was 
seminal in transforming scientific knowledge into different forms of technological and industry-
applied knowledge.  Despite the fact that the group at Imperial College was formed later than 
the T3 Lab, by 1969 it consisted of more than 30 researchers becoming most probably the 
largest CFD group in the world at that time (Runchal, 2009).  As previously discussed, the 
orientation of the IC group was to develop and disseminate applied knowledge. A search in 
Google scholar yields more than 80 published papers by Spalding and his team in the period 
1960-1970.  By 1969, Spalding and his group had published two books containing the source 
codes to solve practical engineering problems related to turbulences and heat and mass transfer 
(Spalding & Patankar, 1967; Gosman  et al., 1969).  
According to Spalding, the publication of the books was critical to knowledge diffusion: 
“We published two books with two computer programs and I think that made the difference. […] 
I suppose that books made us known, and as a consequence we were approached...” (Brian 
Spalding).  
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 It is interesting to mention that during those early days there were no code compilers 
or intellectual property over software, so the whole source code was distributed from the IC 
group to anyone interested.  
“We didn’t think about CFD. Somebody wanted a code, you sent it to them. Essentially, my 
supervisor in London, my external supervisor for the PhD, insisted on including the code in my 
thesis. It was a big code. He said somebody wouldn’t do the equations if he didn’t have the code. 
So I had to include it.” (IC researcher and founder of CFD SME). 
 According to Spalding, distributing the codes had a positive effect for diffusion, as users 
could try themselves testing the predictable capabilities of numeric methods. In addition to 
book publications and distribution of codes, the group at IC innovated in providing additional 
means for knowledge diffusion, like the organisation of post-experience courses since 1969: 
“I think Spalding […] he was the first one to say: ’Hey, let’s give it to the industry’ and like having 
a post experience course at Imperial College in those days was unheard of…” (CFD pioneer and 
founder of CFD SME). 
 Besides the efforts to diffuse knowledge through books, papers, conferences and 
distribution of codes, co-creation of knowledge (Lusch et al., 2007; Kristensson et al., 2008) 
between academics and industrialists was critical to lowering the legitimation barriers for CFD.  
As discussed in section 4.3.2, data analysis suggests that the co-creation of knowledge enhanced 
institutional alignment and ultimately acceptance, as CFD codes were shaped not only to solve 
customers’ problems, but also to comply with customers’ routines, practices and standards. 
 In summary, data analysis suggests that the co-creation of knowledge and the efforts to 
diffuse knowledge by Spalding and his group, is at the core of the development of the TIS. As 
discussed, the co-creation of knowledge between academics and industrialists accelerated the 
development of different forms of applied knowledge.  Moreover, it directly influenced the 
development of legitimation and other functions like entrepreneurial experimentation, 
influence on the direction of search, market formation etc. These are discussed in the following 
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sections.  
4.4.2 Entrepreneurial experimentation 
As discussed in the previous section, knowledge development influences other TIS functions, 
like entrepreneurial experimentation. Co-creation of knowledge between IC and industrialists 
succeeds not only through conferences and seminars, but also through consultancy services 
provided by Spalding and his team. The initial goal of these consultancy services was to develop 
ad-hoc codes to solve customer specific problems. This activity became the seed for 
entrepreneurial experimentation, as it will be analysed in this section. Entrepreneurial 
experimentation and knowledge development acted as intertwined functions. Both contributed 
to reducing uncertainty and acting as a pre-requisite for the legitimation of the CFD TIS (Hekkert 
et al., 2011).  As Bergek et al. (2008a, pp.414-415) argue, entrepreneurial experimentation: 
“...implies a probing into new technologies and applications, where many will fail, some will 
succeed and a social learning process will unfold.”  
CHAM (Combustion, Heat and Mass Transfer) was the first commercial CFD company 
founded in 1969 by Spalding. Later on, in 1974 Spalding renamed it as CHAM (Concentration, 
Heat and Mass Transfer Ltd).  During a decade, Spalding and collaborators faced little 
competition, offering consultancy services to different industries. They developed ad-hoc codes 
to solve specific customers’ problems. As discussed in section 4.2.2, CHAM launched PHOENICS, 
the first CFD multi-purpose code in 1981. Its launch represented a key milestone in the 
development of the entrepreneurial experimentation. Initially conceived as a repository of all 
“solvers” that CHAM had been developing for a decade, PHOENICS led to many other 
entrepreneurs and big firms entering the arena of commercial CFD.  
The relation between knowledge development and entrepreneurial experimentation is 
also present in the development of PHOENICS. As Spalding reflects, PHOENICS was originally 
created to transmit knowledge more efficiently inside CHAM without the need to start from 
scratch for every new requested code:  
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“(Industrialists) came down to visit us and also there was a practicality of turning one problem 
on another. So, before we had PHOENICS, each problem was treated as a new program. We were 
continuously starting new and then it was too expensive, and we learnt sufficiently, then learning 
the new problem. What you have done is in people's mind, but if you have a single computer 
program which you use for everything, then the learning goes into that and it is transferred to 
the new problem.  Yes, I think that is very important about a general-purpose program. It is a 
knowledge transmit there. You can take what you or others have learnt about it and because it 
is in computer code, you can use that code for the new benefiting....it is a means of condensing 
human knowledge and collecting it.” (Brian Spalding). 
As stated, the development of a general-purpose code targeted to solve a variety of 
problems across different industries, opened an interesting market opportunity. A number of 
CFD experts saw this opportunity and founded different CFD start-up firms imitating what 
Spalding had done at CHAM.  The majority of these new entrepreneurs had previously worked 
for Spalding.  On the T3 side, Tony Hirt resigned as lab manager at Los Alamos and founded a 
CFD company called Flow Sciences. In 1985 he launched a CFD general-purpose code named 
Flow-3D. 
The advent of general-purpose codes attracted not only entrepreneurs into the TIS, but 
also incumbent engineering companies.  Two main companies entered into the CFD TIS. One 
was Adapco, an American company interested in a CFD software produced by two of Spalding’s 
disciples and specialised in combustion engine problems. The other company, Creare, also 
American, launched in 1983 a CFD multipurpose code named Fluent. Runchal (2009) suggests 
that Fluent code was developed in Sheffield University from the codes and turbulence models 
originally produced at Imperial College and CHAM. 
 The incorporation of incumbent firms like Creare and Adapco into the CFD TIS had 
important implications as they significantly contributed to strengthening several TIS functions 
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like resource mobilisation, influencing the direction of the search and market formation. These 
are analysed in the next sections. 
4.4.3 Resource mobilisation 
This function measures the extent to which actors in the TIS are able to mobilise the required 
resources for its development. These include experts along the value chain in technical, 
marketing, logistic or managerial knowledge, financial capital and complementary assets such 
as complementary products, services, networks and infrastructure (Bergek et al., 2008a). 
Data analysis suggests that CFD didn’t require massive mobilisation of infrastructure, 
services or complementary products, at least during its formative phase.  As previously 
discussed, Los Alamos and Imperial College significantly increased the number of researchers in 
the 1960s . From the industry side, the advent of personal computers and workstations favoured 
that industrialists could afford the required investments in computing resources. Access to 
codes and technical knowledge were available through books, networks and consultancy 
services.  
However, data suggests that later mobilisation of resources accomplished by incumbent 
companies, had an important influence in the development of the CFD market. While some 
entrepreneurs founded their businesses without any external help:  
“We had no venture capital, no grants, we just put all the money we had and bootstrapped 
ourselves alone. It was an interesting way to go.” (CFD company founder). 
 Others, like CD and Sheffield University, decided early to partner with incumbent 
engineering companies: Adapco and Creare respectively. These incumbent companies provided 
human and capital resources. As one of the founders of CD pointed out, the partnership 
consisted mainly in a labour division where they kept doing the technical developments and the 
incumbents used their capabilities to market the product: 
“They (Adapco) invested money and they became part owners of the company. They helped in 
the development of the graphical user interface and they were doing much of the consultancy 
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[…] The only thing is that CD could not do a lot of consulting at the same time as development. 
So they allowed a certain degree of separation or collaboration between the two companies to 
produce something that was attractive to industry at large. […]. PHOENICS and CHAM were 
doing both consulting as well as development and sales at the same time whereas there was a 
division of labour if you like in Star-CD.”  
 Similarly, Creare and Sheffield University established a partnership where financial 
support was provided and technical and market activities were separated:  
 “Sheffield University decided as a matter of policy, that the University did not wish to market 
the software. At the same time, I, as a Professor of engineering, didn't want to be involved 
directly in marketing, but I'm very interested in developing something to the market. […] They 
were paying us for the use of the software. They were effectively validating the software and 
then they took over the software and commercialised it in America, and now is commercial all 
over the world.  In fact, the turnover of Fluent in this last year was over a hundred thousand 
million euros. […] I have worked for them a way back in  1958 to 1961[…].  I had friends that I 
knew I could sent the software and they wouldn't copy it, or cheat or anything like that.  They 
were a professional body and they actually took the software to market.”  (Sheffield University 
Professor). 
In summary, data suggests that along the very early years, CFD didn’t require high levels 
of resource mobilisation, as entrepreneurial experimentation was initiated mainly out of the 
personal resources of entrepreneurs.  However, data suggests that later on, incumbent firms 
made an important resource mobilisation in form of capital and human expertise along the value 
chain (marketing, sales, managerial etc.). This, in return, influenced the market growth of CFD. 
More evidence of this analysis is provided in the next sections: influence on the direction of the 
search and market formation. 
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4.4.4 Influence on the direction of search 
The function influence on the direction of search focusses on the elements that reinforce the 
incentives and pressures to enter the technological field. Therefore, this function includes a 
variety of topics for analysis like entrepreneurial visions, expectations of growth potential, 
appropriable conditions for key actors, alignment to political agendas, regulations, policies and 
business models that create new opportunities for the innovation to arouse (Hellsmark, 2010).  
Influence on the direction of search and legitimation, as discussed in sections 2.6.3 and 2.6.4 in 
the literature review chapter, are two related functions. As an example, a shared vision on the 
potential of the technology among key actors will reinforce legitimation, whilst contested 
visions, expectations or appropriable conditions can harm its acceptance (Bergek et al., 2008b).  
This section analyses two main themes. The first refers to how the visions and 
expectations of key CFD stakeholders contributed to reinforcing legitimation. The second, 
focuses on the adoption of business models during the formative phase.  
4.4.4.1 Visions and expectations  
As discussed in section 3.4, data analysis suggests that Spalding’s vision in the usefulness of 
numeric methods to solve industrial problems, was critical for the development of CFD as a new 
industrial practice. With Spalding translating his vision to the team, he built up an innovative 
organisational culture at Imperial College that yielded multiple technological advances. 
Additionally, these advances were proactively presented to industrialists who could see the 
evidence and advantages of the capabilities of the codes.  
However, as Hellsmark (2010) suggests, system builders’ visions might not be sufficient 
to strengthen legitimation if institutional frameworks are too rigid and confronted interests are 
in place.  Data analysis does not suggest the existence of confronted interests. Most probably, 
the lack of substitute products for most industries, prevented this type of intentional resistance 
(Barbalet, 1985). Regarding, institutional rigidity, this was sorted mainly through the co-creation 
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of knowledge between academics and industrialists. Co-creation of knowledge contributed to 
articulate customers’ demand and to align expectations.  As discussed, expectations on the 
technology were realistically formed by showing evidence on the capabilities of the technology. 
As one of the early adopters reflects, in this context, it was easy for them to perceive the benefits 
or appropriable conditions that CFD offered: 
“At that time, you didn't know what the problems were going to be because during the design 
process … you couldn't say in advance what the problems would be.... We needed a very versatile 
code, a one code that we could interact with to solve this variety of problems that we were 
potentially faced with. That was the attraction of it.” (early CFD adopter). 
The appropriable benefits of CFD also reached the incumbent companies, as they saw 
the opportunity that selling CFD software could represent. This aspect is the topic of analysis in 
the next section: business models.  
4.4.4.2 Business models 
As Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010, p.14) define, a business model: “describes the rationale of 
how an organisation creates, delivers, and captures value.”  As previously discussed, 
entrepreneurial experimentation was originally developed through consultancy business 
models between system builders and early adopters.  During the 1970s and 1980s , software 
was not clearly protected by intellectual property (Lemley, 1995). As participants pointed out, 
in those days, codes were distributed to anyone interested, or even published in books, as 
discussed. Entrepreneurs didn’t consider the possibility of obtaining revenue from the codes, 
but from helping customers to properly formulate the boundary conditions of the problems to 
be solved. However, as participants pointed out, this business model approach was risky and 
not scalable: 
“So what we originally intended for our company was to conduct contract research not to 
sell software. But we found out that is very difficult when you only have few people: if you 
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have enough contracts you will run busy and if you lose one, you have to either fire someone 
or to find others...so that's hard.” (Founder of CFD company). 
 
Data analysis suggests that the transition from consultancy to software selling was 
propitiated by the incumbent companies entering the TIS (Adapco and Creare).  One of 
Spalding’s closest collaborators explains how Spalding and others didn’t see the opportunity to 
sell software as Creare did:  
“We supplied a code to (a professor in Sheffield University) […] He was consulting with a 
company called Creare. […] So he used our software and supplied the software to Creare. 
Before long, Creare began to see how useful the software was and they started marketing 
the software to others, which it was basically our software going to others through Creare 
at that time. […] They saw the possibilities that other people didn’t see early on […] Actually, 
our group in Imperial College was well behind in spotting that opportunity. […] We saw 
consulting opportunities at Imperial College like someone from the industry coming and 
saying …’could you help us to solve this problem?’ but we did not market it from Imperial 
College as software. Fluent did it before we did.” (IC researcher and founder of CFD SME). 
Later on, entrepreneurs followed what Creare and Adapco did, and transitioned into software 
selling business models too. 
“I started in 1980, so by 1984 or 1985 we went into debt to do our payroll because we have had 
one contract but we didn't have another one...so this is the history in a nutshell. I sold a copy of 
our software to IBM Japan in Japan, and then I sold one to Exxon Mobil 14[…], and that solved 
the debt and the light came up and we said:’ we ought to be selling software and not doing 
contracts’.” (CFD company founder). 
                                                          
14 Note: Exxon Mobile was founded in 1999 as a merger of Exxon and Mobil 
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Data analysis suggests that the adoption of business models based on software selling 
favoured the growth of the CFD market. This topic is analysed in the next section “market 
formation”. As a founder of a big CFD company argues, software selling provides higher returns 
and it is less labour intensive:  
“The code was the main revenue stream and in fact is actually. Consulting can give good revenue, 
but it is labour intensive, so the return on consulting is not as high as code licensing. So that is 
the margin you get is a lot bigger.” (IC researcher and founder of CFD company). 
4.4.5 Market formation 
Bergek et al. (2008a) suggest that market formation goes through three differentiated phases. 
In the very early phases, the TIS develops nursing markets, typically in the form of 
demonstration projects and related activities that can open a learning space for the TIS. Then 
nursing markets evolve to bridging markets as market volume increases and new actors enter 
the TIS. Finally, if the TIS succeeds, bridging markets evolve into mass markets. 
Data analysis indicates that early system builders like Spalding, succeed in the creation 
of nursing and bridging markets. They opened the learning space for CFD, conducted seminars, 
demonstrations and pioneered the incipient CFD market providing consultancy services to a few 
industries. However, the transition to mass markets came mainly through the human and 
financial resource mobilisation that incumbent companies did in partnership with a few CFD 
entrepreneurs. Additionally, as discussed, the adoption of business models based on software 
selling led to higher returns. One of the founders of Computational Dynamics (CD) describes the 
importance of their partnership with Adapco to form CD-Adapco: 
“So they (Adapco) were instrumental in helping conquering the market. They did consulting, 
demonstrating the capability of the code, and that of course induced the industry to actually buy 
licenses to use the code. And eventually, well not eventually, actually, soon after the setup the 
company, they started developing the user interface for the code. So whereas in London the CD 
was focussing on the development of the methodologies for CFD, the solver…Adapco in the 
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United States developed the user interface which eventually became a graphical user interface, 
which actually sometimes is the major heart of the software.” (CD co-founder). 
As the interviewee later points out, Spalding and CHAM opted to continue their journey 
alone, without partnering with other companies:  
“The only thing is that CD could not do a lot of consulting at the same time as development. So 
they allowed a certain degree of separation or collaboration between the two companies to 
produce something that was attractive to industry at large. […]. PHOENICS and CHAM were 
doing both consulting as well as development and sales at the same time whereas there was a 
division of labour if you like in Star CD. […] They didn’t partner with anybody.  In CD the 
partnership came because of two aspects: one is the partners, because they provided the 
finance, and the other is they provided the outlet and the sales.” (CD co-founder). 
 In addition to the adoption of a software selling business model and the partnership 
between entrepreneurs and incumbents, data analysis also points to specialisation as a key 
factor contributing to the growth of the CFD market.  As discussed in section 4.2.3, CFD is a 
highly fragmented and specialised market where the majority of firms focus in providing ad-hoc 
solutions to very specific industrial problems. Spalding provides an interesting reflection with 
this regard, discussing how specialisation by his competitors led to market success: 
“Well, it changed the situation: there were many others who could do better than I could 
but...part of my problem is that I innovated too much, I looked into many different directions so 
whether with the successful competition, I think they took it a little bit different. For example, 
there is a successful company coming out of this building (CHAM Ltd), that contributed to one 
particular area in electronics cooling and then they concentrated on that and they did quite well.  
It was lately bought. It was called Fluomerics at that time, I don't know how is it called now.... 
But yes, specialisation led to success.... while I looked into many different directions….so that is 
still what happens.” (Spalding). 
 As figure 4-2 in section 4.2.2 shows, CFD leading firms changed during the market 
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formation process.  In the early years of commercial CFD, nursing and bridging markets were 
dominated by CHAM, the company founded by Professor Spalding. Second was FDI, an American 
company, and Fluent, formerly Creare (Sheffield University partners), was third. A decade later, 
in the mid-1990s, CD-Adapco entered into the top 3, and CHAM and Flow Science disappeared 
from the ranking.  Today, CD-Adapco and Fluent, together with CFX15, are market leaders. These 
companies have been through different processes of mergers and acquisitions, and nowadays, 
the three of them: Ansys, CD-Adapco and Mentor Graphics, have been acquired by Siemens.  
In summary, resource mobilisation, partnership with incumbents (for financial and 
human capital), specialisation and business models based on software selling, drove the 
transition from bridging to mass markets. Data analysis suggests, that as postulated by 
Lieberman and Montgomery (1998), incumbents took advantage as late entrants. They followed 
the well-studied path of merging their marketing and manufacturing capabilities with the 
scientific and technological knowledge developed by system builders: 
“Pioneering is likely to be a desirable strategy for firms whose relative skills are in new product 
development, whereas firms with relative strengths in marketing and manufacturing may prefer 
to enter later, after the initial market and technological uncertainties have been resolved. […] 
Moreover, later entrants may be able to acquire pioneers, thereby linking their own resource 
base with the pioneer’s market position, resources and skills.” (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988, 
p.1113). 
4.4.6 Development of positive externalities 
This function measures how the generation of external economies influence the development 
of a TIS. Bergek et al. (2008b) define external economies as the mutual benefits obtained when 
two or more different TISs share part of their structural components: actors and networks, 
                                                          
15 CFX is a CFD multipurpose software developed by the UK Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) and later 
acquired by Ansys 
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technology or institutions. The scholars point to three main sources of positive externalities: 
emergence of pooled labour markets, information flows and knowledge spill-overs, and 
emergence of specialised intermediate goods and service providers. 
Following on the previous definition, data analysis doesn’t show any relevant theme 
applicable to the development of positive externalities for CFD. The underlying reason is the 
boundaries and level of analysis selected for this study. As defined in the methodology section, 
the unit of analysis of this research, is the field of knowledge of CFD around its two main 
development centres: the T3 Lab at Los Alamos and the Imperial College group. Consequently, 
as the study is not restricted to any specific code, target industry or CFD company, all relations 
regarding knowledge, labour and complementarities rely within the CFD TIS and have been 
analysed accordingly in the previous sections. 
In spite of this, data analysis shows relevant external factors that influenced the 
development of CFD as a TIS.  As they do not share structural components with CFD, they are 
discussed in the next section. 
4.5 Area of investigation 3: Exogenous factors  
TIS literature suggests that external factors can influence positively or negatively the 
development of a TIS (Hellsmark, 2010; Bergek et al., 2015).  The definition of what an 
exogenous factor is, is determined by the geographical boundaries and the breadth and depth 
of the unit of analysis of the study (Bergek et al., 2015).  For the present analysis, exogenous 
factors relate to those elements that do not share structural components (in the form of actors, 
networks, institutions or technology) with the field of knowledge of CFD at its main research 
centres (T3 Lab at Los Alamos and Imperial College).  Exogeneous factors have been divided into 
two different categories. The first, relates to the development of other technologies that 
contributed to the diffusion of CFD. The second, refers to those dynamics that are beyond the 
direct influence of the actors in the CFD or any related TIS. They typically include macro-
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economic and political issues or deep cultural patterns like financial or political crisis, public 
debates, changes in political agendas etc.   (Geels & Schot, 2007).  
The following sections highlight the most relevant themes around both types of 
exogenous factors. 
4.5.1 Development of related technologies 
The development of CFD is tightly connected to the development of computer capabilities 
during the last half of the 20th century (Hanna & Parry, 2011). Data analysis suggests that 
advances in the computing industry had a critical impact on the development and legitimation 
of CFD. Firstly, as predicted by Moore’s law, the density of transistors in circuits increased to the 
point that big mainframe computers, like the ones originally placed at the T3 Lab at Los Alamos 
and Imperial College, were substituted by workstations, a much more affordable option. This 
enabled the entrance of many industries into the CFD TIS. Additionally, in the early 1980s the 
first parallel compilers were launched. 16 As a consequence of this, simulations were executed 
in less time, while at the same time, the intellectual property of the codes was more easily 
protected, as there was no need to distribute the source code, only a compiled executable. As 
a consequence, compilers opened the possibility of developing business models based on selling 
software as previously discussed in section 4.4.4. 
 In addition to cheaper and more powerful computational resources, CFD benefited from 
the development of graphical user interfaces. These facilitated demonstrations and simplified 
the learning curves for final users, and this contributed to legitimation. An early CFD adopter 
explains the influence of computational advances for CFD users: 
“I remember when I was working at Manchester University in the late 60s and early 70s...I mean 
it was a fairly new program punched cards: you had to take it over to the computer centre and 
                                                          
16 Source: The History of the Development of Parallel Computing: 
https://parallel.ru/history/wilson_history.html 
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there computers there were huge thing. They were in a room. They were massive....and it was a 
fairly new program and you had to wait a few hours or even a day for the results to come back. 
If you made a mistake in the code you had to start again, and when you had the results, you had 
to print them in big piece of paper with very limited graphics. So it was all a lot more difficult to 
do things then. And what it changed in the 80s was the developments in computing power, you 
know, it could make computations far more cheaper and far quicker. You could get the results 
back almost immediately with remote computing...We had these big computers and also we had 
the beginning of graphical interfaces....so all of that came through in the late 70s and early 80s. 
And that made a big change in the use of CFD.”  (CFD early adopter). 
Aligned to the previous participant, another highlights the “virtuous cycle” (Bergek et 
al., 2008b) around external technical developments: 
 “The allied fields began to make progress which became useful and available to CFD, so the CFD 
became more powerful because of mathematicians developing better m solvers. And the graphic 
industry, display industry, grid computing …so all these industries emerged around CFD…” (IC 
researcher and SME CFD founder). 
In summary, data suggests that computational advances contributed to: (i) attracting 
more actors into the TIS, (ii) legitimate CFD by producing more accurate results and shortening 
learning curves through graphical user interfaces etc. and (iii) enabling business models based 
on selling software. Aligned to other TIS studies (Bergek et al., 2015; Markard et al., 2016) data 
analysis shows that external factors contributed to the creation of virtuous cycles that boosted 
the legitimation of CFD TIS. 
4.5.2 Landscape factors 
Participants from the T3 Lab reported a number of landscape factors that contributed to 
opening the institutional constrains and favoured regulatory changes allowing the collaboration 
with other organisations and private firms. These include macro-economic aspects such as loss 
of competitiveness in the US  automotive sector, nuclear accidents and public debates on 
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nuclear energy safety, oil crisis and green technologies etc.  However, data analysis suggests 
that the influence of these landscape factors and regulatory changes, didn’t have a significant 
impact on the legitimation of CFD, as they arose when the CFD market had already sprung. 
 As an example, in 1979, a nuclear accident in the US nuclear plant of Three Mile Island 
17  caused by a cooling malfunction, provoked a big concern and public debate around nuclear 
safety.  As one of the T3 Lab researchers recalls, the situation led the T3 Lab to get actively 
involved in the investigation of the accident. Through this collaboration the T3 Lab researchers 
got in touch with industrialists and nuclear experts to whom they could demonstrate the 
potential of CFD to improve nuclear reactors safety.  
 “Nuclear safety was a big thing in the United States, especially after Three Mile Island. It 
happened in the seventies and there was lot of work to be done […] and that was a big interaction 
with the industry, with the Nuclear Laboratory Commission and for many number of people who 
were interested in what was happening. One of the things that was of particular interest...I think 
it was at Three Mile Island, they had observed pressure spikes.” (T3 Lab researcher). 
Another very relevant related testimony, explains how the energy crisis in the 1970s 
made possible the involvement of the T3 Lab with car manufacturers.  
In the words of a T3 Lab researcher: 
“First, we (worked) through governmental organisations rather than those in the industry. But 
that changed basically. For me it changed when there was an energy crisis in the mid-seventies. 
There was big lines for gas because there was not enough for all of them, and then, there was 
an interest in trying to conserve energy and make cars go further and things like that, and there 
was a contest, I think it was sponsored by NSF, the National Science Foundation, but it involved 
the industry and National Labs and universities and they just got together. I think it was in 
                                                          
17 http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/three-mile-
island-accident.aspx 
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Malibu, California, and we talked about what could we bring to help people. […] . One of those 
persons, was Floriano Blanco, he became a Professor in Princeton… and he saw potential for it 
and he already had an in with working with automotive industry. So, he encouraged this to go 
further. […] About that time, the company was realising that the National Labs could bring...they 
were trying to encourage the National Labs to work with industry on a number of things... So 
they formed a consortium between the National Labs and the car companies called USCAR with 
General Motors and big three for the automotive sector.”  (T3 Lab researcher). 
 USCAR, the consortia mentioned by the T3 Lab researcher was officially formed in 1992. 
However, their works started a decade previously, when two important challenges emerged: 
competition from overseas markets and the necessity to improve fuel efficiency. As they 
explain: 
“Historically, technical collaboration involving the U.S. automakers - Chrysler, Ford and General 
Motors was unthinkable because they dominated the U.S. market and viewed each other as 
tough competitors. […] With competition from both Japanese and European automakers 
intensifying, Chrysler Group LLC, Ford and GM recognised that technical collaboration was 
already occurring among their overseas competitors and that it made good business sense for 
themselves as well. 
In the late 1980s, a common technology need was the development of lightweight materials to 
improve fuel economy. Thus, the U.S. automakers created the Automotive Composites 
Consortium (ACC) in 1988 to work together on the emerging need for composites. ACC's success 
spawned more consortia to address other technical issues, including advanced batteries and 
vehicle recycling.”18 
 Two Congress acts favoured the consortia between car manufacturers and government 
agencies, and indirectly, the possibility for the T3 Lab to collaborate with private companies and 
                                                          
18 http://www.uscar.org/guest/about/ 
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not only government agencies.  In 1984, the US Congress passed the Cooperative Research Act, 
a bill that eliminated the antitrust laws on the collaboration between private companies 
towards research and innovation development. Two years later, in 1986, the Federal Technology 
Transfer Act allowed government agencies and universities to work collaboratively with private 
companies on research and development. 19 However, as previously discussed, regulatory 
changes came to the scene when the CFD market was a growing market, so analysed data 
cannot provide evidence that they effectively contributed to the commercial development of 
CFD. 
4.6 Area of investigation 4: Legitimation 
The former areas of investigation have provided the reader with an analysis of the development 
of structural processes, the dynamic interplay of functions and the impact of exogenous factors 
on the strength of the TIS. Now, this last area of investigation, takes the input from the previous 
areas, and focuses on legitimation, the key topic of this study.  
As previously defined, legitimation is the process of acquiring acceptance and compliance with 
relevant institutions (Bergek et al., 2008b). To accomplish the study of legitimation, this section 
is divided into three main parts: the first part analyses the drivers that contributed to create 
legitimacy. The second discusses the barriers and finally the third reviews the strategies adopted 
by system builders to legitimate CFD.   
As discussed in the literature review chapter, legitimation is influenced by the 
capabilities of system builders to develop structural processes, the performance of the rest of 
TIS functions and external factors that contribute to strengthen the TIS. Therefore, some of the 
topics discussed in this section emerged previously during the analysis of the other areas of 
                                                          
19 Source: https://www.govtrack.us/ 
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investigation.  These are now compiled and evaluated through the lenses of legitimation studies 
by Suchman (1995). 
4.6.1 Legitimation drivers  
As Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2009) argue, the development of structural processes plays an 
important role to build legitimacy. As discussed in section 4.3, CFD system builders were key 
agents in the development of knowledge and networks, in attracting more actors into the TIS, 
and in mutually shaping CFD technology and industrial institutional frameworks. As summarised 
in figure 4-4, data analysis points to a set of technological, organisational, institutional and 
leadership factors that contributed to the development of TIS’s structural processes, and 
directly or indirectly, to legitimate CFD.  As an example, co-creation of knowledge reduced 
resistance and perceived risk, as it allowed customers to adjust the codes to their real needs 
and test the benefits (Rogers, 2003). Related to this, formation of networks between academy 
and industry, the co-development of new CFD standards or the adaptation of CFD 
methodologies to industrial norms and practices, favoured the institutional alignment and 
ultimately legitimation.  
However, not all contributing factors were intentional or attributable to the actors in 
the system. For example, the lack of substitutive products became a key and unintentional 
factor not attributable to actors’ actions or system dynamics.  Similarly, exogenous factors, as 
analysed in section 3.6 contributed to build legitimacy around CFD. In particular, the advances 
in computing capabilities with cheaper and more powerful processors and storage units, 
resulted in more industries and universities being able to test and develop new software.  
Together with the development of structural processes or exogenous factors, TIS 
functions also contributed to build legitimation. As analysed in section 4.4 (area of investigation 
2), knowledge development and entrepreneurial experimentation progressed very closely 
through consultancy services initially provided by system builders. As Hekkert et al. (2011) 
argue, a good performance of these two functions is required for a TIS to legitimate. Resource 
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mobilisation accomplished by incumbents and his association with entrepreneurs also had an 
impact in the legitimation of CFD: although Spalding and his group were seminal in building 
institutional alignment and legitimation, it can’t be obviated that companies like Creare and 
Adapco also legitimated CFD across different wider sectors and regions.  Finally, influence on 
the direction of search played an important role in the legitimation of CFD, as the aligned visions 
of key actors in respect to the potential of the technology, contributed to its acceptance.  
Visions’ alignment was probably influenced by the fact that all key actors could obtain benefits 
from the technology. Whereas for entrepreneurs and incumbents CFD brought the possibility 
to commercially exploit knowledge, on the customer side, interviewees alluded to the 
appropriable benefits in the adoption of CFD. As the founder of a CFD company in the USA 
described, CFD was providing competitive advantage by allowing the production of better 
products at a lower cost and in less time: 
“In Japan it was Canon. They were interested in inkjets. So a lot of our early customers were 
inkjet people modelling inkjet toners. They were trying to develop better products, cheaper, 
faster and with higher resolution ... So it was the competition […] Automobile companies, again 
and metal casting, and there was competition of course, they were trying to make better 
products with less scrap and less waste for the best money....so I think people in these industries 
they realised they were gaining an advantage.” (Founder of CFD company).  
As introduced in section 2.6.3 of the literature review, organisational studies have 
largely studied legitimation, and scholars on TIS usually refer to these studies to describe the 
legitimation dynamics within a TIS. For some examples, see the work of Bergek et al. (2008b), 
Bergek et al. (2015) or Markard et al. (2016).  As argued in section 2.7, this gives the possibility 
to further explore whether the principles for building legitimacy in new industries apply in the 
same fashion to TIS. 
As discussed in section 2.6.3, Suchman (1995), classifies legitimacy into pragmatic, 
moral and cognitive. When applied to an innovation, pragmatic legitimacy relates to the self-
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interest or the benefits obtained through the adoption of the technology. Moral legitimacy 
reflects that the novelty is desirable or ‘the right thing to do’. Finally, cognitive legitimacy 
represents the final stage of legitimation when the routines or standards embedded in the new 
technology are uncontested and taken for granted. As summarised in table 4-4, Suchman (1995) 
divides the three main types of legitimation into a set of subtypes. For example, pragmatic 
legitimation is divided into influence and dispositional legitimation. Influence legitimacy, reflects 
that the adopter perceives he can influence the innovation as his demands are accepted and 
taken into account. Dispositional legitimacy, reflects a perception on whether the innovation is 
trustworthy, honest etc. (this type of legitimacy can overlap with moral legitimacy). Moral 
legitimacy is divided into consequential, procedural, structural and personal. Consequential 
legitimacy relates to the moral dimension of the produced outputs, as it could be the case of, 
for example, sustainable or organic products.  Procedural legitimacy evaluates the procedures 
employed to develop the innovation. It is therefore related to the normative dimension of 
legitimacy. Structural legitimacy denotes a positive evaluation of the structures supporting the 
innovation, for example, the size or service level of the support department. Personal legitimacy 
is represented by the charisma and reputation of the leaders. Finally, cognitive legitimacy is 
divided into comprehensibility and taken for granted.  Comprehensibility legitimacy reflects that 
the plausibility and meaningfulness of the legitimacy can be explained through existing cultural 
models. Taken for granted legitimacy represents, as said, the last step in the legitimation 
process, when the use of older alternative technologies becomes unconceivable.  
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Types of 
legitimacy 
Definition Subtypes Definition 
Pragmatic 
 
Based on self -
interests 
Legitimation given 
in exchange of 
something 
beneficial 
“It provides a 
benefit” 
Influence Innovation is responsive and 
adaptable to audience 
demands. The adopter 
perceives he can have an 
influence. 
Dispositional Audience perceives it as 
“sharing their values, being 
honest, trustworthy, decent.” 
(can overlap with moral 
legitimacy).   
Moral 
 
Based on 
evaluation 
“It is the right 
thing to do” 
Consequential Moral evaluation of the 
produced outputs. Ex: greener 
designs. 
Procedural Evaluation of the employed 
procedures, norms. Ex: quality 
control and validation 
processes. 
Structural Evaluation of the structures. Ex: 
size of research or customer 
support department. 
Personal Evaluation of the charisma and 
reputation of the leaders. 
Cognitive 
 
Based on 
cognition 
“It is understood, 
taken for granted 
and inevitable” 
Comprehensibility Cultural models can explain its 
plausibility and meaningfulness.  
Taken for granted Alternatives become 
unthinkable. 
Table 4-4 Types and subtypes of legitimacy. Adapted from Suchman (1995) 
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Participant’s narratives about the benefits and competitive advantage in the adoption 
of CFD, represent a pragmatic legitimation dynamic. Moreover, the fact that adopters 
participated in the development of the codes by defining the problems, testing results etc., 
symbolise, according to Suchman (1995), influential and comprehensibility legitimation 
dynamic. Additionally, moral and cognitive dynamics emerged in aspects such as the creation of 
academia and industrial networks, the role of leaders/system builders, or the association 
between entrepreneurs and incumbent companies.  
Table 4-5 provides the reader with a summary of the legitimation drivers extrapolated 
from the analysis of the different dynamics in the TIS.  Consistently with the classification given 
in section 4.3.3, drivers are divided into:  technological/knowledge related, organisational, 
institutional, and leadership. In addition to it, exogenous factors, have been included.  The 
legitimation drivers are linked to the types of legitimation proposed by Suchman (1995) and 
supported with quotes from participants.  As data shows, CFD legitimated as a combination of 
factors that build pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. 
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Legitimation factors Type of Legitimation 
(Suchman, 1995) 
Quotes 
Technological 
and 
knowledge 
related 
Co-creation of 
knowledge 
Pragmatic (influential) 
Moral 
Cognitive  
(comprehensibility and 
taken for granted) 
 
“Spalding had been 
consulting with the 
industry, and he was much 
more of an industry 
associate. So…we were 
solving industrial problems 
from 1968 onwards. We 
were consulting with them. 
By 1969 , 1970, …we had 
courses then in the US in 
many other countries and 
we invited the industry to 
see how new technology 
could help them.” (IC 
researcher and SME 
founder). 
 
Lack of substitute 
products 
Pragmatic 
 
Moral 
“Before CFD, the customer 
didn't have anything. It's 
pretty grateful and the 
customer can see the 
improvements, the new 
ideas […], even if it is 
inaccurate in some 
respects.” (IC researcher). 
 
“I suppose that if you are in 
an organisation where you 
already have a complete 
suite of programs as it is in 
the aircraft industry...then 
there might be some 
reluctance, but […]we had 
a range of problems that 
needed solution.” (CFD 
early adopter). 
157 
 
Proactive evidence 
demonstration 
 
Pragmatic 
 
Moral (procedural) 
 
Cognitive(comprehensibility) 
 
 
“I think seeing the 
evidence. We were 
publishing the calculations 
and came and say...and 
then they bought the 
program and... it was just 
seeing the 
evidence.”(Spalding). 
“There was lot of 
verification and validation 
done to the successful use 
of CFD.” (IC researcher and 
SME founder). 
Organisational  Aligned visions Pragmatic 
 
Moral 
“But, nonetheless one of 
the main factors was that 
the industry saw the 
usefulness of that. Once 
the industry started coming 
in, then other researchers 
in other allied fields, which 
were not purely not limited 
by fluid dynamics, people 
like in the mathematical 
field in turbulences, applied 
m solvers, they began to 
have a lot of interest 
because now there were 
these huge m equations to 
be solved, and the 
computers were 
available.”(CFD SME 
founder). 
158 
 
Competitive 
advantage 
Pragmatic  “It was the competition, 
because they couldn't 
make measurements on 
those small scales...so they 
needed to have some way 
to understand what was 
going on. Same in the 
space. They needed some 
way they could do the 
testing in the ground and 
they needed something 
some way to try to 
understand the fluids in 
zero gravity.” (T3 
researcher and company 
founder).   
 
Alliance 
incumbents-
entrepreneurs 
 
Pragmatic 
 
Moral (structural) 
 
“We were approached by 
an American company 
called Adapco […]With 
them, we managed to 
enter in the market. They 
were doing the consulting 
for the industry, driving the 
development of CFD 
methodology.” (IC 
researcher and founder of 
big CFD ). 
“It was very early days of 
getting the system out of 
the market, and the first 
step was at Creare, one of 
the section leaders there, 
decided that he would look 
after the marketing of the 
software.” (Professor 
Sheffield University). 
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 Academy/industrial 
networks 
Cognitive  “CFD was a cottage 
industry. Professors, 
graduate students, and 
even researchers in 
industry wrote their own 
computer programs. There 
was a free and vigorous 
exchange of ideas among 
the members of this 
cottage-industry 
community. If an innovator 
described or published an 
improved algorithm or a 
new mathematical model, 
the others were quickly 
able to implement those 
ideas. ” (IC researcher and 
SME founder). 
Institutional Co-development of 
standards  
Moral (procedural) “Through acquiring 
exposure of the university 
developing these methods 
that industry obviously 
they talk to each other so 
they realised there is 
something that is novel 
and can be used to solve 
their problems and that’s 
how they became to it.” (IC 
researcher and CFD 
company founder). 
Adaptation of 
codes to industry 
procedures 
Moral (procedural) “There was lot of 
verification and validation 
done to the successful use 
of CFD.” (IC researcher and 
SME founder). 
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Leadership System builder’s 
vision and 
reputation 
Moral (personal) “(Spalding’s code was 
accepted) I think through 
his reputation.”  (IC 
researcher and CFD 
company founder).  
 
“(Spalding) was a very 
good leader. Very capable 
and he had a sense of what 
was possible in terms of 
industry and applications 
and…you know…he was a 
good engineer, and he built 
what practically not even 
today has been able to 
match.” (IC researcher and 
SME founder). 
Leader industries 
as early adopters 
Moral (structural and 
personal) 
“Companies adopting the 
code encouraged other 
companies. […] like:’Rolls 
Royce is using it  so it must 
be good, so we want to use 
it […]’ That’s how the word 
spread, with people going 
to exhibitions etc. The word 
spread and that’s how 
proliferated.” (IC 
researcher and CFD 
company founder). 
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External  Development of 
related 
technologies 
Pragmatic  
 
Cognitive 
(comprehensibility) 
“Back in the 80s the issue 
was computer storage… 
…so only small meshes 
could be used, hundred 
thousand cells mesh was 
quite a quite fine 
mesh…now people are 
talking about hundred 
million […]. Parallel 
computing places a major 
part in making that 
happen.” (IC researcher 
and  SME founder). 
“IBM did the first computer 
that came to Los Alamos 
and they only made seven 
of that model of 
computer...So Universities 
had no students doing 
computational fluid 
dynamics, there were no 
professors who knew what 
you're talking about.[…]As 
computers became more 
everyday things, 
universities started buying 
and students started 
programming and so on.” 
(T3 lab researcher). 
Table 4-5 Factors contributing to pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. 
4.6.2 Legitimation barriers 
 
As discussed in section 4.3.4, data suggests that legitimation became more difficult and even 
impossible in industries with substitutive products. As Spalding pointed out, factors that 
contributed to legitimation in other industries, like providing evidence on technical superiority 
of CFD, didn’t work if primitive numeric methods were already established. Another source of 
resistance, came from academic circles, who considered that the approximate solutions 
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provided by numeric methods couldn’t be of relevance. As a researcher from Cambridge 
University recalled20:   
“In Cambridge, there was a lot of scepticism about Spalding. He wasn’t much appreciated as a 
scientist. They considered that his numerical solutions were useless as they only yielded rough 
and very simple results. No one thought that numeric methods could have any applicability at 
all. Then, when he succeeded and his codes became a reality in the industry, they criticised his 
morality for creating a company out of his academic work. “  (CFD researcher at Cambridge). 
 This interpretation is corroborated by Spalding, who declared that academic resistance 
didn’t have any impact on industrial adopters: 
“I already moved from Cambridge to Imperial College, but in Cambridge there was a lot of 
resistance and they didn't approve use of numerical methods. […] (Resistance) was in academy. 
They didn't think that numerical methods are quite right. […] I don't think the industry cared.” 
(Brian Spalding). 
 Although not strictly related to the formative phases of CFD, data suggests that the lock-
in in the methodologies and routines of CFD codes, prevented the adoption of further 
innovations in the field. As briefly described in section 4.2.3, the software and methods used 
today in CFD are practically the same as those developed in the 80s (Runchal, 2012; Hanna & 
Weinhold, 2017).   
 When asked for the reasons behind the lack of further innovations, some of the 
participants reflected that users prefer to stay with the models and methodologies they feel 
comfortable with, even if there are more accurate alternatives. As, an Imperial College 
researcher reflects: 
                                                          
20 Brian Spalding initiated his numerical methods thesis in Cambridge University, where he stood until 
1954  (Runchal, 2009) 
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“(k-epsilon is still used) simply, because it is so simple. I mean... A very successful, what it is 
known as nonlinear viscosity model. That is used in some software, but the plausible scheme that 
solves transport equations for the Reynold stresses that does very well...it is much less used. I 
guess there are also many competitors out there. I mean, the model I'm referring to, there have 
been groups that have produced simpler but less general versions of it, and these simpler 
schemes tend to be used in preference to the ones that I think are the best.” (CFD researcher). 
In the same direction, Spalding expresses beautifully how users are unwilling to try 
unknown novelties if there is an alternative that they know and feel safe about:  
“I developed this new idea, it is like old Eddy break up model which everybody uses, but more 
accurate and interesting, but people use the Eddy breakup-model. So, it is a strange experience 
I've had lots of times. Things that are produced one time are preventing the next advance. People 
understand that, so the next stage they don't follow up. … CFD picked up quickly because there 
was nothing...novelty didn't seem so bad at that time, but now Eddy development, as a novelty 
is not liked.” (Brian Spalding). 
 Aligned to the above, Spalding suggests that taking for granted CFD practices and 
routines (cognitive legitimacy), had a drawback that users do not question results and 
consequently CFD science transformed into a belief for which “reality will obey”. In his words: 
 “The idea that CFD is only a very approximatively subject, that the numeric are accurate, but 
they are based upon models, representations.... That idea has been lost. People get the computer 
code, they do the calculations...ups! I did it, and they believe them to be true. So really, I've tried 
to change things, so results should always come now as approximations, you should know the 
sensitivity, if I change this part a lot of it will be different. […] Yes, in part, it is because all the 
interconnection between CFD and CAD -Computer Agent design - which is the representation of 
shape buildings and alike. That side, the mechanical side, the solid side of computer agent design 
is much more exact, you know what the processes are and you know what it will break and what 
it won’t. […] They expect the answers to be as accurate as they are used to on the solid side and 
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I'm afraid there is in the CFD industry a willing to feed that expectations by not stressing the 
doubt of the fluid dynamic part. So that is a natural revert to me. There is too much belief that 
what we do is .... That reality will obey.” (Brian Spalding).  
 In summary, and as contended by Hellsmark (2010) and introduced in section 4.3.4, data 
points towards two main types of resistance: frictional resistance (in form of organisational 
inertia) and intentional resistance (actions of actors with opposing interests).  On the one hand, 
frictional resistance, hampering for example the legitimation of new innovations in the field, has 
its roots in the complex and long learning curves of CFD, as data suggests that once cognitive 
legitimacy was acquired and CFD algorithms were locked in, technology superiority (pragmatic 
legitimacy) didn’t overcome the barrier of realigning the institutional framework towards new 
models and routines. Intentional resistance, on the other hand, might be represented, for 
example, by firms developing primitive numeric solutions for heat exchangers as discussed in 
section 4.3.4. Additionally, data points to intentional resistance in some academic circles. 
However, data analysis suggests that academy intentional resistance didn’t have any negative 
impact in the legitimation of CFD. As Hellsmark (2010) argues, only actors with bargaining power 
can block the development of a TIS.  
4.6.3 Legitimation strategies  
 
As discussed in the literature review, Suchman (1995) proposes to classify strategies to acquire 
legitimacy into three categories: (i) strategies to conform to the needs of existing audiences and 
institutional environments, (ii) strategies to select audiences and institutional environments 
that will better support the novelty, and (iii) strategies to manipulate institutional environments 
to create new legitimating beliefs (Suchman, 1995). Building on Suchman’s (1995) categories, 
Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) add a fourth one: creation.  Creation involves developing new 
institutions that did not exist. Creation strategies typically apply in the creation of new 
industries, as more likely there will be a lack of existing rules, norms, values and models. As 
165 
 
Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002, p.425) argue: “New ventures need legitimacy, but the basis from 
which they derive legitimacy may not necessarily be established.” 
  Suchman (1995, p.587) suggests that realistic strategies move in a continuum of all 
categories: “All three clusters involve complex mixtures of concrete organisational change and 
persuasive organisational communication (cf. Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975); however, they clearly 
fall along a continuum from relatively passive conformity to relatively active manipulation.” 
Aligned to this, Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002, p. 426) argue that “New ventures can also combine 
selection and manipulation with creation and conformance.” 
 According to Suchman (1995) and Zimmerman and Zeitz’s (2002) observations, data 
analysis suggests that CFD system builders combined different legitimation strategies along the 
spectrum creation-conformation.  For example, CFD created new beliefs to solve problems that 
a number of audiences were facing. As discussed, system builders proactively evangelised “new 
explanations of social reality” (Suchman, 1995, p. 591). In addition, system builders selected 
audiences in industries where they already had a good reputation (personal legitimacy) due to 
previous collaborations. Interestingly enough, in these environments substitutive products 
didn’t exist, making “manipulation” a simple exercise of demonstrating evidence on the 
appropriable benefits of the technology. Finally, legitimation strategies followed by CFD system 
builders, also present a conformation component. As discussed, CFD methodologies and 
standards were co-created with industrialists to conform to the existing industrial norms. 
4.7 Conclusions 
CFD is today a multibillion dollar market (Hanna, 2015) that traces back to the late 1960s and 
1970s, when a group of scientists led by Professor Brian Spalding introduced the idea of using 
numerical methods to solve industrial problems related to flow, heat and mass transfer. CFD 
represents an exceptional case to study the formative phases of a TIS. As introduced in section 
4.2.1, the scientific principles of CFD were developed across two different research centres: the 
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T3 Laboratory at Los Alamos (USA) and the Thermofluids group at Imperial College (UK). Both 
groups were, for more than a decade, working on the same problems and came to the same 
conclusions without knowing about each other (Runchal, 2009). Moreover, data analysis shows 
that while the T3 Laboratory at Los Alamos pioneered in knowledge development, they acted 
as an isolated centre constrained by a rigid organisational and institutional environment. This, 
most probably hampered their orientation towards collaborative and applied knowledge.  On 
the contrary, the Imperial College group, led by Professor Spalding, were recognised for being 
the key system builders in the development of TIS structural processes and several TIS functions.  
They developed applied knowledge, attracted industrialists into the TIS, created networks of 
knowledge sharing between academy and industry, aligned technology to industrial problems, 
methodologies or standards and by acting as the first entrepreneurs, they formed the CFD 
entrepreneurial ecosystem.  
As figure 4-4 summarises, data analysis suggests that the institutional and 
organisational environment in which system builders are embedded, influences their 
transformative capacity.  Following on Giddens’ (1984) structuration postulates of actors 
embedded in structures, Hellsmark (2010) contends that system builders are embedded in a 
structure named general structure that constrains or enables their capabilities to address 
weaknesses and strengthen the TIS.  System builders’ general structure is composed of different 
factors that exist in the structures in which they are embedded. These factors can be: 
organisational, institutional, sectoral, geographical etc. Consistent with Hellsmark (2010), data 
analysis in section 4.3.3 suggests that rigid general structures have a negative impact in the 
transformative capacities of system builders, whereas, on the contrary, more flexible general 
structures, as in the case of Imperial College, enhance their transformative capacity. 
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In addition to system builders’ general structure, figure 4-4 points to different 
intentional technological and leadership factors that enhanced Spalding’s group system building 
capabilities.  Chief among them were their proactivity to disseminate and co-create knowledge, 
their ability to provide evidence on technology usefulness and the group’s leader vision. As 
Kristensson et al. (2008) argues, the early involvement of customers as co-creators reduces 
resistance and contributes to innovation acceptance. Coherently, co-creation of knowledge 
favoured the orientation of CFD codes to solve real customer problems, while at the same time 
these were smoothly adapted into industrial practices and standards. Using Rogers’ (2003) 
attributes of innovation, co-creation of knowledge enhanced trialability and compatibility. From 
a legitimation perspective, as discussed in section 4.6.1, co-creation of knowledge contributed 
to build pragmatic (influential) moral and cognitive legitimacy (Suchman, 1995).  Providing 
evidence on the capabilities of the codes attracted more actors into the TIS and boosted the 
possibility to demonstrate its relative advantage (Rogers, 2003). With this, pragmatic legitimacy 
was also enhanced, as adopters could perceive the appropriable benefit of the new technology 
(Suchman, 1995). Finally, as discussed, Spalding’s vision (leader’s vision) was key to influence his 
group towards diffusing and developing applied knowledge, as it also was to influence on the 
direction of search, through aligning visions and expectations of TIS actors during the formative 
phases of CFD. Moreover, data analysis suggests, as discussed in section 4.6.1, that Spalding’s 
reputation was key to building moral legitimacy.  
Besides the discussed intentional factors driven by system builders, another unintended 
important factor in CFD legitimation success, relates to the lack of substitutive products. This is 
important as data suggests that it set the limits of individual system building capabilities. As 
discussed in section 3.4.4, system builders reported that they failed to legitimate CFD in sectors 
where numeric methods were already in place, as in heat exchangers industry. According to 
Hughes’ (2012) definition: 
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“One of the primary characteristics of a system builder is the ability to construct or to force unity 
from diversity, centralisation in the face of pluralism, and coherence from chaos. This 
construction often involves the destruction of alternative systems. System builders in their 
constructive activity are like heterogeneous engineers.” (Hughes, 2012, p.46). 
Spalding and his team achieved many of the system builder traits exposed by Hughes 
(2012). However, they didn’t manage to “destruct alternative systems”. Their capabilities to 
persuade adopters in industries with substitute products were largely unsuccessful. Moreover, 
once the lock-in of CFD happened, system builders also failed in persuading the adoption of new 
breakthroughs among existing CFD users.  As Spalding argued, organisational inertia has 
hampered the advance of CFD over the last 30 years.  Therefore, data analysis suggests that 
legitimation becomes more difficult to obtain when technological or institutional structures (in 
form of technological substitutes, embedded practices, routines, norms etc.) are already in 
place. This finding is aligned to the point postulated by Tushman and Anderson (1990), who 
stated that innovation will take longer time and be more problematic to succeed if existing 
know-how needs to be destroyed. This aspect is of particular interest in the CFD practice, where 
the operationalisation of CFD software requires a high level of expertise. Most likely this explains 
the high fragmentation of the CFD market, with many SME companies providing niche and ad-
hoc solutions and consultancy services being an important part of CFD industry revenues 
(Technavio, 2016).  
As discussed in section 4.6.3, data analysis suggests that system builders developed 
legitimation strategies along the conformation – creation spectrum (Suchman, 1995; 
Zimmerman &Zeitz, 2002).  As an example, they created new beliefs to solve existing 
engineering problems and at the same time they managed to align these new beliefs into 
products that conformed with industrial regulations. Moreover, they started a selective 
legitimation process in niches where they had a good reputation and previous collaboration 
experiences.   
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In addition to the role of system builders in the development of CFD TIS during the 
formative phase (1970s), data shows the relevance of the alliances between entrepreneurs and 
incumbent engineering companies who came on the scene a decade later. In particular, as 
discussed in sections 4.4.3 to 4.4.5, incumbents were key in developing resource mobilisation, 
influence on the direction of search and market formation functions.  With this, they also 
contributed to legitimate CFD in new industries and regions. As an example, the partnership 
between Creare, an American company, and Sheffield University (who developed their code 
from PHOENICS), introduced and led the CFD market in the United States.  
Figure 4-5 summarises the contribution of system builders and incumbents in the 
development and legitimation of TIS. As it is shown, data suggests that system builders like 
Spalding and his team, were key in knowledge development by proactively diffusing and co-
creating knowledge. They, as well, initiated entrepreneurial experimentation and led niche 
bridging markets. They contributed to the function “influence in the direction of search”, 
aligning visions and expectations around the possibilities of CFD.  Moreover, as previously 
discussed, they were seminal in building pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimation (Suchman, 
1995). On the other hand, the later alliances between some entrepreneurs and incumbent 
companies, became of critical importance to develop resource mobilisation and market growth. 
As discussed in section 4.4.3, incumbents infused capital and specialised marketing and sales 
resources in the TIS. They also anticipated a business model based on software selling instead 
of consultancy services (influence on the direction of search) and legitimated CFD in new 
industrial areas and regions. With all of this, incumbents lead the evolution of CFD from niche 
and bridging markets into growth markets. As Lieberman and Montgomery (1998, p.1113) 
postulate, incumbents took advantage as late entrants, joining their marketing and 
manufacturing capabilities with system builders’ resources and technical skills. 
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Figure 4-5  Role of system builders and incumbents in the development of CFD. Developed by the author 
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Chapter 5 - Case study 2: mHealth technologies for diagnostics and 
chronic disease management 
 
This chapter provides the reader with the analysis of the second case study: mobile Health 
technologies for diagnostic and chronic disease management (mHealth). The first section (5.1), 
sets the context for the study and expands the mHealth overview provided in section 3.4.2.2 of 
the methodology chapter. It analyses relevant TIS considerations, such as identified structural 
components for the study, geographical boundaries, and a summary of the reported adoption 
barriers in the literature that will be later contrasted with the analysis of the primary data of 
this research. The second section, section 5.2, analyses system building capabilities and the 
development of the structural processes of the mHealth TIS (Hellsmark & Jacobsson, 2009). The 
section pays special attention to the institutional misalignment between mHealth proposition 
and traditional healthcare institutions. The third area of investigation (section 5.3), examines 
the performance and dynamics of the TIS functions as defined by Bergek et al.(2008a).  The 
central points covered in this area of investigation, relate to the function influence on the 
direction of search (section 5.3.4) and the different visions, motivations and technology value 
across the different groups of actors in the system.  The next area of investigation (section 5.4), 
explores the influence of external structures, like related TIS or political agendas,  in the 
development of the mHealth TIS. The fourth and last area of investigation (section 5.5), focuses 
on legitimation, the key topic of this research. It analyses the underlying technological, 
organisational and institutional factors that obstruct the legitimation of mHealth, as well as the 
strategies undertaken by different groups of actors. Finally, section 5.6 summarises the main 
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points emerging from the analysis and compares findings with the most recent studies on TIS 
and legitimation (Bergek et al., 2015; Markard et al.,2016).  
 
 
5.1 mHealth: TIS considerations 
 
The section 3.4.2 in the methodology chapter offers a state-of-the-art overview of mHealth, and 
its suitability as a case study to analyse the formative phases of a TIS. As defined, mHealth is a 
term used to encompass a variety of technologies oriented to provide healthcare services. These 
technologies are embodied in mobile devices like smartphones, tablets, wearables etc. and 
bring the possibility to provide healthcare services to any individual with a connected device 
(WHO, 2011). The high penetration rates of mobile devices and the advances in sensors and 
wearable technologies, have spotlighted the potential of mHealth to disrupt healthcare (WHO, 
2011; Topol & Hill, 2012). As an example, Cisco21 estimates that by 2020, 70% of the world 
population (around 5.5 billion people) will be mobile users. If accomplished, this would 
represent a higher percentage in respect to the population with access to basic services like 
electricity or running water.  However, and as it also was discussed in section 2.4.4, recent 
studies show that despite  the potential and expectations around mHealth, its level of adoption 
is still very low (Labrique et al., 2013; WHO, 2011; WHO, 2016). Different studies have pointed 
to a number of adoption barriers (European Commission, 2014; Steinhubl et al., 2015; WHO, 
2016). These adoption barriers could be summarised as follows:  
(i) lack of clinical evidence 
                                                          
21 Cisco Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2016–2021 White Paper available at: 
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-networking-index-
vni/mobile-white-paper-c11-520862.html 
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(ii)  lack of cost efficiency evidence 
(iii)  lack of financial support (reimburshment) and viable business models 
(iv) regulatory constraints  
(v)  standardisation, interoperability and security issues 
(vi) lack of leadership 
In addition, Gagnon et al. (2016) conducted a systematic literature review on reported 
barriers of mHealth by healthcare professionals. Table 5-1 provides a summary of the main 
barriers at technological, individual, organisational and contextual level. The presented 
barriers from extant mHealth literature will be further contrasted in sections 5.2.4 and 5.5.1 
with the findings resulting from the analysis of mHealth as a TIS. 
 
Individual barriers Organisational 
barriers 
Contextual barriers 
Time issues 
 
Time issues 
 
Reduced quality in 
patient/practitioner 
interaction Resistance / not 
welcome attitude 
 
Organisational 
support 
 
Familiarity with 
technology 
Training 
Table 5-1 Barriers perceived by healthcare professionals. Adapted from Gagnon et al. (2016) 
The first consideration when conducting a TIS analysis is the definition of the 
technological boundaries. As Bergek et al. (2008a) suggest, the researcher needs to reflect on 
three types of choices: (1) the choice between knowledge field or product as a focusing device, 
(2) the choice between breadth and depth, and (3) the choice of spatial domain.  As presented 
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in section 3.4.3.2, the unit of analysis of the present case study is the field of knowledge of 
mHealth technologies for diagnostics and chronic disease management across the EU region.  
Although the arguments for the selection of unit of analysis are discussed in the methodology 
chapter, the following reflection by Steinhubl et al. (2015, p.1) depicts how diagnosis and 
chronic disease management epitomises the breakthrough transformation that mHealth can 
bring: 
“…Now are mobile health (mHealth) technologies making initial inroads into health care and, in 
so doing, are providing the foundation to radically transform the practice and reach of medical 
research and care. Through progressively miniaturised and increasingly powerful mobile 
computing capabilities, individuals are becoming increasingly capable of monitoring, tracking, 
and transmitting health metrics continuously and in real time. This metamorphosis has provided 
the potential for acute disease diagnosis and chronic condition management to take place 
outside the standard doctor’s office or hospital.” 
After defining the technological boundaries, Bergek et al. (2008a) suggest to identify the 
main structural components of the TIS: actors, networks and institutions. mHealth represents a 
complex ecosystem with a plethora of structural components. Therefore, analysing all of them 
is out of the scope of this research. Table 5-2 incorporates those that directly or indirectly have 
been considered for the study. The actors’ column includes entrepreneurs, ICT firms, 
consultancy firms, healthcare provider firms, venture capitalists, policy makers, regulators and 
patients. The network column includes formal and informal mHealth related associations like 
HIMMS, mHealth Alliance, mHealth LinkedIn groups, European Health Connected Alliance and 
European mHealth Summits. The institution column includes hard and soft institutions like EU 
medical devices regulation, EU mHealth code of conduct, ICT culture, ICT R&D practices, 
healthcare culture, healthcare industrial practices etc.  
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Actors Networks Institutions 
• Entrepreneurs 
• ICT firms  
• Consultancy firms 
• Healthcare 
providers 
• Venture capitalists 
 
• Policy makers 
 
• Regulators 
• Patients  
 
• HIMMS  
• mHealth Alliance 
• mHealth Linkedin 
groups 
• European Health 
Connected Alliance  
• European mHealth 
Summits  
 
 
 
• EU medical devices 
regulation 
• EU mHealth code 
of conduct  
• ICT R&D practices 
• Healthcare R&D 
practices 
• Healthcare culture 
• ICT culture 
Table 5-2 Structural components of mHealth for the study. 
After identifying reported barriers and mHealth structural components, the rest of this 
chapter analyses mHealth as a TIS with a special focus on the legitimation dynamics during its 
formative phase. To do so, it follows Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2009) framework on TIS 
dynamics discussed in section 2.6.4. As in the previous case study, the sequence of the analysis 
will be as follows:  first, the development of structural processes and the role of system builders 
will be analysed (arrows 1 and 2 in figure 2-7). Then, the second area of investigation will 
examine the development and contribution of TIS functions to legitimation (arrow 3 in figure 2-
7). The third area of investigation will look into the impact of external factors on legitimation 
(arrow 4). Finally, in the last area of investigation, legitimation drivers, barriers and strategies 
will be compiled and discussed in depth through the lenses of organisational studies (Suchman, 
1995; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002).   
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5.2 Area of investigation 1: system building capabilities 
   
As Hellsmark (2010) contends,  the formative phase of a TIS is characterised by the development 
of four structural processes: (i) accumulation of knowledge and artefacts, (ii) entry of firms and 
other organisations, (iii) formation of alliances and networks, and (iv) institutional alignment.  
System builders, as discussed in the previous chapters (see sections 2.4.3, 2.6.4, 4.3), are key 
actors contributing to the development of TIS structural processes.  An important clarification 
is that whereas in the previous case study (chapter 4), the identification of system builders didn’t 
present much complication, in the current study the researcher was not able to identify any 
relevant system builders, at least influencing the development of all structural processes at the 
broad unit of analysis of the study. A potential reason for this, could be the fact that the present 
research is a prospective study for a TIS that is currently in its formative phase. Therefore, most 
probably, the outcomes derived from system builders’ actions haven’t happened yet. Moreover, 
as recent research points out, lack of leadership is identified as one of the barriers for mHealth 
adoption (Steinhubl et al., 2015; WHO, 2016). Aligned to this, one of the participants in the study 
reflects: 
“I think all of us, including the pharma sector, we still have to demonstrate a lot.  We need to 
demonstrate that we can do it, and once we have demonstrated, we will reach the leadership 
phase.” (Pharmaceutical representative). Furthermore, in a highly institutionalised context, as 
in the case of healthcare, the transformative capacity of system builders is more likely to be 
exerted as a collective effort of networks of actors (Musiolik et al., 2012).  
Therefore, despite not being able to focus the analysis of this first area of investigation 
on the role of system builders, the rest of the section presents the state- of- the- art overview 
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of the mHealth TIS structural processes, with a special focus on the institutional misalignment 
between mHealth and the traditional healthcare institutional framework (section 5.2.4). 
5.2.1 Accumulation of knowledge  
 
Since Istepanian (2004) coined the mHealth term more than a decade ago, a vast number of 
mHealth artefacts like apps, devices and wearables have been developed.  As an example, 
according to the estimations of Research2guidance (2017), there are currently about 97,00022 
mHealth apps targeting health professionals, patient records, patient consultation, monitoring, 
diagnostic, drug information etc. However, according to the same report, use ratios and 
revenues are still very low with only 24% of applications registering more than 50,000 
downloads. The implementation of mHealth technologies into EU healthcare systems is also 
below expectations. According to the WHO (2016), despite the variety of technologies available 
and the high rates on mobile devices penetration, only 11 mHealth patient monitoring initiatives 
are implemented across the European region.  
The majority of mHealth apps are developed by entrepreneurs or SMEs (European 
Commission, 2014), and technological market players constitute the biggest group within the 
mHealth market (Research2guidance, 2017). Bergek et al. (2008a) distinguish between different 
types of knowledge: scientific, technological, design, production, market, logistics etc. Data 
analysis suggests that whereas technological knowledge is well developed for mHealth, 
industrial knowledge is still developing. For example, according to Research2guidance (2017), 
the majority of mHealth apps publishers are considerably inexperienced, with 28% having less 
than 2 years of experience in the mHealth field.   
                                                          
22 Estimation from a total of 325,000 mHealth apps and a 70%-30% split between wellbeing and medical 
apps 
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5.2.2 Entry of firms and other organisations 
 
Accumulation of knowledge and expectations on the potential of mHealth have attracted a large 
number of firms and organisations. Figure 1 presents a distribution of mHealth players including 
health insurance companies, IT/Technology firms, governmental organisations, consultancy 
companies, NGOs, pharmaceutical and medical devices organisations, digital health companies, 
venture capitalists etc. As the figure shows, traditional healthcare players represent only 32% 
of the ecosystem23 which is dominated by digital healthcare and technological companies. 
According to the European Commission Green Paper (2014), entrepreneurs and SMEs are the 
largest group in the market, primarily oriented to the development of mobile apps.  On the other 
hand, the majority of big ITC and technological firms are primarily focused on the integration of 
mHeatlh into healthcare systems. Research2guidance (2017), states that the interest of 
traditional healthcare companies in mHealth is increasing. Aligned to this, the three 
pharmaceutical companies participating in this study, reported the creation of mHealth 
accelerators to capture internal and external value from the mHealth entrepreneurial 
ecosystem.  Finally, the potential of mHealth to provide universal and more efficient healthcare, 
has also attracted the attention of governments and public organisations like the World Health 
Organisation and the European Commission. 
In summary, data analysis suggests a rich and diverse ecosystem of firms and 
organisations entering the mHealth TIS.   
 
                                                          
23 Data obtained by Research2guidance from a survey of n=2,400 participants 
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Figure 5-1 Global mHealth market players. (Research2guidance, 2017) 
 
5.2.3 Formation of networks and alliances 
 
Over the last decade, a plethora of networks have been formed around mHealth. They include 
formal networks sponsored by public and private organisations as well as informal knowledge 
networks through, for example, groups of experts in social media like Linkedin and 
Researchgate. A look into the different mHealth networks, allows differentiation between 
networks dedicated to knowledge exchange and promotion of mHealth as an innovative 
practice, and networks oriented to addressing existing adoption barriers like lack of evidence, 
interoperability or security issues.  An example of the former, is the mHealth Alliance, founded 
in Italy in 2008 by the UN and sponsored by a private initiative. 
“The mHealth Alliance (mHA) bridges diverse communities to mobilise innovation for global 
health. Launched by the UN Foundation, which houses the Alliance, and the Rockefeller and 
Vodafone Foundations in 2009, the mHA is dedicated to enabling quality health at the farthest 
reaches of wireless networks. By building public-private partnerships that address health needs 
in underserved communities, the mHealth Alliance and its partners are developing new ways for 
mobile health, or mHealth, to increase the availability, accessibility, and effectiveness of health 
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information and services.”24 Additionally, professional digital healthcare associations like 
HIMMS Europe or the European Health Connected Alliance, also act as knowledge hubs through 
the periodic organisation of seminars and summits involving key market players and public 
authorities.  
On the later type of networks (those oriented to addressing adoption barriers), the 
European Commission is facilitating different working groups with representatives of patients, 
healthcare professionals and providers, industry, public authorities and academy. As an 
example, the code of conduct for mHealth apps initiative, aims to improve trust on mHealth by 
agreeing on a set of standards for mHealth developers to comply with best practices and EU 
data protection rules. In addition, the mHealth assessment guidelines workgroup, is working on 
a set of standards to improve the reliability and quality of mHealth apps. These activities 
illustrate the collective system building capabilities occurring in the mHealth TIS.  As one of the 
participants in the development of the Code of Conduct describes, the purpose of the initiative 
was to build trust through harmonising the development of mHealth apps into the EU data 
protection normative: 
“(The purpose is) to take by hand the app developers to the legal details and how to make these 
legal details easy, and embed them in their developing exercise. So this is one purpose, the other 
one, which is also the purpose of the European Commission, is to foster trust in users. […] We 
struggled a little bit to find the correct structure between all the organisations that were 
involved. But we came up with it and we submitted to the National Data Protection Authorities 
and to the Commission. So, in the end, we made it.” (ICT entrant and mHealth lobbyist). 
More recently, in 2017, The European Commission has sponsored the EU mHealth Hub, 
an alliance between the WHO and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to work 
on the evidence of mHealth for its integration into the healthcare systems.  
                                                          
24 http://mhealthknowledge.org/ 
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On the entrepreneurial side, data analysis suggests that entrepreneurs prefer to interact 
in informal knowledge networks of companies they know. Moreover, some of the participants 
in the study, questioned the usefulness of formal networks to overcome their biggest barrier: 
access to healthcare professionals. 
 “There is a couple of other start-ups here and we meet quite regularly and share information.  
We meet regularly with a number of healthcare companies to share information. So definitely 
there is a community of mobile health companies that are working together...and even with 
competitors sometimes we share information, because we all know how difficult this area is. So 
I think the challenge sometimes is to find the time to see these networks.” (mHealth 
entrepreneur). 
“(the usefulness) is sharing knowledge definitely. Take regulation as an example.  Because there 
is a lot of grey area there... and you know a company that went through and they were able to 
share how they did it. You get a huge amount of insight. It is such a new area that the acceptance 
from the regulatory point of view can rest on the way you present your company.” (mHealth 
entrepreneur). 
“I don’t think mHealth networks are very useful. They organise events and so on, but at the end 
of the day, they do not facilitate the access to healthcare professionals that they claim.” 
(mHealth entrepreneur). 
In addition to networks, different alliances have been formed in the last decade. Data 
suggests that they primarily have a market orientation. On one hand, big ICT companies and 
incumbent healthcare providers like pharmaceutical companies, have established several 
alliances to accelerate the development of mHealth products. As an example, Novartis and 
Google announced in 2014 a partnership to develop a smart contact lens to monitor blood sugar 
levels. The agreement included the licensing of Google’s smart lens technology. As the Financial 
Times (15th July 2014) stated: “…the agreement is among recent moves into the health care 
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sector by technology giants including Apple and Samsung as they develop devices and mobile 
applications to track people’s daily lives.”    
One of the participants in the study, an mHealth manager in a big pharmaceutical 
company, provides an interesting reflection on how main mHealth players have established an 
alliance to collaborate, while at the same time they are still competing to lead the incipient 
mHealth market. 
“I see 4 titans in this fight: we have the pharmaceutical companies, we have the consultancy 
companies…all are doing very powerful initiatives in this arena...we have the TELCO, and as they 
have access to patients, to citizens, they take advantage of that access to the market and (finally) 
we have the technological companies as it can be IBM, Siemens etc... We are all fighting for the 
same. All of us from a different angle, but we are all fighting mainly for the same. What are we 
doing now? We are doing alliances...looking into what makes more sense for a partnership that 
can lead us to the final objective and see who positions better. […] I believe the four of us are 
trying to see who do better movements... Siemens launched a couple of years ago Siemens 
eHEalth, Telefonica has Telefonica eHealth....so all of us are trying to position ourselves on this, 
because we all see a clear market opportunity. As of today, I don't see a clear winner.”  
(Pharmaceutical representative). 
 
In addition to alliances with competitors, ICT companies and incumbent health 
providers are establishing accelerators to capture value from the mHealth entrepreneurial 
ecosystem. For example, the three pharmaceutical companies participating in the present study 
confirmed the recent creation of mHealth accelerators.  On the entrepreneurial side, many 
participants recognised that one of their main goals was to sell their technology to an incumbent 
company. As one the participants pointed out:   
“I think that most of the mHealth companies are in the process of trying to sell to a big partner 
or trying to find a big partner. For that you need credibility and that credibility has to be built in 
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the process, so you have to be very careful in the relationships you hold. So definitely you have 
to have in touch with companies that can mean future partnership for us.” (mHealth 
entrepreneur). 
 In summary, data analysis suggests a vigorous and rich ecosystem of networks and 
alliances that, as it will be discussed in section 5.3, has contributed to enhance knowledge 
development, entrepreneurial experimentation and resource mobilisation.   
 
5.2.4 Misalignment between mHealth and healthcare institutions 
Data analysis evidences a high misalignment between mHealth and traditional healthcare 
formal and informal institutions (values, beliefs, norms, regulation etc.). As Hellsmark ( 2010, 
p.10 ) contends, the process of institutional alignment in environments dominated by few large 
incumbents: “…is often a painful one marked by great uncertainty, conflicting interests between 
advocates of the old and new technologies and between proponents of various designs 
alternatives of the new technologies.[…] Studying this painstaking process of alignment involves 
unfolding the evolutionary interactions between institutions, technology, organisations, and 
their entrepreneurs.”  
Taken from Hellsmark’s (2010) statement, this section provides the reader with an in-
depth analysis of the institutional misalignment between the mHealth TIS and healthcare 
institutions. As an outcome of the analysis, legitimation blocking mechanisms will be unveiled 
and further discussed in section 5.5.1. 
Previous mHealth studies, as discussed in section 5.1, point to a set of barriers affecting 
formal institutions like: unclear regulatory frameworks, lack of clinical evidence or lack of viable 
business models.  However, data analysis in this study points not only to formal institutions  as 
a source of institutional misalignment. Data suggests that informal institutions (norms, beliefs, 
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culture and adopted business models) are also a source of institutional alignment. As one of the 
experts participating in the study contends: 
“Technology is ready and mature and could just be used. It is not about the technology.  The 
problem we have is the change in the processes and in the culture of the healthcare institutions.” 
(ICT participant). 
 Aligned to this, an EU policy maker refers to the slow-adoption pace of mHealth as 
compared to other regulated sectors like banking. Very interestingly, the expert suggests that 
the dimension of mHealth change is of bigger impact, as the new institutional framework 
requires a power shift from professionals to patients: 
“It is a slow revolution in the making. So although might be revolutionary or transformative, it 
goes slowly, much more slowly than we see in some of the other sectors, where likewise also 
mobile and other digital technologies enter...banking for example go faster to mention a 
thing[…]  But it is also a much more revolutionary change. (mHealth) is changing the delivery 
and the power relationships around health and bringing it much closer to individuals. […] It 
brings lots more of opportunities to do a personalised health rather than the general health 
provision, and that means that the centre of gravity can shift more towards the consumer or the 
citizen or the patient... and also reverses the direction of the power from the professional 
towards the citizen in a number of cases.” (EU policy maker). 
 The analysis of institutional misalignment is organised around 4 main themes emerging 
from data analysis. These are: (i) the clash between the ICT and healthcare institutions, (ii) the 
technology-push orientation of mHealth, (iii) the impact of organisational inertia in complex and 
professionalised healthcare systems and (iv) the divergent interests among TIS actors.  
5.2.4.1 Clash between the ICT and healthcare institutions 
 
Data analysis importantly points to institutional misalignment between the formal and informal 
institutional environments in the technology industry  (the main providers of mHealth solutions) 
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and the healthcare industry  (the main receptors of mHealth solutions). On one side, the 
technology industry, and in particular the software industry, is  fast changing with very short 
time to market periods and rapid obsolescence of products. On the other side, traditional 
healthcare is a slow-paced industry, characterised by costly and long periods in the development 
and validation of new products (the average time for a new product development in the 
pharmaceutical industry is 10 years). As pointed out by Research2guidance (2017, p.7): “…the 
two environments are very different, and yet, the fast-paced digital industry and the slow-paced 
healthcare industry have been colliding to produce digital health.”  
 As participants suggested, the different approaches with respect to quality, test and 
validation procedures, makes the alignment difficult between both environments. One of the 
participants summarises it as: 
 “Software and particularly apps fly and see.... It's just build an app and see what happens. Put 
it out there, get your minimum viable product, pivot your project. All these things are anathema 
to doctors and as soon as you try to put that kind of attitude, for innovation in software world 
with the need for safety and security in the medical world, they just hit the wrong direction every 
time (laughs). So the two professions if you like, have a huge culture clash, which means you 
can't even have the initial conversation. So the doctors want something that goes through the 
trial and testing clinical process, and the developers don't have time or money to actually do 
that.” (mHealth advisor). 
 Data analysis suggests that the cultural clash between technology and healthcare 
institutional frameworks, has created distrust and resistance in the healthcare sector. For 
example, this researcher attended a meeting organised by the European Commission during the 
European mHealth Summit in Riga(Latvia) in May 2015. On the meeting’s agenda was the 
discussion on the mHealth code of conduct (described in section 5.3.3). In the meeting, 
representatives from big ICT firms, the pharmaceutical industry and healthcare professional 
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associations were present. The researcher’s notes evidenced the lack of trust of clinicians and 
incumbent pharmaceutical representatives towards big ICT firms: 
“This task should be led by someone who knows well the sector. We should have been leading 
this, we are the experts in healthcare.” (Clinicians’ representative). 
“You don’t understand healthcare. You don’t know patients and you don’t care. You just talk 
about savings.” (Pharmaceutical representative). 
 
Aligned to this, the representative of a healthcare practitioners’ association participating in this 
study, also points out the lack of understanding of healthcare culture by entrant technological 
firms:   
“They are selling business, while if you really want to be successful, I think you need to look at 
what does the population need, what do the European citizens need, what are the needs of the 
Romanian people, what are the needs of the UK people, and try at a global level...because...you 
know, for them it is all about business. It's about billions...So I think, there’s still a long way to 
go. Because the (technology) industry has not really understood the culture of working in this 
field, I think.” (Healthcare practitioners’ representative). 
 This last reflection on how mHealth solutions should be focused on citizens’ and 
patients’ needs, links with the next topic of analysis: the technology- push orientation of 
mHealth solutions. 
5.2.4.2 Technology-push orientation of mHealth  
 
In addition to the clash of institutional environments previously described, data suggests that 
another cause preventing institutional alignment comes from an excessive technology-push 
orientation of the mHealth solutions. As Vallespin et al. (2016, p. 249) state: “…too frequently, 
studies on mHealth solutions have been based on ’How can these technologies be introduced in 
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the healthcare system?’ instead of ’How the healthcare systems can be more sustainable, more 
secure and efficient with the help of mHealth technologies.’...”  
 As the president of a patients’ association recalls: 
  “We don't use mHealth to make  inefficient processes more efficient, but we actually look at 
whether the processes themselves should be completely redesigned with the abilities of mHealth 
....I have the concern that we're looking at the current paths that we have and putting 
information technologies or mHealth into that, as opposed  to standing back and saying: ’let's 
look at something with a blank sheet of paper, completely a fresh...and let's see what we can 
build and then see where does mHealth fit into that.’…" (Patients’ association representative). 
An interesting case exemplifying failure due to technology-push orientation, is the 
3millionlives program started in the UK in 201125. The UK Government Department of Health 
(DH) set up the initiative with the objective to remotely monitor 3 million people with long term 
conditions and/or social needs.  The estimations were that Telecare could save the NHS up to 
£1.2 billion over five years, while at the same time it would provide better patient care service 
and significant reductions in mortality rates. After a few years, the programme was dismantled 
as it didn’t reach the expected objectives.  The report below produced by the Welsh National 
Assembly26, points to the reasons for the program failure which include the lack of contrasted 
evidence on the benefits, the industry driven approach and the orientation to invest in certain 
technologies “rather than practitioners and users/patients identifying areas where technology 
could help them, and so inform the development of appropriate new technology. “ 
 
 
                                                          
25 www. http://3millionlives.co.uk/ 
26 Report found at  
http://www.senedd.assembly.wales/documents/s43139/MT%20AI8%20ADSS%20Cymru.pdf 
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Figure 5-2 Excerpt from 3millionlives report. National Assembly of Wales, Health and Social Care Committee 
 
5.2.4.3 Organisational inertia 
 
 As Hellsmark (2010) points out, prevailing institutions tend to favour incumbent technologies. 
Data analysis suggests that lack of interest and organisational inertia hampers the alignment of 
mHealth and the health institutions. As an expert suggests, inertia does not come only from 
healthcare practitioners, but also from IT healthcare professionals: 
“Inertia. Inertia is what it holds it back. I think most of the other issues like regulation and this 
and that are being resolved....Also, I think IT policies hold it back...actually. That is what it holds 
it back... Whenever you want to do something for mHealth you come with great ideas that are 
safe, that are sensible....and there is always some problem with the IT people saying; ’This has 
189 
 
to be like this, because we have some policies on what can go in people's devices.’...and there is 
always the bureaucratic obstacles. And that's how it is in the NHS.” (mHealth entrepreneur). 
Additionally, as Gagnon (2016) identifies, another factor related to inertia is the lack of time 
practitioners have to deal with mHealth on top of their normal workload. A representative of a 
healthcare practitioner association, declared that under a context of pressure for optimising 
resources, professionals can’t absorb the extra effort of adopting mHealth: 
“You know, we can't do our profession with the commitment that we have tried to do in many 
years. You know, there is too much performance measures. Everything is performance 
measured...even your breathing is performance measurement. […] So, mHealth should be 
considered as something that is enjoyable to have. And not as a stress factor. mHealth is 
something you should pick up because you benefit from it, and not as a burden. And I think also 
it cannot be a top-down decision. It needs to be a bottom-up decision.”  
5.2.4.4 Divergent interests  
 
Hellsmark (2010) contends that conflicting interests among system actors can undermine 
institutional realignment, especially in sectors dominated by a few incumbents with a high quota 
of bargaining power.   According to  North (1994, p.3), maintaining the institutional structure: 
“…is the source of the existence of the organisation and also determines the competitive 
conditions.”  
As already discussed, data analysis suggests that mHealth legitimation and institutional 
alignment is compromised by divergent actors’ interests. Power shift at organisational (entrants 
vs. incumbents) or professional (practitioner vs. patients) level is perceived by some experts as 
a blocking factor in the development of mHealth. As an example, an mHealth lobbyist from the 
ICT industry relates how the lack of business models satisfying all the key actors, has blocked 
the development of digital health initiatives. 
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 “…It can't happen the same as it happened to eHealth (previous technology to mHealth). With 
eHealth there were incredibly good initiatives that passed through the development phase, they 
passed through the clinical evaluation phase and through the pilot phase and result analysis, 
and from that moment on, either they were left on the shelf, or they got closed and never 
mentioned again. And that happened because there is an enormous barrier that it has to do with 
the generation of sustainable business models that can somehow benefit all participants.” (ICT 
alliance representative). 
 In addition, the same expert reflects on how mHealth can potentially increase 
competitiveness among healthcare providers:  
“I firmly believe that the (healthcare) finance model needs to change. I believe that there are 
models capable of benefiting all parties and we need to look for them. It can happen that those 
models will make that some actors will have to play from now on in a much more competitive 
environment. Those actors have made up until now huge amounts of money through 
monopolistic practices. It is probably that they won't make those enormous amounts of money 
anymore...but this is what happens in a lot  of sectors.” (ICT alliance representative). 
 One of the participants describes how his mHealth product, a mobile device for skin 
cancer detection, could potentially jeopardise other actors’ earnings: 
“Reducing the cost of that treatment might very well reduce the amount of money that goes into 
the pockets of people in the healthcare system such as specialists and GPs and...In the US we 
talked to a couple of people and they said; ’Hang on, you are going to reduce the number of 
biopsies that get done. We make all our money from biopsies and oncology reports. We don't 
want to care on what you are doing (laughs)’...And that is not the line to improve healthcare...So 
I think there are many cases of misalignment in the practice.” (mHealth entrepreneur).  
 In summary data suggests that the existing misalignment between mHealth and the 
prevailing healthcare institutions is driven not only by conflicting formal institutions like 
regulation or validation procedures, but also by opposing informal institutions like the cultural 
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clash between the technology and healthcare sectors and the push orientation of mHealth 
solutions. Additionally, frictional resistance (in form of organisational inertia), intentional 
resistance (in form of divergent interests) and lack of interest in the technology by some 
healthcare professionals, constitute, as postulated by Hellsmark (2010) and previously discussed 
in section 4.3.4, a limitation for the development of system builders’ transformative capacity 
 
 
5.3 Area of investigation 2: TIS functions 
 
The previous section has shown the status of mHealth structural processes, the blocking factors 
in the re-alignment of the healthcare institutional environment, as well as the indiscernible role 
of individual system builders in the development of such structural processes. As a consequence 
of the barriers for institutional realignment, a certain level of malfunctioning in some of the TIS 
functions should be expected.  For example, frictional and intentional affect functions like 
influence on the direction of search, market formation and legitimation.  
Therefore, this second area of investigation focuses on analysing the dynamic interplay 
of the TIS functions and particularly, on how they influence legitimation. The functions analysed 
in this area of investigation include: knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation, 
influence on the direction of search, resource mobilisation, development of positive 
externalities and market formation.  Legitimation, as a key topic of this research, is analysed in 
greater detail in area of investigation 4. 
5.3.1 Knowledge development 
 
This TIS function captures the breadth and depth of the knowledge base in the TIS and its 
evolution over time. It focuses on how it is developed, diffused and combined (Bergek et al., 
2008a). Knowledge development is at the core of any technological innovation. It constitutes a 
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pre-requisite, together with entrepreneurial experimentation, for the legitimation of any TIS 
(Hekkert, 2011). 
Data analysis indicates, as discussed in section 5.2.1, that technological knowledge is 
well developed for mHealth. However, data suggests that many entrants lack specific knowledge 
regarding the healthcare sector. According to the research company Research2guidance   
(2017), 28% of mHealth app publishers declared not having any information on the healthcare 
sector. The diffusion of mHealth knowledge through academic papers, blogs, reports etc. is very 
extensive, and mostly oriented to describe mHealth potential, socio-economic benefits or 
barriers for its implementation. As Vallespin et al.(2016) point out, an analysis of mHealth 
publications in the period 2000-2010, yield only 2% of papers offering  clinical evidence. In a 
later systematic review by Zapata et al. (2015), only 22 studies of the total of mHealth 
publications performed usability evaluations of mHealth applications in the period 2010-2014. 
Moreover, the majority of these studies lacked automated design-evaluation methods, as 
authors found that 73% of the papers used only interviews or questionnaires to evaluate the 
applications. 
 
Figure 5-3Rates of  mHealth publications providing evidence. From Vallespin et al. (2016, p.258) 
 As discussed in section 5.3.4.2, mHealth has been predominantly a technology-push 
innovation advocated by big ICT entrant firms. Contrary to CFD, mHealth has been largely away 
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from a co-creation of knowledge approach. Co-creation of knowledge refers to the early 
involvement of users in the innovation development process (Lusch et al., 2007; Kristensson et 
al., 2008).  As it was concluded in chapter 4, co-creation of knowledge enhances legitimation, as 
on one hand, technology is oriented to solve customer problems (pragmatic legitimation is 
enhanced) and on the other, it smooths the conformance with existing beliefs, norms and 
practices (moral and cognitive legitimacy are boosted).  
 Data analysis suggests technology-push solutions, have been mainly developed by big 
ICT entrant firms. As a participant from a big ICT recalls:  
“We have all the pool of entrepreneurs and start-ups oriented exclusively to the rapid and agile 
creation of solutions oriented to solve the day to day problems of healthcare professionals. They 
have the advantage that they are very familiar with the development of solutions in 
collaboration with the clinical professionals, and this is something that the big companies are 
not doing. So this helps to understand the problem from the beginning, it helps to involve the 
professional during the development of the solution while at the same time it ensures better 
adoption rates as compared to  a solution that is imposed and closed beforehand, and this is the 
way in which the big companies are working until now.” (big ICT representative). 
 The representative of a healthcare practitioners’ association confirms this sentiment: 
 “I trust more the small SMEs to be honest...because these are young people. These are people 
who start from scratch, from nothing, and they have young ideas. They know local environments, 
they want to produce something...They are very up to the point to the needs. […] Yes, I think 
SMEs are closer to the people than the big organisations.” (Healthcare practitioner’s association 
representative). 
 Meddicapps represents an interesting example of an SME that successfully co-
developed an mHealth app named Mersey Burns.  Mersey Burns, became in 2014, the first 
mobile software certified as a medical device in the UK (www.merseyburns.com). Meddicapps, 
the company producing Mersey Burns, was founded by a physician who specialised in burns, 
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and two software developers, one of which has participated in the present research. The 
application provides a diagnosis and medical decision by automating arithmetical operations on 
medical tables, to calculate the amount of resuscitation fluids that a patient needs in the event 
of a burn. 
  One of the creators of Mersey Burns participating in this study, pointed to co-creation 
of knowledge as a key success factor. He describes three important related aspects: 
(i) the relevance of looking into real and existing problems. 
(ii) the importance of providing evidence using accepted practices, like in this case, 
the publication of a paper showing clinical evidence. 
(iii) the involvement of practitioners in the development and testing of the 
application, as a way to build trust and legitimacy.  
 
“We tried to look for the real problems that (practitioners) generally had... […] You can't expect 
that people will just accept the new way you are recommending. It is exactly the same for apps. 
There is no difference. So, if I come out with a new way of injections for people, people won't just 
start using it...you have to share how it is backed up...it is exactly the same with apps....no 
difference. You come up with a new technique, which is what an app is, you just need to show 
evidence that it is better, how it works and then let them use it. We published a paper showing 
that the app was more reliable and was producing better results than the pen and paper method. 
So following the usual rules to do something...  So again, showing the people the way, producing 
a paper and showing evidence...so you don't need to vary that approach just because it is an 
app.” (mHealth entrepreneur). 
 The above discussion suggests that Mersey Burns was developed following the same 
principals of co-creation of knowledge as CFD software discussed in chapter 4.  This reinforces 
the point (discussed in section 4.3.3) that co-creation of knowledge is seminal to build 
legitimacy. In opposition, data suggests that technology push solutions and ultimately 
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technological solutionism, can become systemic barriers for the development of mHealth. 
Technological solutionism (Morozov, 2013) refers to the tendency of looking for the solution of 
non-existent or extremely complex problems through relatively simple technological 
applications. 
5.3.2 Entrepreneurial experimentation 
 
Knowledge development and entrepreneurial experimentation are a pre-requisite for the 
legitimation of a TIS (Hekkert et al., 2011). Both functions contribute to reducing uncertainty 
about the new technology and with that, they stimulate the entrance of new actors to the 
system. Moreover, as Bergek et al.(2008a) suggest, entrepreneurial experimentation 
contributes to unfolding the social learning process through the exploration of different 
technologies, much of which will never pass from the demonstration and pilot phase. 
Technological knowledge development, expectations on the potential of mHealth, and 
the rapid smartphone penetration have propitiated a vigorous entrepreneurial ecosystem 
around mHealth. As discussed in section 5.2.3, many incumbent firms are creating mHealth 
accelerators to capture value from the entrepreneurial landscape. The European Commission 
(2014), states that the majority of mHealth firms are constituted by individuals or small 
companies of up to 9 employees with a technological background. 
The large majority of mHealth devices developed by SMEs rarely pass the pilot phase. 
On the mobile application side, the majority of existing mHealth apps have very low rates of 
download and usage (Research2guidance, 2017). The Mersey Burn example discussed in the 
previous section represents an exception to the rule. Entrepreneurs participating in this study 
reported a number of barriers to successfully move from the experimentation phase. These can 
be summarised as: 
(i) access to healthcare professionals  
(ii) complexity to comply with existing regulation 
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(iii) impossibility to negotiate a reimbursement model 
When asked how they were dealing with these barriers, a big majority suggested that 
they were positioning their solutions to the end-user market rather than the clinical. This aspect 
is further discussed in section 5.5.3 legitimation strategies. 
5.3.3 Resource mobilisation 
 
This function measures how actors in the TIS are able to mobilise the required resources for the 
development of technology. Mobilised resources include experts along the value chain with 
technical, marketing, logistic or managerial knowledge, financial capital and complementary 
assets such as products, services, networks and infrastructure (Bergek et al., 2008a). 
As previously discussed, big firms in the TIS (both entrants and incumbents) are 
mobilising a large amount of resources to fund pilots, accelerators, form lobbyist groups etc.  
On the other hand, policy makers are also actively promoting initiatives and groups of experts 
to discuss and agree on mHealth guidelines and standards across Europe. Finally, according to 
Research2guidance (2017) venture capital for mHealth keeps increasing globally.  On the 
negative side, some participants pointed out that funding from the pharmaceutical industry will 
only increase as long as viable business models are found and reimbursement issues are solved. 
This aspect is further discussed in section 5.3.5 (market formation). 
“…The only people with money in healthcare are the drug companies. And the drug companies 
have money and invest money to do new drugs, and until the drug companies start investing 
money to develop apps in the same way, and find reimbursement for their investments, you 
won’t have any significant move forward....You get lot of small changes and it will go very 
gradually, and you have apps like the one we were talking about, but you won't find a mass take-
up until either the government or drug companies put money into it.” (mHealth advisor). 
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 “I believe that until big players like Apple, Google decide to enter, but to enter decidedly, or until 
the big pharma don't enter into technology for medical devices, we are not going to see the 
change.” (mHealth entrepreneur). 
 In summary, evidence suggests that resource mobilisation, although increasing, is not 
yet the optimal because some of the key players (healthcare firms, big ICT companies) are not 
investing in a substantial and systematic way. Data also suggests that this situation will change 
once mHealth business models are defined and involved players can positively evaluate 
investment returns.   
 
5.3.4 Influence on the direction of the search 
 
This function analyses the elements that reinforce the incentives and pressures on actors to 
enter the technological field. Therefore, the function includes a variety of topics for analysis 
including actors’ visions, expectations of growth potential, appropriable conditions, alignment 
to political agendas, regulations, policies and business models that create new opportunities for 
the innovation (Hellsmark, 2010).  
As discussed in the literature review chapter, legitimation and influence on the direction 
of search, are closely related functions.  As Bergek et al.(2008b) contend, formation of 
expectations and a shared vision on the technology are central aspects in the formation of 
legitimacy. This section provides the reader with the analysis of two different topics: the first 
reviews the evolution of expectations on mHealth and the different visions of the potential of 
the technology across main groups of actors. The second topic, focuses on business models, as 
data analysis suggests it is one of the main barriers for the development of mHealth TIS.  
5.3.4.1 Visions and expectations 
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The analysis of visions and expectations represents a key aspect in the study of the dynamics of 
innovation and technological change in socio-technical studies. In the formative phases of a TIS, 
expectations of technology outcomes act as a key force that reduces uncertainty and provides 
structure and legitimation by attracting actors and resources. As Borup et al. (2006, p. 285) 
state:  “novel technologies and fundamental changes in scientific principle do not substantively 
pre-exist themselves, except and only in terms of the imaginings, expectations and visions that 
have shaped their potential. As such, future-oriented abstractions are among the most 
important objects of enquiry for scholars and analysts of innovation.” 
The present research has analysed a number of reports on mHealth prospects and has 
confronted them with the visions of the experts participating in the study.  The analysed 
documents have been sponsored by public bodies and mHealth entrants like mobile operators 
or IT firms. As discussed in the methodology chapter, the analysis has been done through a 
hermeneutic perspective (Bryman, 2012). This means that instead of taking the reports as an 
accurate representation of reality, the analysis has considered the context, its purpose and the 
impact on other groups of stakeholders. 
The majority of the analysed mHealth reports are focused on the benefits that mHealth 
can bring to solve landscape and societal problems (Geels, 2005a). These include among others 
cost savings, citizens’ empowerment, democratisation of healthcare, opportunities for 
entrepreneurs etc. Cost savings represent an important topic in many of the mHealth reports.  
As an example, figure 5-4 shows a forecast on mHealth savings by Price Waterhouse Coopers 
(2013), estimating that by 2017 mHealth could potentially save €99 billion in the EU region. The 
low levels of adoption of mHealth initiatives (WHO, 2016), suggest that these forecasted savings 
haven’t materialised.  
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Figure 5-4  PWC mHealth savings forecast by PWC (2013) 
 
 Data analysis suggests that entrant firms and policy makers are more aligned to the 
economic expectations generated by mHealth reports. As discussed, these groups of actors 
appeal to problems in the existing regime or landscape (Geels, 2005a), such as aging population, 
sustainability, pressures to control public expenditure etc.  to envision a technological solution 
through mHealth. On the contrary, practitioners and incumbents, manifest more cautiously on 
the economic benefits of mHealth.  
As some of mHealth entrants refer:  
 “Of course, patient empowerment (through mHealth) goes along with an economic outcome 
which is saving costs from patients’ side and the medical institutions side…” (big ICT 
representative). 
“There are some clinical savings in terms that if you treat someone better, that will bring 
savings...We know (our application) helps people to be treated better, we know it helps to be 
more accurate...so that's where I think the savings will come from.” (mHealth entrepreneur). 
 “(Cost saving) It is one of the key factors. The healthcare model as it is known today is completely 
unsustainable. At least as we know it in the developed countries. Hospitals need to be for healing 
and not for prevention. Palliatives and prevention should be done from home, and for this 
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mHealth will be of great help.  If we can help in a manner that these patients do not have to go 
to the hospital, that they don't have to be hospitalised, or doing a surgery because we couldn't 
prevent it before it etc....we will be saving a lot in the healthcare bill. It is one of the big drivers, 
of course.”  (mHealth SME). 
“Population is getting older and mHealth monitoring systems prevent older people from being 
in the hospital and incurring higher costs.  Yes, definitely mHealth is going to save costs and it is 
something that is going to grow in the future.” (mHealth association representative). 
 
 As discussed, healthcare providers and clinicians’ representatives are less optimistic 
about the impact of mHealth on cost savings.  
“I don't think it will help to reduce budget. I believe that it can help to do a more efficient 
management. In fact last year we made a consultancy with Oblique to assess the cost/efficiency 
of  mHealth model.  The report concluded that you need to invest differently to get better results, 
but it is not going to bring any savings because at the end you need to keep doctors and nurses.  
[...] The patient will have more knowledge and will be more demanding, so will ask for more, or 
even ask for specialists he hasn't asked before.”  (Pharmaceutical representative). 
“I think mHealth is going to have an impact but is not the solution. The solution comes from 
lifestyle changes from the population.” (Pharmaceutical representative). 
“Prevention, should lead to saving in one way or another. I don't know if that will immediately 
be the case because I think mHealth is quite competitive, and the industry...I don't know how 
well the industry will cope with the development of mHealth and if everybody goes their own 
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way, perhaps then it is not so cost effective27. We do not need to exaggerate because 
sustainability and cost effectiveness have different angles.”  (Practitioners’ representative). 
An mHealth expert and firms’ advisor also provides  a sceptical view about mHealth’s claimed 
savings: 
“Cost saving come from being able to manage patients remotely, comes from patients being 
able to monitor their own conditions, which is slightly controversial when you talk to the doctors 
on how to effectively manage patients. […] If you are talking of savings in terms of preventative 
medicine, that's a different thing all together, and that has huge savings if you can have some 
sort of form to prevent people from getting ill in the first place, but nobody has cracked that yet.” 
(mHealth expert). 
 
Data analysis suggests that during the formative phases of mHealth, advocacy coalitions 
have been very active in influencing the expectations and desirability of the new technology.  
Evidence suggests that forecast reports produced by big entrants have influenced the agenda 
of policy makers.  As an example, figure 5-5 shows an mHealth leaflet by the European 
Commission including the benefits and potential market size of mHealth by 2017.  Most of the 
data supporting this leaflet, as it can be read in the paragraph below, has been obtained from a 
market report by the GMSA (the association of mobile operators and telephony firms) and Price 
Waterhouse Cooper.  As Jacobson and Bergek (2011, p.50) argue: “…ultimately, the objective is 
to shape expectations of policy makers. This is done in many ways, some of which are subtle and 
difficult to unmask.”  
“The worldwide mobile health revenue is expected to reach about US$ 23 billion across all 
stakeholders – mobile operators, device vendors, healthcare providers and content/application 
                                                          
27 (Researcher note): When asked for clarification on what industry the participant was referring to, he 
stated it was the big IT companies. 
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players - by 2017. By 2017, the largest markets for mobile health services will be Europe and Asia 
Pacific (APAC) with 30% market share each, followed by the developed markets of North America 
(USA and Canada) with 28% share. Latin America and Africa will comprise 7% and 5% share 
respectively.” (GSMA &PWC, 2012. p.4 ). 
 
Figure 5-5 European Commission mHealth leaflet. (EU digital single market website) 
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However, data suggests that influencing policy makers in the potential of mHealth, 
might not be sufficient if confronted interests among relevant groups of actors exist. As an 
expert in the telecom industry points out, one of the complexities of mHealth rests on the 
divergent values and interests among key actors: 
“One of the particularities of mHealth is that some actors have completely different objectives 
respect to other actors, and they have to work together and in a coordinated manner. As an 
example, on one side we have the healthcare system formed by government, regulatory agencies 
etc…and for this group of actors, the use of mobile technologies in healthcare would mean cost 
reduction. When we talk to professionals like clinicians, the use of technology to monitor and 
treat their patients generates the possibility of giving them much more information respect to 
what they currently have…“ (ICT representative). 
The rest of this section offers an in-depth analysis of the conflicting visions and 
expectations across the different groups of actors in the system. Firstly, data is presented 
around three main subthemes: (i) value and benefits of mHealth, (ii) motivations to enter into 
the field and (iii) potential disruptiveness of the technology. After this, and to facilitate the 
reading, the analysis of the three subthemes and its comparison with extant theory is presented 
all together in a conclusions subsection.   
5.3.4.1.1 Value and benefits  
 
Data shows that different groups of actors provide a different value to the technology. Whereas 
for entrants and policy makers mHealth is seen as an enabler to empower citizens and change 
the centre of gravity from professionals to patients, healthcare incumbents and practitioners 
envision the technology as a way to improve existing healthcare pathways. 
 
As the CEO of a SME on mHealth devices states: 
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“That capability of wearing the data with you and being constantly monitored is, on my view, 
one of the big technological disruptions that we are going to see in the next years in healthcare. 
It is not about going to your GP or to the clinical lab to do a blood test, now it is all about doing 
it yourself at any place.” (mHealth entrant representative). 
 The representative of a big ICT company argues:  
“From the industry perspective, which is the one I'll advocate for, mHealth will empower users, 
and this is a very important element, especially when you are referring to chronic disease 
management.” (big ICT representative). 
 In a similar vein, the manager of the mHealth competence centre at a telecom 
consortium, states: 
 “mHealth offers the possibility to self-manage patients’ conditions, hence, taking a more active 
role. So we are talking about better informed patients, about more active patientsin their health 
management, while at the same time, they are generating very valuable information for 
clinicians.” (big ICT representative). 
 An mHealth entrepreneur provides an example on how mHealth can put healthcare into 
patients’ hands: 
“Patients will be empowered. For example, there is a device called IphoneECG, and you can check 
your ECG (electro Cardiogram) on your hands using an iPhone. This is great. […] Of course, it will 
change everything because the consumers are empowered and consumers start to understand 
more…”  (mHealth entrepreneur). 
 Policy makers agree on the view of empowering citizens and patients through 
technology: 
 
“People have a lot more of information and can start increasing their personal involvement and 
personal control on health in this case, and conversely there are lots more opportunities to do a 
personalised health rather than the general health provision.”  (Public mHealth policy maker). 
“I think you are going to see more empowered citizens and more empowered patients but also 
healthcare professionals who have access to more information and are able to have a discussion 
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on the same level. So I think in some cases there'll be a little more responsibility on the part of 
the citizen or the patient.” (Public mHealth policy maker.) 
 
 The representative of the patient’s associations, also points to that capability of putting 
healthcare into patients’ hands, although not necessarily as a positive aspect:  
“We are assuming that people have a mobile device, you've got something that it is held in their 
hands and it is always on and it gives them an ’always access’ opportunity. It is something that 
they are addicted to, and this brings advantages and disadvantages.” (Patients’ association 
representative). 
 In contrast to the disruptive vision of shifting healthcare centre of gravity from 
professionals towards patients, the representative of a clinicians’ association places the value 
of mHealth technologies in the improvement of current clinical practices:  
“I see one big advantage for mHealth, especially in the field of prevention.... not in the health 
intensive care… but more in the soft care data for the clinical pathways that we should develop 
for different conditions. mHealth could bring in the big data in order to streamline the existing 
clinical pathways.” (Practitioners’ association representative). 
 The representatives from the pharmaceutical industry, also place the main value of 
mHealth as an enabler to improve existing services through more data and better patient-
professional communication.  
 “The main objective is to reach the patient… […] On one side, to bring healthcare to patients 
and on the other side to get information from the patient. To get data so when the patient arrives 
to the clinician, it is not only treated over the symptoms he presents that day, but also on how 
the patient was 4 months before going to the clinician.” (Pharmaceutical representative). 
Aligned to this, another expert from the pharmaceutical industry, states that: 
“I think mHealth can connect the health providers with the patients more easily...so we can have 
a more active communication and monitoring of the disease that it is being treated.  So this gives 
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a benefit for the patient as you provide a better service at the end of the day.” (Pharmaceutical 
representative). 
 
 Finally, data analysis suggests that participants who had already participated in mHealth 
and telehealth projects are more sceptical about the transformative potential of the technology. 
As an example, an ICT expert who was part of the 3millionlives program, reflects that: 
“…It is difficult to demonstrate the cost savings. I mean, we were enthusiastic about what people 
like Phillips were saying about the savings and revenues they could take...but it all faded out.” 
(big ICT representative). 
 An expert mHealth advisor also shows scepticism about mHealth reports and the 
potential of the technology to reduce healthcare costs: 
“Cost saving come from being able to manage patients remotely, comes from patients being 
able to monitor their own conditions, which is slightly controversial when you talk to the doctors 
on how to effectively manage patients. […] If you are talking of savings in terms of preventative 
medicine, that's a different thing all together, and that has huge savings if you can have some 
sort of form of preventing people getting ill in the first place, but nobody has cracked that yet.” 
(mHealth advisor). 
 
  
5.3.4.1.2 Motivations 
 
Data suggests that actors’ motivations and interests to enter into the mHealth arena are related 
to the appropriable benefits they can obtain from the technology. As North (1994, p.2) states: 
“Organisations and their entrepreneurs are the actors; they will introduce new institutions or 
technology when they perceive that they can improve their competitive position by such 
innovation. Their perceptions are a function of the belief systems they possess.” 
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 For example, the practitioners’ representatives are guided by the belief that mHealth, 
if well developed,  can assist  the healthcare professionals to better discharge their duties: 
 “I hope that mHealth will support the mHealth professions in making their jobs easier, in making 
sure that time is freed up for them in order to do the real work that they have to do. So I hope 
that technology is a support to the workforce, and not a barrier to the workforce. […] Technology 
is for us a support to automate the health records and everything, the communication between 
physicians and nurses, the inter-professional development...and all these things are really a 
support for us, but only if they lower down the workload.” (Practitioners’ representative).  
 The representative of a patients’ association acknowledges that patients would prefer,  
in certain circumstances,  to consult a device rather than a professional: 
“ (mHealth) is something you have an increasing relationship with...so, you know, there is 
evidence showing that people is sometimes more honest to an inhuman device than they are to 
a human doctor in terms of their feeling on anxiety, depression etc...”(Representative of 
patient’s association). 
 For the pharmaceutical industry, mHealth is perceived as a ‘must’ to compete in the 
field of integral healthcare services. 
 “Pharmaceutical and diagnose companies, as we want to call them, what they typically do is to 
treat specific episodes: either a drug or a measurement. But....this leaves lots of uncovered gaps 
with respect to what treatment or patient's trajectory is. […]  So I believe that in the short term 
it will be a ’must’. It is not something they want or don't want to do...as they will be forced to 
compete in that arena and offer an integral patient management covering from treatment, to 
diagnostic and maintenance.” (Pharmaceutical representative). 
 Moving into the entrants’ space, experts reported a combination of factors. Some 
entrepreneurs pointed to personal rewarding motivations  making a difference in healthcare, 
while others referred to new market opportunities in the saturated ICT space. Again, the 
resolution of problems existing at landscape level were present in many entrants’ reflections: 
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“We looked at the age demographics, we looked at the healthcare spent and we looked at what 
is happening in the developed world, what could happen in the third world...and we looked into 
finding the general solution for (participant’s company name) and then we settle the product 
finding something with a European focus. So that was the thinking. At the time the UK 
government started the 3miillionlives issue.  NHS England had a 1.2 billion short fall in its  budget, 
but they believed that 3 million people with health conditions could benefit from telecare.  And 
we saw an emergence of players in this space starting to develop products. So that was the 
basis… and we had a need as well, we had to source some innovation, and we opened an 
innovation centre in Germany and in the UK, and we wanted just a project to work within our 
group.  So that's where we came essentially. Vodafone as well were developing a portfolio. So, 
we saw this as an opportunity, and very much now, when in the ICT space everyone is competing 
much more and the budget pool is getting smaller…” (big ICT firm representative). 
 “I would say it is the marketplace ...I want to bring innovations to patients in the way they are 
looked after. So for the last 50 60 years we used the same old-style devices to measure our 
physiological performance. […] I look at the digital revolution and I think we should be applying 
all the technology to physiology... The answer is I want to bring new technology. I want to bring 
high fidelity readings of our physiology...so that we might understand our health better.” 
(mHealth entrepreneur). 
5.3.4.1.3  Disruptiveness  
 
A recurrent topic in mHealth reports refers to its disruptive capabilities to revolutionise the 
healthcare landscape (WHO, 2011; European Commission, 2014; WHO, 2016).  This vision was 
contrasted with the view of experts participating in the study, who were asked whether they 
considered mHealth as a revolution for healthcare. Once more, data suggests that  entrants and 
policy makers,  with some nuances,  are the most optimistic actors about the transformational 
capabilities of the technology.  
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“Yes, I think it will be a revolution, it will be a paradigm change. […] I think the market is going 
to change massively.” (mHealth entrepreneur). 
“I believe that healthcare as we've understood it up until now is going to radically change. And 
we believe that this change is unstoppable. That is, it can take 5, 10 or 20 years, but this is going 
to come. It is totally doubtless and due to a number of reasons: the first one is that healthcare 
as we know it today …it is completely unsustainable. Therefore, we need to look for new models 
and new ways of maintaining quality in the healthcare systems. And no doubt mobile 
technologies are one of the tools that will facilitate this change.” (big ICT entrant). 
 
“I agree with the WHO statement that mHealth can revolutionise healthcare because definitely 
the market is already booming. There is so many of these mHealth apps out there. I just read a 
new article just today about mHealth potential and the new kind of innovations that for instance 
intelligent contact lenses for diabetic patients or some other things....it is very big. It is coming 
very big in the treatment of mental health issues and it is, indeed, it is more and more in use with 
the clinical practice. I believe the quality of these apps will become better and better.” (EU policy 
maker). 
 Divergently to entrants and policy makers, the representative of the clinicians, disagree 
on the revolutionary potential of mHealth.  
“No, no. (emphasised). I think mHealth is part of the development. […] For me mHealth is not as 
such an innovation. Innovation for me is something that has never been known. […] So change 
in the healthcare sector is there because of many factors that are changing, and mHealth is a 
contributor to it, but we cannot exaggerate.” (Health practitioners’ representative). 
 
 Disruptiveness of mHealth also lead to the topic on whether participants considered 
that mHealth could substitute clinicians’ roles in the near future. Whereas entrepreneurs and 
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entrants agree on this possibility, the participants on the healthcare side do not contemplate it 
as a realistic possibility. 
 As an example, an entrepreneur explains how his product could replace doctor’s roles 
in the future:  
“In this service you take an image and we will tell you whether you need or not to visit an 
oncologist. That is not replacing the role of the doctors in the short term but it might end up 
doing it in the long term...So in the long term we can capture an image and send it to a diagnostic 
service better than a GP and that it is usually disruptive.”  (mHealth entrepreneur). 
 A representative from the pharmaceutical industry disagrees on this possibility: 
“They (practitioners) can't be replaced because I don't think that anyone or any company that 
provides a service wants to take the blame if something goes wrong, because medicine is not an 
algorithm only. You can be based on that but at the end of the day someone with experience has 
to decide if it is correct or not to do that. I think those systems will only give advices to users on 
what to do, but the final decision should be on professionals and not on people.” (Pharmaceutical 
firm representative). 
 Aligned to the pharmaceutical representative, the representative of the clinicians’ 
association does not contemplate the possibility of being replaced by technology: 
“We are not afraid that a robot will replace us...a robot will never (emphasised) replace the 
human contact...but we can use technology to support us at some moments.” (Healthcare 
practitioners’ representative). 
5.3.4.1.4 Conclusions  
 
Data analysis evidences important divergences in the visions and expectations that participants 
have on mHealth. On one hand, entrant firms including entrepreneurs, SMEs and big ICT 
companies show higher expectations on mHealth, and advocate for a disruptive use of the 
technology. In many cases, these actors consider mHealth as the solution to landscape or 
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societal problems (Geels, 2005a), in what it could be described as a form of technological 
solutionism (Morozov, 2013). Moreover, evidence shows that mHealth reports sponsored by big 
ICT entrant firms forecasting savings and market opportunities, have influenced policy makers 
and attracted more entrepreneurs and firms into the mHealth TIS. On the other hand, actors 
closer to the existing healthcare practice like practitioners and pharmaceutical firms’ experts, 
perceive mHealth not as a radical or breakthrough innovation, but as a tool to improve existing 
healthcare practice.  Finally, actors who have already participated and experienced failure in 
mHealth projects, also present a more sceptical view on the disruptive potential of mHealth. 
 Swanson and Ramiller (1997) propose the concept of organising vision in information 
systems innovation. An organising vision is defined as “a focal community idea for the 
application of information technology in organisations” (Swanson & Ramiller, 1997, p. 460).  
Organising visions describe from an institutional perspective, how shaping a shared view of the 
technology contributes to its diffusion. Organising visions serve three main functions: 
(1) Interpretation: A commonly shared explanation on the innovation purpose to reduce 
uncertainty. 
(2) Legitimation: A shared rationale on why the innovation is desirable and should be 
adopted. 
(3) Mobilisation: The coordination of stakeholders to activate the diffusion of the 
innovation.  
However, in many  breakthrough innovations, as  is the case for mHealth, the organising 
vision needs to include a large number of actors with different views, values and interests on 
the technology.  In the study “The organising vision for telehealth and telecare: discourse 
analysis” by Greenhalgh et al. (2012), the authors identify the different organising visions in the 
extant literature for telehealth and telecare (former technologies to mHealth).  The study 
suggests that the limited uptake of telehealth and telecare can be partially explained by four 
contested organising visions or discourses. In the modernist or utopian discourse, technology is 
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envisioned as the solution to existing healthcare problems and presented as a rational cost-
effective solution in a future where users are empowered by its use. In the Humanist discourse, 
the centre is not technology, but the patient and his/her lived experiences of the illness. The 
future is not dominated by high-tech solutions but based on the existing ones.  Technology, with 
its benefits and disadvantages, only provides partial solutions to complex healthcare problems. 
In the political/economical discourse, telehealth is presented as a construction of existing 
techno-economic regimes to perpetuate their interests with the acquiescence of policy makers. 
This discourse neglects that healthcare problems can be fixed through technological 
intervention. Moreover, they are seen as a form of social control transferring responsibility from 
the system onto the patient.  Finally, the change management discourse, is posed by those on 
the frontline who already have experienced failure or resistance in the implementation of the 
technology. Although still seeing a transformative potential in it, their discourses have nuances 
in respect to the technological determinism of the utopians, as they acknowledge the existing 
complexity and the need to integrate technology in a service model (Greenhalgh et al., 2012).   
 Three of the different organising visions suggested by Greenhalgh et al. (2012) are 
evidenced in the responses of participants in the present case study for mHealth. These are: 
utopian or modernist, humanist and change management. Data analysis however, did not 
support any political/economical discourse from participants. According to Greenhalgh et al. 
(2012), political/economical discourse corresponds to social scientists, sceptical academics and 
clinicians.  As previously discussed, data shows the scepticim of some participants about the 
possibility of solving healthcare problems through technology. However, their overall visions 
and discourses fit better into the other three categories as  discussed in the next paragraphs.  
One of the most evident findings in data analysis is the breach between the utopian and 
humanist discourses: while entrants and policy makers focus their discourse on rational and 
economic factors contributing to solving existing healthcare problems, clinicians together with 
the patients’ association and pharmaceutical experts on the other side centre their discourse 
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on patients, experiences and improved or personalised treatments.  Change management 
discourse is present too, by those experts who have worked on the frontline and had 
experienced failure in the development of mHealth or IT health projects.  Although they still 
envisage high potential in the technology, these actors emphasise the difficulties to implement 
mHealth projects and the need to look for business models that facilitate adoption.  This aspect 
is discussed in the next section 5.3.4.2, business models. A difference with respect to 
Greenhalgh et al. (2012)  findings, is that participants in the present study acknowledge 
stakeholders conflict pointing to different cultural and organisational misalignments . This could 
be partially explained because in the present study, participants are interviewed confidentially 
whereas in the Greenhalgh et al. (2012) study, data comes from published documents. 
Table 5-3, summarises the main findings of the present study mapped into the 
organising visions classification by Greenhalgh et al. (2012).  Together with the focus of the 
discourse, the value of the technology, its intended use and level of expected disruptiveness’, 
and the groups of actors’ belonging to each group, are compiled.   
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Table 5-3 Organising visions in mHealth study. (Adapted from Greenhalgh et al., 2012) 
 Utopian/ modernist Humanist Change management 
Focus of the 
discourse 
Technology oriented Person/illness centred Service model oriented 
What is 
considered of 
value? 
• Technology capabilities  
• Resolution of 
healthcare societal 
problems 
• Cost efficiency 
• Technological 
democratisation 
(citizen empowerment) 
• Patient and 
professional 
experience  
• Integral care 
• Personalised care 
• Relationships 
 
• Adoption 
• Integration 
• Assimilation into 
business-as-usual  
• Sustainability 
Main intended 
use of the 
technology 
• Monitoring 
• Self-diagnosis 
• Put healthcare in to  
patients’ hands 
• Prevention / soft 
care 
• Improve existing 
clinical pathways 
• Improve 
communication 
• Reduce practitioner 
workload  
• Supporting activities: 
Administrative, personal, 
family, healthcare 
provider 
Disruptiveness High Mid-Low Mid-High 
Stakeholders 
 
• Policy makers  
• ICT firms (big entrants 
and SMEs) 
• IT Health associations 
• Entrepreneurs (with IT 
background) 
• Clinicians 
• Patients 
• Incumbents 
(pharmaceutical 
companies) 
• Front-line 
implementers 
and consultants 
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5.3.4.2 Business models  
Experts participating in the study pointed to the lack of viable business models as one of the 
main barriers for mHealth adoption:  
 “mHealth won't take off until somebody fixes a business model that can work. Because at the 
moment there is no business model. There is no reimbursement model that actually enables 
anybody to take on doing the work that needs to be done.” (mHealth firms’ advisor). 
“(mHealth) requires new innovative models to buy, maintain and manage payment...new 
business models is - as of today - the main drawback that mHealth has for the industry and for 
the healthcare systems.” (big ICT firm representative). 
This aspect is well acknowledged in the literature on digital health and mHealth (Topol 
& Hill, 2012; Hwang & Christensen, 2008).  To present an in-depth analysis on mHealth business 
models, this section is organised according to business model components as defined by 
Christensen (2008): (i) value proposition, (ii) processes and resources and (iii) profit formula.  
 The value proposition defines how the innovation delivers more efficient, affordable or 
convenient jobs for its adopters. In the case of mHealth, and as discussed in the previous section, 
different actors pointed to divergent value propositions on mHealth. As an example, 
practitioners expect that mHealth technologies will contribute to facilitating their jobs, whereas 
policy makers for example, place the value of the technology on cost effectiveness and citizens’ 
empowerment. Therefore, one of the complexities for mHealth is to align the ‘for whom’ and 
‘for what’ of its value proposition.    Moreover, as pointed out by some participants and 
acknowledged in the existing literature (Topol & Hill, 2012; European Commission, 2014), 
mHealth would require a change in the overall value proposition of healthcare from illness-
centred to prevention: 
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“There is no way of building a reimbursement model today for preventative medicine. Our entire 
medicine culture is based on illness culture not on a wellness culture. So, to achieve the sort of 
savings that people are talking about, it is more about to turning around our health provision 
into a wellness provision rather than fixing illness if that make sense.” (mHealth entrant). 
  Regarding the resources and processes component of a business model, the majority of 
entrepreneurs and ICT entrants pointed to regulatory barriers as the main obstacle.  However, 
on the clinical, policy makers and pharmaceutical side, experts didn’t consider regulation as a 
blocking factor. As an mHealth expert summarises: 
“If you are looking at the existing business model, it is locked-in. And it is locked-in not just 
because of business, it is locked in because of regulation and because if you do things differently 
people die...So, it's harder to change how doctors treat a patient than it is to order a taxi.”  
(mHealth firms’ advisor).  
 An entrepreneur on mHealth medical devices, reflects on the advantages that existing 
regulation has for incumbent companies: 
“I'm a strong supporter of regulation because we are talking about people's healthcare....so I'm 
a strong supporter, but I also believe that we are taking it too far with bureaucracy and 
regulation. I'm convinced that if we do a top down review, and we manage to eliminate certain 
powers who are interested in such a strict regulation, we could make it much simpler […]. You 
shouldn't be Roche to put a glucometer in the market. At the end, it is an extremely simple 
product that it has its complication in the validation in the manufacturing and the 
reimbursement […] I believe that regulation should be reviewed to make it simpler and more 
sensible, so patients can benefit of new technologies. […] The industry has a strong interest in 
regulation, but they also have an interest in keeping the barriers high, because the higher they 
are, the less competitors will be.[…] That's precisely why the incumbent industry try to make 
these barriers as high as possible: first to protect patients but secondly also to be able to compete 
easily.” (mHealth entrepreneur). 
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 The debate on how existing institutions act in favour of incumbent companies is well 
acknowledged in TIS literature (Hellsmark & Jacobsson, 2012).  Business models are institutions 
as they establish the rules of operations for an industry. As Hwang and Christensen (2008, 
p.1334) contend, over time, established business models determine acceptable value 
propositions and the types of organisations that can deliver them. Therefore, only propositions 
fitting into existing values, processes and profit formulas can be taken to the market: 
“The firms that grew to become successful under specific regulatory conditions subsequently 
worked very hard to make sure that those conditions remained in their favour. […] However, 
although often written with good intentions, these regulations unintentionally trap health care 
in high-cost models of care. For example, many states do not allow nurses to interpret simple 
test results or write basic prescriptions, leaving care delivery to be performed by physician(s).”  
 On the profit formula, participants referred to the difficulty of developing mHealth 
profitable business models without a reimbursement scheme from healthcare authorities.  As 
an mHealth entrepreneur explains: 
“patients are not used to paying for healthcare. Healthcare is free, it is actually not, but they 
perceive it as free. So it is very complicated to get reimbursement for a device of these 
characteristics. Only big pharma like Roche, Abbott or Johnson & Johnson can get 
reimbursement for their medical devices, but for a start-up company like ours, getting 
reimbursement is impossible. So our product needs to be paid for at the pharmacy, and patients 
do not want to pay for them.” (mHealth entrepreneur). 
 The lack of financial viable models is also described by an expert from an ICT firm: 
 
“There are projects that have demonstrated clinical efficiency, and that contribute to reduce 
costs and increase patients' quality of life, but the fact of not having managed to provide a 
business model that answers the very basic question of: Who pays for this service? has lead to 
the closure of the project. […] This is one of the most important barriers.” (ICT big entrant). 
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Another expert on mHealth reflects on the difficulties to make mHealth apps profitable: 
“So, you might see something flash up, but it will die again because it won't ever happen. The 
trials come up, but they never turn into real businesses. You need to make real businesses out of 
it, either with scale of numbers or with a reimbursement model from the organisations, 
governments or drug companies... the app developers will play it because it is fun and sexy, but 
nothing will ever succeed out of it.” (mHealth firms’ advisor). 
 In summary, data analysis suggests that replacement of existing healthcare business 
models represent an important barrier for moving mHealth from the formative to the growth 
phase. The reasons for this difficulty encompass a set of intertwined factors that include: 
• A complex ecosystem of actors posing different values on mHealth technologies. In this 
context, value propositions seem to diverge when answering the questions: value for 
who? and value for what?  
• Strict regulatory barriers that contribute to create entry barriers for competitors and 
act in favour of established business models. 
• Difficulties to implement financially viable models without reimbursement from public 
healthcare systems. 
• Many mHealth technologies require a radical change of orientation in the healthcare 
system, from illness centred to prevention centred.   
5.3.5 Market formation  
 
According to Bergek et al. (2008a) market formation goes through three different phases. First, 
in the very early days of TIS formation, markets take form by providing demonstration projects 
and related activities that can open a learning space for the TIS. They are called nursing markets. 
Later on, nursing markets evolve into bridging markets as operation volumes increase and new 
actors enter the TIS. Finally, if the TIS succeeds, bridging markets evolve into growth or mass 
markets. 
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The majority of experts participating in the study, contented that the evolution of 
mHealth into a mass market will be a slow and gradual process. As previously discussed in 
section 5.3.5, the definition of viable business models becomes critical to reach growth markets.  
An interesting emerging aspect is that the majority of participants, as will be further discussed 
in section 5.5.3, consider that moving mHealth to growth markets won’t change the landscape 
of key players in the healthcare sector.  As in the case of CFD, mHealth experts foresee 
collaborative models between incumbent and entrant firms. These results partially question the 
postulations of some theories on innovation and firms’ competition (Anderson & Tushman, 
1990; Chirstensen, 1997). These theories postulate that radical technological change, causes the 
displacement of incumbent firms in favour of entrants. However, as stated, experts participating 
in the study do not foresee a displacement of incumbent healthcare providers, and as discussed 
in the previous chapter, this was not the case for CFD either.  
5.3.6 Development of positive externalities  
This function accounts for the influence of external economies in the development of a TIS. 
External economies in the context of a TIS, occur when two or more different TISs benefit from 
sharing part of their structural components: actors, networks, technology or institutions (Bergek 
et al., 2008b). As a consequence, the main sources of positive externalities are: emergence of 
pooled labour markets, information flows and knowledge spill-overs, and emergence of 
specialised intermediate goods and service providers (Bergek et al., 2008b). 
Experts participating in the study, contend that mHealth for fitness and wellbeing in the 
consumer market, will act as a positive externality for clinical mHealth in the diagnostics and 
chronic disease management (the focal TIS of this research).  However, the foreseen impact of 
the former on the later varies among participants. For example, and EU policy maker foresees 
uneven effects on healthcare systems: 
“I think that what it will come rapidly from the citizen side will be an increase in the use of 
wellness and monitoring […]. I think this demand will come up relatively quickly and we'll be 
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hearing that the extent to which the (healthcare) systems can and do to take it into account will 
be diverse.” (EU policy maker). 
Entrepreneurs’ views are also aligned to the idea of a positive influence of the fitness 
and wellbeing market into clinical mHealth: 
 “I have the feeling, and this is a very personal opinion, that the big revolution will come from 
the IT companies.  They will start with the wearables for fitness, then for wellness and they will 
end up entering into healthcare. Then is when the disruption will happen in telemedicine.” 
(mHealth entrepreneur).  
“A lot of what happens so far in mHealth is starting from the consumer market...from wellbeing 
and fitness.  We have very nice fitbands, we have Apple watches ...If you look at the cyclists of 
the world, they look at their heart, they track their speed, they also have a GPS...There is a 
consumer revolution that starts from fitness and wellbeing and moves into health. So when you 
start tracking everybody's motion, heart rate etc. for the fun, then eventually you will lead on to 
clinical studies and you will lead onto more and more sort of data push.” (mHealth 
entrepreneur). 
 Despite the entrepreneurs’ views, it is difficult to determine at this point in time, the 
extent of the impact of the fitness and wellbeing consumer market on the mHealth TIS. As the 
policy maker contends, it seems plausible to assume that the effect will be uneven across 
healthcare systems.  In any case, it is a fact that the wellbeing and fitness market is contributing 
to creating pooled labours, expertise, knowledge spill-overs and in addition, it is an extremely 
valuable source of patients’ data.  As an example, Rudner et al.(2016), report the first registered 
spill-over from a non-regulated fitness  medical device (wrist-worn activity tracker) into a 
medical decision tool on a patient attending  the emergency department in need of 
defibrillation. 
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5.4 Area of investigation 3: Exogenous factors 
 
TIS literature highlights the influence of external factors in the development of a TIS (Hellsmark, 
2010; Bergek et al., 2015; Markard et al., 2016).  The definition of an exogenous factor is 
determined by the geographical boundaries and the breadth and depth of the unit of analysis 
of the study (Bergek et al., 2015).  For the present study, this section focuses on the influence 
of global or landscape issues (Geels, 2005a) beyond the direct influence of the actors in the TIS 
like socio-economic crisis or debates, changes in political agendas etc.    
Data analysis suggests that concerns like aging population or sustainability of public 
healthcare systems have influenced the development of some mHealth TIS functions. In 
particular, they have contributed to knowledge development (see section5.3.1), 
entrepreneurial experimentation by attracting more firms and organisations (see section 5.3.2) 
and resource mobilisation (see section 5.3.3). As discussed in section 4.3.4, the expectations 
created on the potential of mHealth to alleviate public healthcare issues, have been 
incorporated in the agenda of EU policy makers and have led to the development of a set of 
initiatives to overcome existing adoption barriers.  In this respect, and as  will be further 
discussed over the next section (5.5 legitimation), positioning mHealth as an enabler towards 
sustainable healthcare has contributed to building moral (consequential) legitimation for 
policymakers (Suchman, 1995). However, data analysis doesn’t show any evidence of a similar 
effect among healthcare professionals. Moreover, benefits and cost-effective analysis by 
mHealth proponents have been criticised as self-interested.    
Markard et al.(2016) contend that TIS developments and ‘virtuous cycles’ can be affected 
by changing problem agendas at societal level.  As will be further discussed in the next sections 
5.5. and 5.6, data analysis suggests that landscape factors might result in being insufficient to 
build legitimacy if pragmatic legitimation for adopters is not built. 
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5.5 Area of investigation 4: Legitimation 
 
The previous sections have provided an analysis of TIS’s structural processes, functions, and 
exogenous factors in the development of mHealth technologies for chronic disease 
management and diagnostics. This last area of investigation focuses on legitimation, the key 
topic of this thesis.  Legitimation, the process of acquiring socio-political strength and 
acceptance within relevant institutions and actors,  is key for the growth and success of any TIS 
(Bergek et al., 2008b).  As discussed in the literature review chapter, legitimacy is built through 
actors’ actions plus the result of positive systemic feedback in the form of virtuous circles. 
Moreover, recent TIS literature has recognised the influence of external context structures 
(sector, geographical etc.)  and societal problems as a determining factor of TIS legitimation and 
growth (Bergek et al., 2015; Markard et al., 2016).  Therefore, some of the topics already 
discussed like institutional misalignment, divergent visions, expectations or influence of 
exogenous factors are now put together and evaluated through the lenses of legitimation 
studies (Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). 
This area of investigation is divided into three main parts: the first two analyse the 
blocking mechanism and drivers for mHealth legitimation, whereas the last section focuses on 
the legitimation strategies undertaken by the different actors in the TIS.   
5.5.1 Blocking mechanisms for legitimation 
As discussed in section 2.6, Suchman (1995) classifies legitimation into pragmatic, moral and 
cognitive and provides a number of subtypes that are the starting point of this analysis. They 
were already discussed in section 4.6.1 and summarised in table 4-4.   
As previously argued in this chapter, data analysis points to different technological, 
organisational and institutional blocking mechanisms hindering mHealth legitimation. For a 
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clearer analysis, they are presented in table 5-4 together with its perceived barriers and the 
affected types of legitimation as proposed by Suchman (1995). 
For example, data analysis suggests that the technology-push orientation of mHealth 
acts as a blocking mechanism.  As discussed in section 5.3.4.2, different participants as well as 
mHealth scholars (Topol & Hill, 2012), contend that mHealth technologies have been typically 
advocated by entrant technological companies as closed solutions to the existing healthcare 
problems. As a consequence, this has generated distrust among healthcare professionals and 
has led to a lack of pragmatic (influential) legitimation (Suchman, 1995). Additionally, mHealth 
entrants have built expectations on mHealth as an enabler to solve issues like sustainability of 
public healthcare systems, or as a tool to democratise healthcare and empower citizens. This 
utopian vision has influenced the creation of moral (consequential) legitimacy for policy makers 
(European Commission, 2014; WHO, 2016), but, as said, it hasn’t contributed to building 
pragmatic legitimation among healthcare professionals. Different organising visions (Swanson 
&and Ramiller, 1997), have produced, in consequence, a misalignment in the different value 
propositions around mHealth. With this, pragmatic legitimation (benefits on the adoption) are 
diluted for healthcare practitioners. Additionally, divergent visions and opposing interests 
among different groups of actors block the implementation of viable business models, which 
also affect pragmatic legitimation. In addition to these barriers, that emerged during the 
analysis of previous sections in this chapter, participants pointed to the organisational inertia of 
the complex healthcare systems that manifests in high levels of bureaucracy, lack of time for 
professionals to deal with change etc. As a consequence, cognitive and moral legitimacy are 
damaged. As one of the entrepreneurs participating in the study contends: 
“The NHS is the main barrier. There are 227 clinical commissioning groups, so you need to sell 
your services to every single one. So it's like having one customer with 227 sales people to go to. 
So, that's the biggest problem: the bureaucracy of the NHS.” (mHealth entrepreneur). 
The president of a European practitioners’ association, points to lack of time: 
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“In our profession, everybody is running behind schedule. There are cuts in the healthcare sector 
[…]. Time is not on our side.”  (Practitioner’s association representative). 
On the institutional side, data analysis points to the clash between the technological 
and healthcare institutional frameworks as a critical blocking mechanism. The clash affects both 
formal and informal institutions like regulation, validation procedures, beliefs, organisational 
culture etc.  As a consequence, moral legitimacy (structural, procedural and personal) is 
undermined.  For example, compliance with the existing clinical regulation and evidence-based 
procedures represent a big debate in mHealth TIS (European Commission, 2014; Villaespin et 
al., 2016). As participants in this study pointed, technological industry is characterised by 
continuous product launches with agile development practices and short time to market lead 
times, whereas regulation in the healthcare industry slows developmental processes in favour 
of safety. 
“The software world, has a remarkably different view to the medical world. The medical world 
knows that they need to go down... for anything new, they go down to clinical trials, they test a 
few things...it takes years to sort out a new treatment, a new drug, whatever....because the 
impact, the side effects, the down side can be catastrophic and indeed literally fatal.” (mHealth 
advisor). 
Table 5-4  Blocking mechanisms for mHealth legitimation. 
Blocking mechanisms Consequences (Perceived 
barriers) 
Types of 
legitimation 
affected 
(Suchman, 1995) 
Technological 
and 
knowledge  
related 
Technology-push 
orientation of mHealth 
• Low involvement of 
healthcare 
professionals   
• Poor perception on the 
benefits of mHealth by 
professionals 
 
 
Pragmatic 
(Influential) 
Moral 
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Organisational Contested organising 
visions 
• Misaligned value 
propositions 
 
Pragmatic 
 
Moral 
Divergent interests • Lack of business models 
• Lack of reimbursement 
 
Pragmatic 
 
 
Organisational inertia • Bureaucracy 
• Lack of time 
• Low access to 
healthcare 
professionals 
Moral 
Cognitive 
Institutional Clash between 
healthcare and 
technological 
institutional 
frameworks  
• Lack of trust 
• Negative evaluation of 
mHealth solutions 
• Low compliance with 
healthcare practices 
and norms (ex. 
evidence based, 
regulatory framework) 
Moral (structural, 
procedural and 
personal) 
 
As discussed in section 4.1, the extant mHealth literature points to a number of barriers 
affecting the adoption of mHealth.  Figure 5-6 shows a graph containing the categories of the 
most important perceived barriers from a survey conducted by the World Health Organisation. 
Each of the represented category, includes more refined barriers like: legal issues, lack of 
evidence on cost–effectiveness, competing priorities, lack of legislation and regulation, lack of 
clinical evidence on the effectiveness of mHealth, lack of demand, human and/or technical 
capacity issues, reimbursement, interoperability and standardisation, privacy concerns and lack 
of leadership. (WHO, 2016). 
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Figure 5-6 mHealth adoption barriers in Europe. (WHO, 2016, p.49) 
 
The aim of the present analysis is to identify the underlying root causes of these barriers. 
As an example, data analysis in this study suggests that lack of clinical evidence, a main reported 
barrier in mHealth literature, is a consequence of the clash between the technology and 
healthcare institutional frameworks. Moreover, lack of clinical evidence is a legitimation block 
as it negatively affects moral legitimacy. Another example is the lack of reimbursement methods 
and lack of viable business models. As shown in table 5-4, these act as a block for pragmatic 
legitimacy. Moreover, data analysis suggests, as discussed in section 5.3.4.2, that the difficulty 
to establish innovative business models comes in part from the strict regulatory barriers that  
act in favour of incumbent business models. 
In summary, table 5-4 shows the main mechanisms blocking mHealth TIS legitimation. 
The majority manifest in different barriers affecting pragmatic and moral legitimation. These 
two types of legitimation are a pre-requisite before cognitive legitimacy can be obtained (Laïfi 
& Josserand, 2016). Cognitive legitimacy represents the last step in the legitimation process as 
when it occurs, the innovation is taken for granted and alternatives become irrelevant 
(Suchman, 1995).  
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5.5.2 Legitimation drivers 
 
The previous section has analysed the legitimation barriers for mHealth.  As data evidences, 
expectations created by entrants on the potential of mHealth had a positive legitimation impact 
on policymakers. However, data analysis points to a set of technological, organisational and 
institutional aspects impeding the legitimation of mHealth.  
 Now, this section analyses in more depth, the case of Mersey Burns. Mersey Burns, as 
introduced in section 5.3.1, became the first mHealth application certified as a medical device 
in the UK. Therefore, it constitutes a good example for the analysis of the legitimation drivers of 
mHealth.  The application calculates on a mobile device (typically a tablet), the type and amount 
of resuscitation fluids that doctors need to prescribe to patients in cases of burn injuries. The 
application prescribes the fluids through analysing pictures of the burning surface area.  Mersey 
Burns was created by a plastic surgeon MD. Mr Rowan Pritchard Jones and two IT experts. One 
of the creators of Mersey Burns participated in this study.   
 Data analysis suggests that the drivers enhancing Mersey Burns’ legitimation are very 
similar to the ones found for CFD (see section 4.6.1 in chapter 4).  First of all, the application 
was developed to help burn specialists deal with  problems they face in their daily practice.  To 
do so, MD. Mr Rowan Pritchard Jones involved his colleagues and students during the 
development and tests of the application, following a knowledge co-creation pattern as 
opposed to a technology push orientation. Through this, pragmatic legitimation was enhanced, 
as practitioners could see the benefits of the application. Moreover, as they participated in its 
development, pragmatic influential legitimacy, moral and cognitive legitimacy were enhanced 
also.  Secondly, the development process complied with the norms and regulations of the 
healthcare system: clinical trials were conducted and a paper was published. This contributed 
to getting a quick acceptance by the regulatory bodies (less than 6 months according to the 
participant), and from a legitimation perspective, it contributed to enhancing moral and 
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cognitive legitimacy.  Thirdly, MD. Mr Rowan Pritchard Jones is a reputed plastic surgeon and 
the application was endorsed by the Plastic Surgeon Association, which contributed to building 
moral(personal) legitimacy.  
 In summary, Mersey Burns legitimated by conforming to customers’ requirements and 
healthcare practices and regulations. Although on a different scale, MD. Mr Rowan Pritchard 
Jones, acted as a system builder in a similar way as Professor Spalding did for CFD (chapter 4). 
 
5.5.3 Legitimation strategies 
 
The previous section presented Mersey Burns as an example of how conforming with the 
prevailing institutions contributes to building legitimacy.  As Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) 
contend, conforming to existing norms and practices is the most convenient legitimation 
strategy. However, innovations frequently come with new rules of the game (Suchman, 1995) 
and conforming to incumbent institutional rules might undermine the transformative potential 
of the innovation. As Steinhulb et al. (2015, p.5) reflect:   
“Attempting to fit disruptive technologies into existing systems has historically been shown to 
prevent anticipated gains. Similarly, the implementation of mHealth technologies only as 
adjuncts to existing systems of care likely will lead to results that fall well short of demonstrating 
their true impact.”  
As repeatedly discussed in sections 2.6.3 and 4.6.3, Suchman (1995) defines in addition 
to conform strategies, two additional ones: selection and manipulation.  Selection refers to opt 
for audiences where the novelty will fit or be supported better by the institutional environment. 
Manipulation, on the other hand, defines the process of changing the existing institutional 
environment in favour of the innovation.  Suchman (1995) suggests, that realistic strategies fall 
in a continuum from conformity to manipulation. In addition to Suchman’s (1995) strategies, 
Zimmerman and Zeitz propose a fourth one, creation of new institutions that did not exist. 
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Contrary to Mersey Burns’ strategy, the 3millionlives program, as discussed in section 
5.2.4.2, attempted, without much success, a manipulative strategy for changing healthcare 
practices in favour of the technology. As discussed, the program was driven by technology firms 
without the involvement of practitioners in the decision-making process.  
In between Mersey Burns and 3millionlives projects, data analysis suggests that the majority 
of strategies undertaken by participants in the study (entrepreneurs, entrant and incumbent 
firms), fall in the conformation-selection space. Data suggests that they look for favourable 
contexts with less institutional constraints. The reported strategies can be summarised as: 
I. Selection of less regulated and professionalised areas of healthcare   
Data analysis suggests that entrant firms, and particularly entrepreneurs and SMEs, tend to 
develop mHealth solutions in areas with blurred regulation resting between the clinical 
healthcare and wellbeing space. As an example, Brown et al.(2016), analyse the increase of 
mHealth solutions to treat common mental health disorders like anxiety or depression, an area 
where therapies are probably less regulated. Moreover, the analysis on mHealth economics 
conducted by Research2guidance (2017, p.6), confirms that mHealth app companies, which 
have a predominantly technological background, are focused on mental health and weight: 
 “… pharma companies are concentrating on providing products and services for ’medication’, 
’diabetes’ and ’heart, circulation, blood’, whereas hospitals are developing apps for ’hospital 
efficiency’. mHealth app companies are specialising in areas like ’weight management’ or 
’mental health’. Health insurers are active above average in ’health & fitness’.” 
 Additionally, data suggests that big ICT companies have pivoted their orientation 
towards mHealth to avoid regulation. As an example, in a conversation with the representative 
in one of the top ICT firms, he stated: 
 “We’ve changed our orientation towards mHealth. We try not to play in the medical space 
anymore. It is very difficult to compete there. We are (in this summit) presenting a solution for 
the integral care of elderly people once they leave hospital. There is a big gap there to ensure 
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they have food when they arrive home, that the house is warm etc…We also monitor that they 
take their pills, that they feel well and can talk to their nurse from home…” 
II. Position of products and services for the consumer market 
The majority of entrepreneurs participating in this study manifested the intention to position 
their mHealth products for the end user market. The reasons for their strategic decision were 
to avoid regulatory issues and facilitate direct access to their target customers.  At the time of 
data collection, EU regulation for mHealth applications and mobile devices presented many grey 
areas, and entrepreneurs could market their products and obtain a CE Mark complying with the 
Radio and Telecommunications Terminal Equipment (RTTE) Directive. The requirements of this 
directive are much less strict compared with those of the EU Medical Devices Directives (MDD).  
III. Collaboration between entrants and incumbent healthcare providers 
Despite the competition and technological firms’ push, data analysis reveals, as discussed in 
section 4.2.3, important alliances and collaboration between entrants and incumbent 
organisations. According to some participants, collaboration enhances moral and cognitive 
legitimacy. As an EU policy maker contends:  
“ What we see happening now is that there are certain let's say...companies that are good in IT 
and in citizen interaction and they are teaming up with professionals from the field like 
doctors....So there are that companies that are providing for example remote diagnosis and 
remote health consulting....that have a professional team of doctors who are willing to offer 
their services […]. So it is the partnership arrangement where the professionalism is coming from 
the medical field partnering with the professionalism coming from the IT field.”  (EU policy 
maker). 
 An interesting aspect related to collaboration, is that the majority of participants didn’t 
foresee a shift of key players in the healthcare field as a consequence of mHealth. As an expert 
from a big ICT firm contends: 
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“I don't tend to think that we will see another Kodak moment...  So I don't think we're going to 
see something like that for a very simple reason, those are consumer electronic devices 
technologies. […] whereas medical devices are very expensive...I see here more a collaborative 
model where you have these big companies and lot of medium app developers providing 
innovative solutions. But I don't envision at least in the short term -as it happened to Kodak or 
Nokia - a total shift of actors in the market for the very simple reason that the nature of the 
technology is different....and it is way more expensive than others and it requires a lot of time 
for developments, certifications....it is very different.” (big ICT company representative). 
 
IV.  Sell innovation to incumbent healthcare companies 
All entrepreneurs participating in the study confirmed that they had contacted, or at least tried 
to be, by pharmaceutical and medical device companies to offer them their products.  
Participants from the pharmaceutical side confirmed the vigorous activity in their mHealth 
accelerators, where they evaluate innovation coming from entrepreneurs and SMEs. As the 
mHealth manager at a big pharmaceutical industry summarises:  
“I think the big majority (of entrepreneurs and SMEs) will end up selling their product. In fact, I 
receive almost on a daily basis, SMEs and entrepreneurs offering their ideas and products. Why? 
Because you can have a great idea, but when it comes the moment to commercialise it, you need 
a big injection of venture capital. You need the backup of a big firm. […] There are small 
companies that are working very well […] and they are having a high impact at patient level. 
What happens then? That they fail in reaching the healthcare practitioners and managers. But 
from patient's perspective they are having a lot of impact […]  (Healthcare systems) are very 
traditional environments. They don't contemplate these visits of people offering them a new 
idea. If you have an idea...to whom do you offer it? It doesn't exist that figure in healthcare 
systems that you go and if they like your idea they fund it...At the end, it is us, the industry, who 
fund this type of projects.” (Pharmaceutical representative). 
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V. Move to geographical areas with less rigid regulatory frameworks 
Some participants in the study pointed out that emerging regions with low or non-existent 
public healthcare systems are experiencing faster levels of mHealth adoption. As the 
representative of an ICT alliance contends: 
“In emergent countries, in some regions in South America or Africa, where public healthcare as 
we understand doesn’t exist, and where to some extent they start from scratch, adoption is much 
more rapid and easier, because they don't have to coexist with the previous healthcare system.” 
(ICT alliance representative). 
 However, this vision, backed up by other participants in the study and several consulting 
firms’ reports, is contrasted by different academic studies raising several technical, economic 
and cultural barriers for the legitimation of mHealth in emerging countries (Mechael et al., 2010; 
Iwaya et al., 2013). 
 Despite this, one of the big pharmaceutical companies participating in this study, 
confirmed the creation of different mHealth accelerators in Africa arguing a more flexible 
institutional environment:  
“There are lots of opportunities for mHealth (in Africa). We’ve got great results in the pilots we’ve 
conducted so far […] There is less red tape involved. It is easier to work with doctors too…” 
(Pharmaceutical representative). 
 In summary, data analysis reveals that successful mHealth legitimation strategies move 
in the conformation – selection space. Manipulative strategies for mHealth, on the other hand, 
present important difficulties to succeed. Particularly if these strategies are undertaken by 
entrepreneurs and firms outside the healthcare sector. Evidence suggests that entrepreneurs 
will strategically select contexts with lower institutional barriers. Consequently, data analysis 
shows that legitimation strategies are influenced by the institutional constraints in the different 
contexts (geographical, sectoral, organisational etc.) where the TIS needs to be legitimated.  This 
aspect is further discussed in the next section 5.6, and in section 6.3.1. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
 
The surge in mobile connectivity and wearables over the last decade, has created 
unprecedented levels of expectation around the opportunities to transform traditional 
healthcare pathways through the provision of mobile healthcare products and services. 
mHealth offers among other choices, the possibility to supply ubiquitous monitoring and 
diagnostic devices with automated clinical decision tools.  Furthermore, in some cases, through 
a fraction of the cost of traditional medical equipment or services. 
In spite of this, mHealth technologies for clinical care present low levels of adoption due 
to significant barriers and challenges (European Commission, 2014; WHO, 2016). This suggests 
that at the present time, mHealth, as a TIS, is in its formative phase (Bergek et al., 2008a).  
Therefore, mHealth for diagnostics and chronic disease management, represents an exceptional 
case to study legitimation in the formative phases of a TIS. However, the endeavour is not 
exempt from difficulties, as conducting TIS prospective research presents certain limitations. 
Chief among them, is the study of the dynamics of a system that is still evolving and for which 
its final configuration might be different from that observed at the time of data collection.  As 
an example, this study hasn’t succeeded in identifying mHealth system builders as defined by 
Hughes (1987).  
One of the main overall conclusions of the study is the uneven development and 
performance of the mHealth TIS functions. On one hand, data analysis suggests that knowledge 
development, entrepreneurial experimentation and resource mobilisation (to a more limited 
extent than the others), are well developed and performing functions. On the other hand, 
influence on the direction of search, legitimation and market formation present important 
blocking mechanisms. These results are consistent with the findings by Hellsmark and Jacobson 
(2009) in their study on the Austrian gasified biomass TIS.  The authors made use of the “motors 
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of the TIS” expression (Hekkert et al., 2007) to group closely related functions of similar 
performance and outline their underlying blocking factors. 
 
 
Figure 5-7 mHealth motors of innovation. Developed by the author 
  
Figure 5-7 shows the motors of innovation for mHealth. As discussed, the knowledge 
development, entrepreneurial experimentation and resource mobilisation functions constitute 
the “strong motor of the TIS”, whereas the influence on the direction of search, market 
formation and legitimation constitute the “weak motor of the TIS”.  The boxes on the left side 
of the figure represent the mechanism inducing or hampering the motors. For the strong motor, 
data analysis points to two main inducement mechanisms: landscape pressures in the form of 
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socio-economic problems in the incumbent health systems (Geels, 2005a), and market 
opportunities raised by the potential of the technology.  The weak motor is obstructed by a set 
of blocking mechanisms like the technological push orientation of mHealth, contested 
organising visions (Swanson & Ramiller, 1997), organisational inertia, divergent interests among 
key actors leading to lack of innovative business models, and the clash between healthcare and 
technological institutions. These blocking mechanisms produce in consequence, observable 
barriers as reported by mHealth literature (European Commission, 2014; WHO, 2106).  
Furthermore, data analysis evidences lack of pragmatic and moral legitimation due to the 
blocking mechanisms in the system. As Suchman (1995) and Laïfi and Josserand (2016) contend, 
pragmatic and moral legitimacy are prerequisites to building cognitive legitimacy, the last step 
in the legitimation process.  
Expectations created by mHealth advocates on the potential of the innovation to solve 
healthcare systems’ problems, have contributed to creating pragmatic and moral legitimation 
among policy makers. However, the technological push orientation of mHealth and the lack of 
viable and innovative business models have turned into a lack of pragmatic legitimacy (in the 
form of appropriable benefits) for healthcare professionals. 
Data analysis suggests that building moral legitimacy (i.e. mHealth is the right thing to 
solve healthcare problems), might not be enough if pragmatic legitimation for adopters and 
other key actors is not built. Furthermore, the arguments provided by mHealth entrants to build 
moral legitimacy, are grounded on a utopian discourse (cost efficiency, citizens’ empowerment, 
technology as a transformational tool), that has not been bought by healthcare professionals 
with a humanist organising vision (centred on patients, illness experience, relationships etc.) 
(Greenhalgh et al., 2012). On the contrary, some participants in the study perceived claimed 
mHealth benefits as self-interested.  Data analysis evidences that whereas expectations can 
contribute to build a shared vision about a desirable future,  and might also fulfil a performative 
function attracting attention and investment (Bergek et al., 2008a; Borup et al., 2006), they need 
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to be contrasted with high quality evidence to avoid self-promoter paradoxes and recurrent 
disappointments that can result in credibility damage (Brown & Michael, 2003), and 
consequently in a loss of moral legitimacy. Therefore, building pragmatic and moral legitimation 
requires the sustainment of expectations supported with evidence.  
Data analysis suggests that building pragmatic legitimation among TIS key actors is 
crucial for the success of the TIS. However, organisational studies beyond Suchman (1995), see 
Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) for a review, or TIS studies, have neglected the role of pragmatic 
legitimacy. This omission has probably hidden the political dimension and conflicting 
interactions inside the TIS, an aspect much criticised by TIS contestant scholars like Kern (2015) 
or Meadowcroft (2011). As an example, in a recent TIS legitimation study by Markard et al. 
(2016), the interactions that contribute to build or destroy pragmatic legitimation are not taken 
into account.  
This chapter has also brought to discussion an example of successful and unsuccessful 
mHealth projects. The unsuccessful project, named 3millionlives, reported barriers that are 
consistent with the findings in blocking mechanisms of the study (see table 5-4 and figure 5-6). 
The successful project, -the mHealth app Mersey Burns,   reported legitimation drivers that are 
consistent with those found for CFD (chapter 4) like: (i) knowledge co-creation  (enhancing 
pragmatic moral and cognitive legitimacy), (ii) adherence to healthcare norms and practices  
(enhancing moral and cognitive legitimacy), (iii) endorsement from professional surgeons’ 
association  (enhancing moral/personal legitimacy) and (iv) provide evidence (enhancing 
pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy). 
This case study reveals interesting insights regarding the influence of institutional 
constraints in the development of legitimation strategies. As discussed in section 5.5.3, data 
analysis evidences that mHealth entrants strategically search legitimation in favourable 
contexts like: end user market, clinical practices with lower regulation and lower level of 
professionalisation, geographies with non-rigid regulations etc.   
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As discussed in section 2.6.5, TIS has been criticised for its myopia towards external 
contexts, and different TIS scholars have urged for the need of empirical research on external 
contexts (Bergek et al., 2015; Markard et al., 2015). Bergek et al. (2015) define contexts as 
external organisational fields that share dominant technological paradigms, common held 
beliefs and culture, and shared problem agendas that translate into common institutional 
arrangements. Contexts can be sectoral, geographical, technological etc.  Data analysis reveals, 
as discussed, that entrepreneurs and entrant firms will strategically look for favourable contexts 
where the institutional barriers or the institutional clash between proponents and adopters is 
low. This finding is also supported by the CFD case study, where data analysis showed that 
system builders succeed to legitimate in contexts with no substitutive products for CFD.  A 
further discussion on external contexts, and its impact on legitimation is provided in section 
6.3.1. 
Finally, data analysis suggests that the adoption of mHealth won’t necessarily come with 
a displacement of incumbent firms as key players. As in the case of CFD (chapter 3), collaborative 
models between incumbents and entrants contribute to enhance legitimation in wider contexts.  
Collaborative innovation models (Chesbrough, 2006), as the ones evidenced in this research, 
question different theories of firms’ competition.  Theories of firms’ competition (Anderson & 
Tushman, 1990; Christensen, 1997) argue that “competence-destroying” or disruptive 
innovations give an attacker’s advantage to entrant firms and displace incumbents.  
The next chapter will present the propositions and empirical framework resulting from 
the themes that emerged in this and in the previous chapter. In addition, a discussion of the 
theoretical, methodological and practical contributions arising from this thesis will be provided. 
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Chapter 6 - Research conclusions and contributions 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter brings this thesis to a conclusion. The next section, section 6.2, presents a summary 
of the research and a discussion on the attainment with respect to the research primary 
objective and the research questions. This is followed by section 6.3, where a summary of the 
key research findings and associated propositions are discussed. These propositions ground a 
framework (discussed in section 6.4), that attempts to explain the mechanisms contributing to 
building legitimation of BTIs. Section 6.5, presents the contributions to theory, methodology 
and practice. The next section6.6, discusses the limitations of the study and suggests the agenda 
for future research. Finally, section 6.7, brings the chapter to an end with a summary. 
6.2 Summary and research aim attainment  
 
The research aim and objectives set out at the beginning of this study (see section 1.3) are 
largely met, and as a consequence, the research questions posed in section 2.7.2 have been 
answered. The following subsections provide a summary of the research and the rationale 
supporting the statement of achievement.  
6.2.1.1 Research aim and objectives 
Guided by the importance of understanding why most BTIs at the formative stage (past the pilot 
phase and with a fledgling market presence), fail or remain in niches without acquiring critical 
mass on one hand, and the paucity of studies on the early phases of the innovation phenomena 
on the other, the broad research aim of this thesis was set out to identify and unfold the critical 
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processes in the formative phase of BTI’s before they acquire critical mass and start their 
diffusion trajectory. In order to accomplish such an ambitious aim, the researcher conducted a 
critical and analytical literature review to identify, among the different strands of innovation 
studies, what theoretical and analytical starting points could best serve the study’s overall 
purpose. As a result of the literature review process, the researcher selected TIS (Carlsson & 
Stankiewicz, 1991; Hekkert et al., 2007; Bergek et al., 2008a; Hellsmark & Jacobsson, 2009) as 
the most suitable theoretical and analytical starting point to unfold the early phases of the 
innovation phenomena. However, and to some extend surprisingly, the researcher found that 
TIS studies have largely ignored the insights of legitimation, a critical process in the formative 
phase of TIS. (Bergek et al., 2008b; Hellsmark, 2010; Markard et al., 2016). Consequently, the 
research aim was narrowed into three research questions, for which the degree of achievement 
is discussed in the next subsections. 
Overall, the research aim and objectives of this thesis have been achieved as: 
(I) Legitimation has been identified as a critical process in the formative phase of TIS. 
(II) Empirical data has corroborated the contextuality of the legitimation process as 
suggested by recent research in the field (Bergek et al., 2015; Markard et al., 2016). 
(III) The interdependency of legitimation with other external and internal processes in 
the TIS has been refined. 
(IV) The relevance of system builders (Hughes, 1987) in the legitimation process has 
been confirmed. 
(V) As the result of all the above, this research proposes a framework portraying the 
mechanisms contributing to developing legitimacy. The framework and the 
developing propositions grounding it, are further discussed in sections 6.4. and 6.3 
respectively. 
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6.2.1.2 Research Question 1: how do and the extent to which system builders 
contribute to establishing legitimacy within a TIS? 
This thesis confirms the critical role that system builders play in the formative phase of a TIS.  
The analysis of empirical data reveals that the extent of their transformative capacity to build 
institutional alignment and legitimacy depend on different intentional, unintentional, internal 
and external factors. In terms of internal factors, this study identifies that both the internal 
organisational and institutional structures in which system builders are embedded, aka general 
structure (Hellsmark, 2010), influence their transformative capacity. Data reveals that system 
builders embedded in flexible general structures, will more likely develop higher levels of 
transformative capacity than system builders constrained in rigid general structures.  In relation 
to the external factors, data analysis suggests that the extent of their transformative capacity 
will be determined by the constraints of the different contexts in which legitimation needs to 
be accomplished. The study suggests that system builders are more likely to start building 
legitimation in contexts with low institutional constraints, or in contexts where formal and 
informal institutions do not represent a clash with respect to system builders’ general 
structure.28 
Therefore, this study confirms that system builders contribute to legitimacy mainly through 
developing knowledge, leading entrepreneurial experimentation, attracting actors, creating 
informal networks of knowledge and setting the basis for institutional alignment across “aligned 
contexts”. However, the study reveals that their transformative capacity acting individually 
might be limited in contexts with significant institutional barriers. In these contexts, data reveals 
that alliances with incumbent firms will increase the possibilities of transitioning the TIS from 
the formative to the growth phase.  
                                                          
28 Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 provide more insights on the definition and conceptualisation of general 
structure and institutional contexts 
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As a consequence of the above discussion, research question 1:  how do and the extent 
to which system builders contribute to establishing legitimacy within a TIS? is answered. 
6.2.1.3 Research Question 2:  what are the principal mechanisms aiding the 
legitimation of a TIS? 
This thesis suggests that mechanisms involved in the legitimation of a TIS come largely from: 
interactions inside the focal TIS, interactions between the focal TIS and the contexts where 
legitimation is required, and interactions between the focal TIS and exogenous factors. The 
propositions developed in section 6.3 together with the framework discussed in section 6.4, 
explain the identified mechanisms contributing to developing pragmatic, moral and cognitive 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995), and therefore, they answer research question 2.  To highlight a 
critical mechanism, this study finds that the way knowledge is developed during the formative 
phase of TIS has a critical influence in the likelihood of a successful legitimation. Data analysis 
reveals that co-creation of knowledge as opposed to technological solutionism or technology 
push solutions, contribute to creating pragmatic, moral and ultimately cognitive legitimation. 
 
6.2.1.4 Research Question 3: what are the key legitimation strategies capable of 
overcoming the ’liability of newness’? 
 
Understanding the mechanisms that contribute to building legitimacy (RQ2), it becomes critical 
to take informed strategic decisions.  As discussed in sections 2.6.3, 4.6.3 and 5.5.3, Suchman 
(1995) defines three types of legitimation strategies: conform, selection and manipulation. 
Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) adds creation to account for the development of new institutional 
contexts that did not exist. Whereas conforming to adopters’ institutional contexts becomes the 
most straight forward strategy, technological innovations often require new game rules, and as 
such, conforming strategies might not be an option. On the other hand, data analysis suggests 
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that manipulative strategies to modify institutional contexts in benefit of the innovation might 
not be a realistic entry strategy, particularly if system builders are entering into institutional 
contexts with high barriers. This thesis finds that successful system builders’ entry strategies fall 
in the space conform-selection. As evidence suggests, system builders will strategically select 
institutional contexts that fit well enough into what the new technology requires.  In more 
complex contexts, this study shows that system builders will more likely create alliances with 
incumbent firms, combining knowledge developed by the former with the capabilities and 
resources of the latter, to build pragmatic and moral legitimacy, and therefore, “overcome the 
liability of newness”. 
As a consequence of the above discussion, research question 3 is answered. 
6.3 Key findings and developing propositions 
This section summarises key findings from data analysis and develops a set of propositions 
aimed at grounding a framework on legitimation (section 6.4).  Findings are organised following 
a similar logic as the data analysis in chapters 4 and 5. In chapters 4 and 5, Hellsmark and 
Jacobsson’s (2009) framework on TIS dynamics discussed in section 2.7 (figure 2-7), was used as 
a guide to organise data analysis into four main areas of investigation: system building 
capabilities, TIS functions, exogenous factors and legitimation. In this section, the discussion 
starts with the analysis of exogenous elements influencing legitimation. Consistently with recent 
TIS studies (Bergek et al., 2015; Markard et al., 2015; Markard et al., 2016), data analysis reveals 
a strong influence of external structures into legitimation. An in-depth discussion of the 
different external structures and its developing propositions is presented in section 6.3.1. After 
this, the rest of the subsections focus on the findings and developing propositions around 
system building capabilities, TIS functions, and legitimation dynamics and strategies. 
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6.3.1 Findings and propositions regarding external structures 
 
Data analysis evidences that the process of innovation legitimation depends heavily on external 
elements to the TIS: for example, as discussed in section 4.3.4, the pace of legitimation of CFD 
varied across sectors and was more readily acquired in those with no substitutive products.  
Similarly, section 5.3.3, identified that system builders orientate their legitimation strategies 
towards less professionalised areas of healthcare or regions with underdeveloped services and 
less rigid regulations. Additionally, the development of other technologies, suggests a positive 
influence on the legitimation of a TIS, as discussed in sections 4.5.1 and 5.3.6. 
The external factors and structures outside the TIS (like sectors, related technologies, 
geographies etc.) are named as “contexts” in recent TIS literature (Bergek et al., 2015; Markard 
et al., 2015).  Therefore, from the above discussion, this research evidences that legitimation is 
a context dependent process. And context extends beyond the internal dynamics of TISs 
encompassing external structures including technological, sectoral, geographical etc. 
As defined in section 2.6.5, TIS literature conceptualises contexts as organisational fields 
that share common institutional arrangements including: dominant technological paradigms, 
common held beliefs, practices etc. (Bergek et al., 2015). As areas of higher order than the TIS, 
contexts exhibit a degree of coherence and stability (Markard et al., 2016). Bergek et al. (2015) 
identify 4 different context structures: technological, sectoral, geographical and political.  
Technological contexts refer to related and surrounding TISs. As different technologies can 
compete and complement each other, they mutually influence each others development 
dynamics. Consequently, a TIS can become a technological context for other related TISs. 
Sectoral contexts are associated with the pre-existing infrastructures and institutions in a 
specific sector. Sectors are characterised by well-defined institutional settings (norms and 
practices, specific regulations, developed technologies etc.) and developed infrastructures. 
Through their institutionalisation, sectors become stable contexts. Breakthrough innovations 
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might change, or on the contrary adapt to, these established contexts (further insights on the 
adaptation/change process are discussed in section 6.3.4). Geographical contexts relate to the 
links and resources that may exist in a territory out of the boundaries of the TIS. Finally, the 
political contexts in which a TIS is embedded, is also of key importance for its development. As 
an example, political agendas in support of a TIS are of key importance to mobilise resources 
and to some extent, to build legitimation as will be further discussed at the end of this section. 
This research finds that whereas technological contexts (in the form of related TIS) and 
landscape pressures like political and societal debates (as part of the political context) are 
relatively simple to identify, other external factors and structures emerging from data analysis 
overlap between sectoral, geographical or political contexts.  As Bergek et al. (2015, p.61) argue: 
“the four context structures might not be neatly separated in an empirical setting. The point 
made here is, however, that depending on the purpose of the study we can focus on a particular 
context structure to investigate its dynamics and links to the focal TIS”.  
As the focus of this research is on legitimation, a process tightly bounded to formal and 
informal institutions, this research names a new external context: “institutional context” to 
refer to the external institutions (formal and informal), that affect the legitimation process. As 
discussed, an institutional context can overlap between sectoral, geographical, and/or political 
settings that are not always possible to separate. The definition of a new external context is 
consistent with Bergek et al.(2015, p.61) postulations: ” We fully acknowledge that there are 
other relevant context structures than the four we discuss […] We still expect that the 
elaborations made in this paper provide a sort of template for analysing other context structures 
in the future.” 
In summary, this thesis finds three main differentiated external structures that influence 
TIS legitimation. These are: (i) institutional contexts defined as external formal and informal 
institutional structures, (ii) the development of related TIS and (iii) landscape factors or 
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pressures at macro level like political or societal debates.  These identified external structures 
serve as the basis for the first developing proposition discussed over the next paragraphs.   
 This research finds, that when a TIS needs to legitimate across different institutional 
contexts, (typically sectors or geographical areas with a coherent set of formal and informal 
institutions), the process will typically start in institutional contexts that present more 
favourable conditions for system builders. Previous TIS studies suggest that geographical or 
technological proximity factors might be relevant for system builders (Markard et al., 2016). 
However, TIS scholars haven’t so far delved into the conditions that make an institutional 
context a favourable space to legitimate a new technology. This research finds that institutional 
contexts with favourable conditions for system builders, might be those with a low degree of 
institutionalisation. In particular, institutional contexts with:   
• no substitutive products (or no dominant technological paradigms) 
• low entry barriers  
• low regulatory constraints  
• low professionalisation (lack of deeply embedded beliefs, norms or practices)  
•  certain alignment to system builders’ beliefs, values and norms (further discussed in 
section 6.3.2) 
 As discussed in section 4.3.3, the lack of substitutive products, was key in the smooth 
legitimation of CFD across different sectors. In addition, and probably also as a consequence of 
not having a technology to displace, low competition and low entry barriers boosted the entry 
of new entrepreneurs and firms in the TIS. On the other hand, as discussed, the mHealth case 
study reveals that entrants are preferably looking to legitimate in regions with more favourable 
regulations or regions with underdeveloped healthcare services, where mHealth does not 
replace existing practices. Moreover, entrants are also looking for low professionalised areas in 
healthcare like elderly care or mental health. Finally, data analysis also reveals that system 
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builders try to take advantage of the grey regulatory areas by positioning their mHealth 
solutions in the wellbeing and fitness area, where regulation is less strict.  
As a consequence of the above, a first proposition can be formulated:  
P.1: The pace to gain legitimacy varies across the different institutional contexts. The process 
will most likely start in contexts that present less institutional constraints for system 
builders.  
 This research suggests that the development of related technologies has a positive 
impact in the legitimation of a focal TIS. The finding is aligned to other TIS studies (Bergek et al., 
2015; Markard et al., 2016). As discussed in the CFD case study, the development of 
computational capabilities, graphical user interfaces, and even software compilers, facilitated 
the legitimation and development of CFD. On the other hand, in the mHealth case study, 
although maybe still too early to determine, the use of wellbeing products (wrist-worn activity 
trackers) as medical decision tools (Rudner et al., 2016) suggests the positive effect that related 
technologies can have in the legitimation of an emerging TIS. Moreover, as discussed in section 
5.3.6, experts agreed on the positive impact of mobile fitness and wellbeing technologies into 
clinical mHealth. 
Finally, as Bergek et al. (2008b) contend, even technologies that might be a priori seen 
as competing technologies, can act as complementarities and develop positive externalities. 
Therefore, a new proposition can be formulated: 
 
P.2: The development of complementary technologies has a positive impact on the 
legitimation of an emerging TIS.  
 
Markard et al. (2016), in a recent study of TIS legitimation, contend that mobilisation 
due to societal problems or political agendas is critical to create (or destruct) legitimacy of 
technologies. In their words: “…What is relevant with regard to legitimacy is that context 
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structures such as larger societal problems or political goals can be mobilised by TIS actors to 
motivate (and legitimate) the focal technology.” (Markard et al.,2016 p.333). Although this may 
be true in certain contexts, the data presented here did not reveal any causal link between 
societal issues and the legitimation of the technologies under scrutiny. In particular, in the case 
of mHealth, data shows that the expectations created on the technology as an enabler for 
affordable universal healthcare, have not contributed to building legitimacy among healthcare 
experts and practitioners.  As discussed in section 5.3.4, data analysis evidences that mHealth 
networks and advocacy coalitions formed primarily by big technology firms, have influenced the 
agenda of EU policy makers, and as a consequence, public resources have been mobilised. 
However, as argued, on the practitioners’ and healthcare experts’ side, these expectations have 
been interpreted as a self-interested act of technology entrant firms, leading, as Suchman 
(1995) contends, to self-promoter paradoxes. Moreover, this research evidences that potential 
adopters of mHealth do not perceive an appropriable benefit in the use of healthcare solutions 
developed by technology firms, particularly, if healthcare professionals haven’t been involved 
in the process.  
In summary, this research finds that pressures at landscape level (Geels, 2005a) in the 
form of societal or political debates, contribute to creating expectations and mobilising 
resources. However, expectations can be perceived as self-promoter paradoxes if they are not 
supported with evidence. Moreover, potential adopters need to perceive an appropriable 
benefit for its adoption (pragmatic legitimacy), in addition to a positive moral evaluation of the 
technology. As a consequence of the above discussion, an additional proposition can be put 
forward: 
 
P.3: Problems at societal level and public debates contribute to building legitimation as long 
as adopters perceive an appropriable benefit on its adoption (pragmatic legitimacy). 
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6.3.2 Findings and propositions regarding system builders’ capabilities 
 
The focus of this section, is to discuss the findings and developing propositions 
pertaining to the extent of the transformative capacity of system builders to build legitimacy in 
the formative phase of a TIS.  As discussed in section 2.6.1, system builders are an important 
subset of TIS actors that contribute to the development of the TIS. They can be entrepreneurs, 
firms, organisations etc. or act collectively through networks and alliances.   
According to Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2009), system builders are critical in the development 
of four structural processes during the formative phase of a TIS. These processes are: (i) 
accumulation of knowledge and artefacts, (ii) entry of firms and other organisations, (iii) 
formation of alliances and networks, and (iv) institutional alignment. The development of these 
processes is critical to legitimate the TIS and move it to the growth phase.  In particular, 
institutional alignment is a core part of the legitimation process. System builders are key in 
shaping institutional alignment in the best interest of the technology (Kukk et al., 2016). The 
different forms of institutional alignment (from creating new institutions on one extreme, to 
adapting the TIS to the existing institutions), are further discussed in section 6.3.5.  
Following Giddens’ (1984) structuration ideas of agents (actors) embedded in 
structures, Hellsmark (2010) argues that system builders are embedded in a structure named 
general structure. According to Hellsmark (2010, p.48): “…system builders’ ‘general structure’ 
both constrains and enables the system builder(s) to address system weaknesses, to reduce 
further uncertainties and to strengthen the TIS.” 
This research finds, aligned to Hellsmark’s (2010) statement above, that system 
builders’ general structure influences their transformative capacity.  As discussed in section 
4.3.3 and summarised in figure 4-4, this research finds that flexible general structures have a 
positive impact in system builders’ transformative capacity. As discussed in chapter 4, although 
the Los Alamos National Laboratory was ahead in the development of knowledge, their 
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organisational and regulatory constraints as a National Laboratory (like the culture of working 
in an isolated environment or the regulation prohibiting their involvement in industrial 
activities), prevented the transformation of scientific knowledge into applied innovation.  In 
other words, Los Alamos’ general structure inhibited their transformative capacity.  
Moreover, this research finds the characteristics of the general structure in which 
system builders are embedded, conditions the innovation trajectories.  As Bergek et al. (2008b, 
p.577) argue: “actors are guided in what they think is right and what they want to do by what 
they know and are able to do. […] Taken jointly, normative and cognitive institutions influence 
decisions and actions in the form of frames (Bijker, 1995; Geels & Raven, 2006) or paradigms 
(Dosi, 1982) that structure learning processes (problem agendas, ways to do business, etc.).”  
In other words, the analysis on how knowledge was created both for CFD and mHealth, 
shows that system builders tend to develop knowledge drawing on the capabilities, beliefs, 
norms and values of the general structure in which they are embedded.  As Hellsmark (2010, 
p.326) contends: “the extent of the system builders’ transformative capacity is conditioned, 
although not determined, by the general structure in which they are embedded.” Extending 
Hellsmark’s (2010) assertion, this research finds that, in some cases, system builders’ general 
structure might have a negative impact on legitimation. As an example, the discussion in section 
5.2.4, the mHealth case study,  reveals a strong clash between the general context of the main 
group of mHealth proponents (technology firms), and the rigid institutional context of the 
healthcare sector: whereas technology firms are embedded in a general structure specialised in 
rapid product developments,  healthcare, on the other hand, is a slow-paced industry with high 
regulatory barriers and rigid organisational procedures and practices aiming at developing safe 
products. This misalignment between the general structure of technology firms and the 
institutional context of the healthcare industry, translates into a lack of trust and legitimacy of 
the solutions proposed by technology firms among adopters in the healthcare sector. 
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Based on the above discussion the following propositions are put forward: 
P.4: System builders are embedded in a general structure that influence the extent of their 
transformative capabilities. 
P.4.1: A flexible general structure has a positive impact on system builders’ 
transformative capacity.   
P.4.2:. Misalignment between system builders’ general structure and the institutional 
context where the TIS needs to adopted, hinders legitimation.  
 
As discussed at the beginning of this subsection, system builders can act individually or 
collectively through networks and alliances.  This research finds that alliances between system 
builders and incumbent firms facilitate the transition of breakthrough technologies from the 
formative to the growth phase.  For example, as discussed in chapter 4, although Professor Brian 
Spalding, the principal system builder in CFD, was key in developing knowledge and nursing 
markets, the transition to growth markets came propitiated by the alliances between other CFD 
system builders and incumbent engineering firms. The latter made use of their marketing and 
sales capabilities to legitimate CFD in wider sectors and geographies. Moreover, they also 
shifted CFD from an initial business model based on consultancy services, to a business model 
based on selling software. 
Data analysis in the mHealth case study discussed in chapter 5, showed that incumbent 
healthcare firms such as large pharmaceutical companies, are establishing alliances with big 
technology and consultancy entrant firms and creating accelerators to capture value from 
entrepreneurs and SMEs. The formation of alliances and mobilisation of resources by incumbent 
healthcare firms entering  mHealth, suggest that legacy healthcare are less interested in creating 
barriers and more interested in developing sensible options to take advantage of the potential 
offered by mHealth. Data suggests that incumbent firms mobilised resources to push a 
trajectory that can preserve their competitive advantage.  This research suggests that whereas 
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small entrants are more likely to develop new knowledge and build legitimacy in few initial 
institutional contexts with favourable conditions (see proposition 1), incumbent firms, 
sometimes taking late entrants’ advantage (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998), will mobilise 
resources towards the adoption of the technology in wider markets and more complex 
institutional contexts. This finding suggests that disruptive technologies, and particularly 
innovations that need to legitimate in complex institutional contexts, do not necessarily come 
with the destruction of incumbent firms as postulated by theories of innovation and firm 
competition (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Christensen, 1997). On the contrary, this research 
evidences that incumbent firms might play a critical role if they mobilise resources and combine 
their capabilities with the knowledge primarily developed by system builders.  This finding is 
aligned to the idea of Open Innovation coined by Chesbrough (2006) and the research on the 
automotive and gas turbine industries by Bergek et al. (2013, p.1210), who contend that 
theories of innovation and firm competition: “...overestimate the ability of new entrants to 
destroy and disrupt established industries and underestimate the capacity of incumbents to 
perceive the potential of new technologies and integrate them with existing capabilities.”  
As a result of the above findings, two additional propositions can be put forward: 
P.5: Incumbent firms might take late entrant advantage of knowledge developed by system 
builders to legitimate the TIS in wider and more complex institutional contexts.  
P.6:  Incumbent firms will collaborate and compete with system builders, mobilising their 
resources and capabilities towards a trajectory that can better preserve their competitive 
advantage. 
Finally, this research acknowledges, that as Kukk (2016, p.131) contends, alliances 
between system builders and incumbent firms are: “often an asymmetric relationship that is 
diﬃcult to balance and gives the larger partner a power advantage.”  As an example, some 
participants in the CFD case study argued that once large firms took control over CFD, 
knowledge networks between academy and industry disappeared, and with them, new 
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breakthroughs in the field. Although there is a wide consensus on the lack of innovation in the 
CFD field since the lock-in of multipurpose codes in the 1980s, this study hasn’t been able to 
establish a solid causal link between lack of innovation and CFD market takeover by large firms. 
However, as discussed in section 6.6, this thesis suggests as an avenue for future research, to 
study the influence of the power advantage of large firms in innovation trajectories.  
6.3.3 Findings and propositions regarding TIS functions 
 
The third group of findings relate to the dynamic interplay of TIS functions towards the transition 
from the formative to the growth phase.  From a methodological perspective, this research finds 
that TIS functional frameworks (Bergek et al., 2008a; Hellsmark & Jacobsson, 2009) present a 
number of limitations for the analysis of technological transitions, particularly, if the study, as 
in the case of mHealth, is not retrospective. These limitations can be summarised as: 
(i) Translation of data into functions performance. Translating observed dynamics and 
experts’ opinions into function performance indicators, might become a 
complicated endeavour. Firstly, because TIS frameworks do not offer thresholds on 
what is defined as a good or bad performance of a function, and secondly, because 
events occurring in the TIS usually affect a combination of functions, making in some 
cases the presentation of results confusing and repetitive. 
(ii) Contextual differences. Aligned to the self-criticism by Bergek et al. (2015), TIS 
functional frameworks (Bergek et al., 2008a; Hellsmark & Jacobsson,2009) do not 
inform on contextual differences in the performance of functions. 
(iii) Heterogeneity of the function “influence on the direction of search”.   This function 
encompasses a wide range of considerations associated with incentives and 
pressures faced by actors upon entering a TIS. These include visions, expectations, 
belief in potential growth etc., mechanisms in terms of competing technologies or 
business models, external factors like demographic or economic debates etc.  This 
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research finds that for better operationalisation, at least external contextual factors 
should be separated from internal incentives in the TIS. 
In addition to Bergek et al.(2008) and Hellsmark and Jacobsson’s (2009) frameworks, this 
research has also operationalised a similar, and maybe a more simple and visual approach, 
developed by Hekkert et al. (2007) and named “motors of innovation” .  As discussed in section 
5.6, motors of innovation represent similar performing functions together with the factors that 
support strong or weak motors.  For example, figure 5-7, shows how expectations on mHealth 
to solve healthcare inefficiencies together with market opportunities raised by the potential of 
the technology, have created a strong motor in the TIS in the functions: knowledge 
development, entrepreneurial experimentation and resource mobilisation.  However, divergent 
interests among key actors, technology-push orientation of the mHealth solutions, or different 
organising visions have created a weak motor in the functions: legitimation, market formation 
and influence on the direction of search. Although the analysis of motors of innovation doesn’t 
solve the limitations of functional analysis outlined above, it provides a more visual tool to 
analyse the dependencies between functions in the TIS.  
This research finds that, as Hekkert et al.(2011) contend, a good performance of “knowledge 
development” and “entrepreneurial experimentation” functions are a pre-requisite to building 
legitimacy.   However, this condition might not be sufficient to form a strong motor of innovation 
around legitimation if, as in the case of mHealth, divergent interests, visions or beliefs exist. 
This research finds that although it is not expected that all actors share the same visions 
and expectations on the technology (function “influence on the direction of search”), a certain 
level of alignment is a pre-requisite for a successful legitimation. This research finds that the 
organising vision concept (Swanson & Ramiller, 1997), represents a good tool to assess the level 
of convergence/divergence of the different visions in the TIS. As an example, in the mHealth 
case study actors were asked about their visions on the main use of the technology, its main 
benefits, degree of disruptiveness etc. The results show that the different groups of actors have 
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contested discourses on the potential and best use of the technology.  As an example of two 
contested visions, data reveals that whereas technology firms and policy makers envisage 
mHealth as a breakthrough innovation capable of solving existing healthcare problems, 
incumbent healthcare firms and healthcare practitioners, on the other hand, perceive mHealth 
as an incremental innovation useful to improve existing healthcare pathways.  The following 
proposition can therefore be formulated: 
P.7: Aligned organising visions among key actors in the TIS enable legitimation.   
6.3.4 Findings and propositions regarding legitimation dynamics and 
strategies 
As previously discussed, this research finds that legitimation is the result of the deliberate 
actions of system builders across different institutional contexts. As reflected in proposition 1, 
system builders will typically orientate their early actions towards institutional contexts where 
they perceive legitimation can be attained more readily.  
In addition to contextual factors, this research reveals the importance of pragmatic 
legitimation (Suchman, 1995). As introduced in section 2.6.3, Suchman (1995) classifies 
legitimacy into three types: pragmatic, moral and cognitive (See table 4-4 for a description of 
Suchman’s types and subtypes of legitimacy). However, pragmatic legitimation has been 
ignored by many scholars in organisational studies (Scott, 1995; Aldrich & Fiol,1994; Zimmerman 
& Zeitz ,2002), as well as in the TIS literature (Bergek et al., 2008b; Markard et al., 2016).  Data 
analysis reveals, aligned to Suchman’s (1995) postulations, that adopters need to identify an 
appropriable benefit in the innovation before they perform further moral or cognitive 
evaluations. In consequence, building pragmatic legitimacy is a pre-requisite for the legitimation 
of a TIS.  As an example, CFD adopters could see important benefits in the adoption of the 
technology, like cheaper and faster product development cycles. Contrary to this, in the 
mHealth case, most of the blocking factors detailed in table 5-4 like: technology-push 
orientation of mHealth, contested organising visions, or divergent interests, have their roots in 
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the lack of perceived pragmatic legitimacy by adopters (healthcare professionals) and to some 
extent, for incumbent healthcare firms.  Therefore, the following proposition is formulated: 
P.8: Building pragmatic legitimacy, in form of appropriable benefits for adopters, is a pre-
requisite for the legitimation of a TIS. 
 As well as pragmatic legitimacy, positive moral evaluations of the technology are a 
requisite before cognitive legitimation can be acquired (Suchman, 1995; Laïfi & Josserand, 
2016). This study evidences the influence of leadership in building moral legitimacy. This 
research finds that system builders’ reputation contributes to building moral legitimacy during 
the early phases of the TIS. As discussed in section 4.6.1 and shown in table 4-4, personal 
legitimacy is a subtype of moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) related to the charisma and 
reputation of the leaders. Personal legitimacy in this research is exemplified in Professor Brian 
Spalding.  On the other hand, the mHealth case study also reveals the importance of system 
builders’ reputation in building moral legitimacy.  As discussed in section 5.5.2, one of the 
factors leading to Mersey Burns becoming the first mHealth app certified in the UK, is the 
reputation, as a plastic surgeon, of his creator and the endorsement of the app by the Plastic 
Surgeons Association. Aligned to this, the majority of experts participating in the mHealth study 
contended that in a highly institutionalised context such as healthcare, moral legitimacy is also 
built through the positive evaluation of the procedures, practices, norms and resources 
employed by system builders.  As table 4-4 illustrates, this type of evaluation corresponds to the 
procedural and structural subtypes of moral legitimation.   
As a consequence, the following propositions are put forward: 
P.9: Building moral legitimacy is a pre-requisite for the legitimation of a TIS.  
P.9.1:  System builders’ reputation and positive evaluations of procedures, norms and 
resources contribute to build moral legitimacy. 
This research provides new insights on the inducing and blocking mechanisms for 
pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. As shown in tables 4-5 and 5-4, legitimation 
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mechanisms can be technology and knowledge related, or associated to organisational, 
institutional or leadership factors.  Some of these mechanisms have  already been covered in 
the course of the previous discussions. The next two propositions add two important levers that 
contribute to legitimation building.   
Data analysis evidences, as shown in table 5-4, that providing evidence on TIS 
capabilities contributes to building pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. This research 
finds that whereas shared expectations on technology contribute to attract actors and 
investment (Bergek et al., 2008a; Borup et al., 2006), they need to be contrasted with high 
quality evidence to avoid recurrent disappointments that can result in a damage of credibility 
(Brown & Michael, 2003), and in consequence, in a loss of moral legitimacy. 
The arguments presented above lead to the formulation of the following proposition: 
P.10: Contrasting expectations on TIS potential with evidence, contributes to creating 
pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. 
Aligned to the above discussion, this research finds that co-creation of knowledge 
(Lusch et al., 2007; Kristensson et al., 2008) is a critical lever for system builders to build 
pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. Developing knowledge involving potential adopters 
contributes to develop a technology that can better solve their problems. This increases 
pragmatic (subtype influential) legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Showing the capabilities of the 
technology also contributes to building pragmatic legitimacy, as the relative advantage of the 
technology (Rogers, 2003) can be demonstrated and adopters can perceive the appropriable 
benefits. Moreover, trialability and compatibility (Rogers, 2003) are enhanced, and with this, 
moral and cognitive legitimacy.  Examples of co-creation of knowledge are found in the analysis 
of Phoenics,  the multi-purpose code developed by Professor Spalding,  and Mersey Burns,  the 
first mHealth certified app in the UK.  
A new proposition can be put forward: 
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P.11: Co-creation of knowledge is critical to building pragmatic, moral and cognitive 
legitimacy.    
As discussed, this research suggests that the dynamics to create a new order of things 
can be a long process, that starts with selective legitimation on “aligned” institutional contexts 
that act as niches of innovation. From this point, different trajectories might occur, depending 
on the characteristics of the institutional contexts where the TIS needs to be legitimated. If the 
remaining institutional contexts do not present high barriers, legitimation will most likely 
succeed by imitation, as described in epidemic models like Rogers’ (2003).  However, this 
research suggests that for trajectories faced with reaching complex institutional contexts, the 
process will be much longer and complicated. Under these circumstances, system builders are 
more likely to act collectively with other key actors like incumbent firms. As contended in 
proposition 6, the latter will mobilise their capacities and resources to build legitimacy towards 
a trajectory that can preserve their competitive advantage. Should this succeed, the TIS will 
legitimate and eventually transition from the formative to the growth phase.    
System builders and other key actors will accomplish different actions to align 
technology to the different institutional contexts. Suchman (1995) and Zimmerman and Zeitz 
(2002) propose four main strategies, as examined in sections 4.6.3 and 5.5.3. These strategies 
can be summarised as:  (i) conform to the needs of existing audiences and their institutional 
contexts, (ii) select audiences and institutional contexts that will better support the novelty,  (iii) 
strategies to manipulate institutional contexts to create new audiences and legitimating beliefs, 
and (iv) creation of new institutional contexts that did not exist.  
This research finds, aligned to Suchman (1995) and Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002), that realistic 
strategies are a combination of conformation, selection, manipulation and creation. For 
example, as discussed in section 4.6.3, CFD system builders created a new institutional context 
for CFD including norms, standards, best practices etc. The majority of the formal rules of CFD 
were developed by ERCOFTAC, a consortium formed by CFD experts, system builders and 
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industrialists.  This new institutional context conformed to the different industrial norms. In 
addition, CFD legitimation processes also followed a selection strategy, as system builders 
selected audiences among industries where they already had a good reputation (personal 
legitimacy) due to previous collaborations.  As discussed in section 5.5.3, the mHealth case study 
suggests that in complex institutional contexts, as in clinical healthcare, initial legitimation will 
more likely succeed by strategies in the conformation-selection space. This research has not 
found so far, any evidence of successful “creation” or “manipulation” strategies for mHealth, 
neither through the analysis of primary data or through an exhaustive search on mHealth 
literature. Although manipulative or creation strategies might be present in the future, data 
suggests, as previously argued, that early successful strategies are those that conform with 
existing healthcare institutions or select niches where mHealth can better fit into existing 
institutional arrangements.  
From the above discussion, a final proposition can be formulated:  
P.12: TIS legitimation will come along as a combination of conformation, selection, 
manipulation and creation strategies. In institutional contexts with high constraints, early 
legitimation strategies will more readily succeed within the conformation-selection space. 
 This last proposition links with proposition 1 (P1) and reinforces the idea that system 
builders might typically start legitimating in “aligned” institutional contexts where technology 
can more easily fit into existing institutional settings.  
 The next section provides the reader with a framework, illustrating how the 
propositions developed in this section can contribute to unfold the underlying dynamics of TIS 
legitimation. 
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6.4 Legitimation framework for Technological innovation systems 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the results from this research have enabled the 
development of a framework that attempts to illustrate the dynamics and mechanisms that 
contribute to building legitimacy in a TIS. This framework,  as depicted in figure 6-1,  is grounded 
on previous research in the TIS field (Bergek et al., 2008b; Jacobson & Hellsmark, 2009; Bergek 
et al., 2015; Markard, 2016), legitimation organisational studies (Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman 
& Zeitz, 2002) as well as in the propositions developed as a result of this study and presented in 
the previous section. 
The proposed framework uses the notion of institutional context as discussed in section 
6.3.1. Technological innovation systems are located in broader environments or contexts 
formed by institutional structures, actors etc. (Bergek et al., 2015). These contexts form areas 
of higher order at different levels: geographical, sectoral, technological etc. As Markard et al. 
(2016, p.333) contend: contexts “exhibit some degree of institutional coherence as they are 
characterised with a host of regulations, organisational practices, user expectations, beliefs 
etc.”. Similar to the socio-technical regime concept (Geels, 2005a) discussed in section 2.5.1, 
contexts can be described “as large sets of semi-coherent institutional and technological 
structures that affect (and often hinder) emerging technologies due to a rigid institutionalisation 
of their core structures.” (Markard et al., 2016, p. 333). 
As Bergek et al. (2015) contend, the distinction between sectoral, regional, 
technological or political contexts might be difficult, and to some extent artificial, in empirical 
research. As presented in section 6.3.1, data analysis in this research suggests a close relation 
between the legitimation and three external structures: (i) the development of related TIS 
(technological context), (ii) landscape factors (political context) and (iii) institutional contexts. 
This research defines institutional contexts as a coherent set of formal and informal institutions 
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like values, beliefs, norms, industrial standards, regulations, technological paradigms etc. 
Institutional contexts can overlap between regional, sectoral or political dimensions. 
Figure 6-1 presents the legitimation framework illustrating main interrelated dynamics. 
As proposition 1 contends (P1), legitimation will initiate with system builders tactically selecting 
institutional contexts where they perceive legitimation can be more readily attained.  As 
discussed in section 6.3.1, examples of these “favourable” institutional contexts can be: (1) 
organisations or sectors where the TIS or system builders’ general structure29 does not 
represent a big clash with respect to the existing institutional arrangements (P4.2), (2) 
geographical regions with non-rigid regulatory frameworks or, (3) market segments with low 
entry barriers or no substitute products for the TIS etc. These initial institutional contexts act as 
“niches” for legitimation. The concept of niche in this framework, is similar to the one developed 
by Geels (2005a). In both cases, niches represent spaces “that allow nurturing and 
experimentation with the co-evolution of technology, user practices, and regulatory structures.” 
(Schot & Geels, 2008, p.538). However, they differ in the sense, that in the present framework, 
niches are mainly developed by system builders as plausible opportunities and not necessarily 
nurtured and protected, as in Geels’ theory, by policy structures.   
This research finds that developing pragmatic legitimation, is crucial to reach more 
adopters and legitimate in wider institutional contexts. This framework suggests that system 
builders will enhance pragmatic legitimacy if the expectations on the technology are contrasted 
with evidence of quality (P10), and knowledge is developed involving technology adopters 
through a co-creation of knowledge paradigm (P11).  In addition, system builders should also 
work in the alignment of the different organising visions within the TIS (proposition 7) (P7). 
The evolution of TIS legitimation from niches to wider contexts will largely depend on 
the institutional constraints in the remaining contexts.  If the remaining institutional contexts 
                                                          
29 See section 6.3.1 for a definition of system builders’ general structure 
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do not present high barriers, legitimation will most likely succeed by imitation as described in 
epidemic models like Rogers’ (2003). On the contrary, if as figure 6-1 shows, the TIS needs to 
gain legitimacy in complex institutional contexts presenting high constrains (see institutional 
contexts 5 to 11 in figure 6-1), system builders will most likely form alliances with larger or 
incumbent firms (P6). As a consequence, the latter will mobilise resources and capabilities, 
sometimes taking late entrant advantage, towards a trajectory that can better sustain their 
business models and competitive advantage (P5).  In this transition, pragmatic and moral 
legitimation will still be critical to gain legitimacy. Therefore, propositions 8, 10 and 11 (P8), 
(P10) and (P11) also apply to complex institutional contexts.  Moral legitimacy, as contended in 
proposition 9.1 (P9.1), will more likely emerge through the evaluation of procedures, norms, 
firms’ resources and structures of the incumbent firms. 
Aligned to TIS literature (Bergek et al., 2008b; Bergek et al., 2015; Markard et al., 2016), 
this framework acknowledges that the development of related TIS (P2) (technological context) 
and landscape factors in the form of public debates, political agendas etc. (P3) (political context) 
contribute to reinforce the TIS and build legitimacy. However, as contended in proposition 3 
(P3), positive moral evaluations of the TIS as a consequence of societal or political debates will 
might not be sufficient to build legitimacy if adopters do not perceive an appropriable benefit 
(pragmatic legitimation). 
 Finally, as proposition 12 contends (P12), the process of legitimation is one that 
combines different strategies in the spectrum conformation-selection-manipulation and 
creation (Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). As an example, legitimation in niches with 
favourable conditions (P1) is a selective strategy. The final aim of co-creation of knowledge is to 
conform to adopters’ needs and norms. Manipulative strategies to change institutional contexts 
in favour of the TIS will typically require lobbyist actions of networks. However, in highly 
institutionalised contexts, early strategies will more likely succeed if they remain in the 
conformation-selection space.     
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Figure 6-1 TIS Legitimation dynamics. Developed by the author 
 
 
6.5 Research contributions 
 
This thesis makes a contribution to theory, methodology and practice. On the theory side, it 
contributes to systems of innovation studies, by offering a broader understanding of 
legitimation in technological transitions. As discussed in section 2.7, despite its criticality, the 
process of legitimation of new technologies has been largely ignored in systems of innovation 
studies. This research presents a set of propositions and a framework that contribute to 
understanding the underlying mechanisms of legitimation. It also provides findings that 
challenge existing perspectives on innovation, like the role of public debates and political 
agenda, the importance of pragmatic legitimacy and co-creation of knowledge or the dynamics 
of competition and collaboration led by incumbent firms.   
In addition to theoretical contribution, this thesis also contributes to systems of innovation 
methodologies, as it validates the principles of TIS for technologies outside the energy sector. 
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Finally, on the practical side, it provides applicable insights and recommendations for innovators 
and policy makers. 
The next sections present an in-depth discussion of the contributions made by this 
study. 
6.5.1 Contribution to theory 
 
As contended by TIS scholars (Bergek et al., 2008b; Hellsmark, 2010; Markard et al., 2016), 
legitimation, despite being a critical function for the transition of TIS into the growth phase, has 
been largely ignored in the Systems of Innovation literature. There is a paucity of empirical 
research on TIS legitimation, with the exception of the recent study by Markard et al. (2016).  
 The overall theoretical contribution of this thesis, is a new framework illustrating the 
dynamics and mechanisms that influence TIS legitimation. This framework can be incorporated 
into the TIS literature strand, in addition to the recent study by Markard et al. (2016). A more 
detailed analysis on the theoretical implications of the framework, point to additional 
contributions to TIS studies, socio-technical transitions and theories of innovation and firms’ 
competition. These are discussed in the next paragraphs and a summary is presented in table 6-
1. 
The first contribution of this thesis relates to the contextual aspects of the legitimation 
process.  Recent TIS research acknowledges the influence of external contexts (geographical, 
institutional, sectoral etc.) in the evolution of a TIS. However, as contended by Bergek et al. 
(2015, p.52): “we still lack a coherent framework that makes explicit how the interactions 
between a TIS and its contexts can be conceptualised.”   In the words of Markard et al. (2016, 
p.333): “Which of the context elements matter for a focal technology has to be determined 
empirically.” 
As presented in section 6.4, this thesis proposes a framework centred in institutional 
contexts to understand TIS legitimation dynamics. The framework illustrates how during the 
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early phases of a TIS, system builders will strategically select institutional contexts where they 
perceive legitimation can be more readily attained. For example, system builders will more likely 
look for contexts with lower regulatory barriers, with no substitute products for the TIS or 
institutional contexts where the innovation does not entail a large clash with respect to the 
values, norms and beliefs of those institutional contexts.  
The second theoretical contribution of this thesis is the incorporation of pragmatic 
legitimacy into the TIS legitimation analysis.  This research, extends the work of Suchman (1995) 
for the legitimation of new industries, by evidencing that system builders need to build 
legitimacy along 3 axes: pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. Moreover, as postulated by 
Suchman (1995), cognitive legitimacy represents the last step in the legitimation process: once 
cognitive legitimation is acquired, the innovation is taken for granted and incorporated into the 
beliefs and routines of adopters. As discussed in the literature review chapter, different 
branches of socio-technical studies define similar closure processes.  For example, Bijker (1997) 
defines closure/stabilisation as the final stage where the technology is accepted by all the 
relevant social groups in its final layout. Similarly, Actor Network Theory (Callon & Latour, 1981) 
define closure as a process that results in artefacts that are given for granted and become 
irreversible. More recently, Markard et al. (2016), refers to framing as the process involving the 
generation of new interpretive frames and shared meanings through the intentional actions of 
actors.   Suchman (1995) contends that legitimation becomes more difficult to obtain as one 
moves from pragmatic, to moral and to cognitive. Consequently, pragmatic and moral 
evaluations are a pre-requisite to building cognitive legitimacy and taking for granted the 
innovation.  The pragmatic dimension of legitimation has been largely ignored by organisational 
and TIS studies.  While different institutional and organisational studies on legitimacy, see Scott 
(1995), Aldrich and Fiol (1994), Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002), have generally analysed the 
cognitive and normative dimensions of legitimation, they’ve omitted the importance of 
pragmatic legitimation.  In the same direction, Markard et al. (2016) distinguish between 
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cognitive, normative and regulatory legitimacy, and neglect pragmatic legitimacy. This research 
finds that ignoring pragmatic legitimacy hinders the confronted interests and to some extent, 
the politics within the TIS. This aspect, as discussed in the literature review chapter, is one of 
the main criticisms of TIS construct (Jacobsson & Bergek,2011; Meadowcroft, 2011; Kern, 2011; 
Kern, 2015; Bergek et al., 2015; Markard et al., 2016). Therefore, this thesis suggests the 
incorporation of pragmatic legitimation in future TIS studies. 
The third contribution to TIS studies, is the consolidation in a framework of a set of 
levers that contribute to building legitimacy. For example, the study unveils factors like system 
builders’ reputation, alignment of different organising visions, contrasting expectations with 
evidence or the criticality of co-creation of knowledge as opposed to technology push solutions 
or technological solutionism.  
The fourth contribution to legitimation studies, comes as a consequence of the 
theoretical implications regarding the relevance of pragmatic legitimation in the field of socio-
technical transitions. Geels (2005a) contends that “landscape pressures” like societal problems 
or public debates can trigger technological change. Aligned to this, Markard et al.(2016) in their 
recent study on TIS legitimation, contend that legitimation can be positively (or negatively) 
influenced by problems at societal level. This research contributes to this strand of studies by 
suggesting that, although public debates and societal problems contribute to building (or 
destroying) moral legitimacy and mobilise resources around an innovation, they are insufficient 
if pragmatic evaluations on appropriable benefits of the technology cannot be demonstrated to 
relevant audiences like potential adopters, investors, incumbent firms etc.   
In addition to the above discussed contributions, this thesis questions the attackers’ 
advantage positions postulated by different theories of innovation and firms’ competition. Most 
well-known theories of innovation and firms’ competition, postulate the creative destruction of 
incumbent firms and industries as a consequence of discontinuous technological change  
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Christensen, 1997). They argue that “competence-destroying” or 
266 
 
disruptive innovations give an attacker’s advantage to entrant firms and leave incumbents 
vulnerable to these attacks.  This thesis, aligned to Bergek et al. (2013) findings, evidences that 
these theories: “overestimate the ability of new entrants to destroy and disrupt established 
industries and underestimate the capacity of incumbents to perceive the potential of new 
technologies and integrate them with existing capabilities.” (Berget et al., 2013, p. 1210). In 
particular, as discussed in the previous sections, this thesis finds that incumbent firms 
simultaneously compete and collaborate with entrants during the formative phase of the TIS. 
Moreover, incumbents become critical for the legitimation of the TIS in complex institutional 
contexts. 
267 
 
Table 6-1 Main theoretical contributions. Developed by the author 
Theory/studies Contribution Extent of contribution 
Technological innovation 
systems (Carlsson and 
Stankiewicz, 1991; Bergek 
et al. 2008b; Bergek et al., 
2015; Markard et al., 2016) 
 
 
Legitimation as a contextual 
process 
This study confirms and 
extends the understanding of 
legitimation as a critical 
contextual process for the 
transition of formative to 
growth phase in a TIS. 
Pragmatic legitimation 
dimension 
This research adds important 
insights to TIS legitimation 
by evidencing the criticality 
of pragmatic legitimacy and 
incorporating it into the TIS 
analysis. 
Mechanisms of legitimation This study adds new insights 
to existing literature on TIS 
legitimation dynamics by 
proposing a framework on the 
mechanisms that contribute 
to build legitimacy. 
Sociotechnical transitions 
(Geels, 2005a; Markard, 
2016) 
Influence of landscape 
pressures (societal and public 
debates) 
This study adds new insights 
to the influence of societal 
and public debates in 
technological transitions, by 
suggesting that landscape 
pressures might not be 
sufficient to build legitimacy.  
Theories of firm competition 
(Anderson and Tushman, 
1990; Christensen, 1997) 
Role of incumbent firms 
Competition and 
collaboration 
This study suggests new 
insights to theories of firm 
competition, by evidencing 
the coexistence of 
collaboration and 
competition dynamics led by 
incumbent firms. It confirms 
the analysis done on this 
respect by Bergek et al. 
(2013).  
 
 
 
6.5.2 Contribution to methodology 
 
This thesis has explored the operationalisation of different TIS constructs such as, the analytical 
framework by Bergek et al.(2008a), the motor of innovations approach (Hekkert et al., 2007), 
and the framework proposed by Hellsmark and Jacobson (2009). The findings in the 
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operationalisation of these frameworks, generate a number of contributions to the 
methodology of TIS that are discussed over the next paragraphs.  
The first contribution relates to the validity of TIS constructs beyond the field of the 
energy sector.  With probably the only exception of Kukk (2016), Kukk’s et al. (2016) studies on 
Herceptin30 and personalised cancer medicines, empirical studies in the TIS field relate to 
technologies in the energy sector. This thesis validates the principles of TIS for technologies 
outside of the energy sector, through the exhaustive operationalisation of TIS constructs for two 
very different technologies: CFD and mHealth. 
As discussed in the literature review chapter, TIS analysis has traditionally taken a meso-
level perspective in the analysis of system functions, as a way to explain innovation failure and 
draw policy recommendations (Hekkert et al., 2007; Bergek et al., 2008a; Bergek et al., 2008b).  
However, more recent TIS research has also incorporated micro-level analysis, to study the 
influence of the actions of system builders in the development of TIS structures and institutional 
alignment. See for example the studies of Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2009), Hellsmark (2010), 
Musiolik and Markard (2011) or Kukk et al. (2016).  This research evidences that an analysis 
centred on system builders provides richer results to unfold TIS dynamics, particularly when 
looking at the dynamics surrounding different institutional contexts.  Therefore, this thesis 
suggests the inclusion of system builders’ perspectives into TIS analysis and concur with recent 
criticisms of TIS scholars on the limitations of analysis purely based on functions’ frameworks 
(Bergek et al., 2015). 
This research finds that the identification of system builders might present difficulties, 
particularly in non-retrospective studies like the mHealth case study (chapter 4). This thesis 
                                                          
30 Herceptin is an antitumoral drug developed by Hoffman la Roche group and initially targeted at 
aggressive breast cancer.  
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points to this aspect as a limitation of current TIS methodology and suggests further empirical 
research to elaborate new methodologies in the identification of TIS system builders.  
Finally, this research agrees with Bergek et al.(2015) in considering the setting of TIS 
boundaries as a potential analytical problem in TIS studies. This particularly applies to the 
identification of what remains inside the TIS and what is part of the external context structures. 
Moreover, this research suggests that TIS frameworks, like Bergek et al. (2008a) and Hellsmark 
and Jacobsson (2009), should be updated to include the analysis of context structures, currently 
only covered in part by the function “Development of positive externalities”. 
6.5.3 Contribution to practice  
 
This thesis explores the dynamics and mechanisms leading to innovation legitimation. The topic 
is of central relevance not only to innovation scholars, but also to involved practitioners like 
policy makers, system builders and firms. They can benefit from a set of propositions and a 
framework that can be of practical value in the development of strategies and policy actions 
towards the development of BTIs. 
 An important practical benefit of the framework is its focus on the interactions between 
the TIS and its contexts. As Bergek et al. (2015) contend, providing a framework based on 
contexts improves TIS as a policy tool and increases the awareness among practitioners that 
technologies develop differently in different contexts. As a consequence, it allows the 
identification of more favourable opportunities for the development of new technologies.  
As an example, system builders can optimise the entrepreneurial experimentation 
function by selecting favourable institutional contexts with lower levels of competition or 
institutionalisation. Moreover, this thesis provides a set of actions that contribute to developing 
pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. Chief among them is co-creation of knowledge. 
Should system builders develop knowledge following the precepts of co-creation of knowledge, 
they will have more chances to legitimate in a larger number of institutional contexts. 
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Additionally, this research provides insights on the factors that contribute to the development 
of system builders’ transformative capacity. As shown in figure 4-5 in section 4.3.3, in addition 
to co-creation of knowledge, organisational, institutional and leadership factors influence their 
ability to develop TIS institutional processes and institutional alignment. 
Policy makers, on the other hand, can also benefit from the insights and results of this 
thesis. They are, together with system builders, key actors during the formative phase of 
technological innovations.  Their role is critical to mobilise resources and facilitate the creation 
of collaborative spaces where knowledge can be developed and actors’ visions aligned in a 
similar manner to the initiatives led by the European Commission during the elaboration of the 
Code of Conduct.  The proposed framework will help policy makers to identify frictions and 
misalignment in involved contexts and provide them with a set of tools that will contribute to 
reducing misalignment. 
6.6 Limitations and future research 
 
This thesis has explored important non-studied areas on innovation legitimation that, as 
discussed in the previous section, offer significant contributions to theory, methodology and 
practice. Moreover, they pave the way for further research pointing to the same central topic. 
However, this study, as most research in the social science domain, entails certain limitations. 
The most important ones, are highlighted below. 
The first limitation relates to the scope of this research. The results and conclusions of 
this thesis are valid only for BTI’s developed by system builders or entrant firms. As in the 
majority of co-evolutionary studies of innovation, this research presents certain Schumpeterian 
bias in placing entrepreneurs at the core of the innovation process. However, this bias doesn’t 
necessarily imply that this thesis neglects the role of large incumbent firms as potential creators 
of BTIs. As discussed in sections 5.2.3 and 5.5.1, this research acknowledges, in alignment with 
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Bergek et al. (2013), that incumbent firms operating in well-established sectors can also develop 
BTI’s as a result of their internal capabilities.  
From a methodological perspective, the main limitation of this research relates to the 
reliability and validity of the obtained results and  in particular, to the external validity and the 
generalisation of the results beyond the context of each presented case study (Bryman, 2012).  
As discussed in section 3.7 of the methodology chapter, whereas some scholars have criticised 
the use of case studies to generate theory (Tellis, 1997), others like Yin (2003), Williams (2000) 
or Eisenhardt (2007), consider case study a valid methodology, as the aim is to engage in a 
theoretical analysis from rich and in-depth data examination.  In any case, this research has 
accomplished a number of countermeasures to minimise potential reliability and external 
validity weaknesses.  
Firstly, during the research design phase, case studies were carefully selected to 
represent two opposing poles with respect to legitimation: whereas for CFD technology 
legitimation occurred smoothly, mHealth for clinical use was well known for being a field full of 
market and regulatory constraints that prevented acceptance and further adoption. Moreover, 
CFD represents a unique case to analyse and compare two different organisational and 
institutional contexts, Los Alamos National Laboratory and Imperial College,  that despite  having 
developed the same technology at the same time, took very different trajectories in the 
transformation of scientific knowledge into commercial innovation.  
Secondly, in addition to the selection of case studies, validity and reliability weaknesses 
have been countered by using TIS theory and TIS analytical frameworks as a starting point for 
data analysis, as well as by binding emergent themes to most recent research in the field and 
additional literature in other related fields (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Thirdly, the interpretative nature of qualitative analysis, poses the question of whether 
researcher’s preconceptions, experiences, values or relationships with participants represent a 
bias to research results. To minimise author’s bias, the researcher has followed a number of 
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best practices to maximise trustworthiness and credibility, in line with those proposed by 
Lincoln and Guba (1985). These include clear and robust research design and case selection, as 
previously discussed, triangulation of interviews with document analysis and participant 
observation, the supervision and counselling by an experienced researcher as well as member 
check techniques both during the interviews and also in further post-interview communications. 
Therefore, although researcher bias represents one of the potential major pitfalls in qualitative 
research, the author has made every effort to preserve the integrity of the research, and to 
produce outputs based on evidence that merit credibility among academy and practitioners. 
Despite its potential limitations, an important consequence of exploratory qualitative 
research is the opportunities that open up to extend research.  The most immediate opportunity 
for future research in relation to this thesis, is the testing and refinement of the proposed 
framework and developed propositions. Such testing should be performed in both similar and 
different contexts to keep deepening the understanding on innovation dynamics and 
legitimation mechanisms. In particular, future studies could look in the following directions: 
i. Refined definition of institutionalisation constraints. This thesis highlights a number of 
institutional constraints that influence the legitimation of TISs, like the existence of 
substitutive products or the clash between innovation producers and innovation 
adopters’ institutional contexts. However, a more specific map of constraints would be 
highly beneficial to theory and practice. In particular, further empirical research 
exploring the dynamics in the creation of new business models would be very relevant.  
ii. Impact of the alliances between system builders and incumbent firms on innovation 
trajectories.  As discussed, this thesis evidences that alliances between system builders 
and incumbents contributes to the legitimation of TISs in complex institutional contexts. 
However, at the same time, these alliances form an asymmetric relationship that often 
strengthens the power of the larger partner (Kukk, 2016).  Different experts 
participating in this thesis acknowledged that market takeovers by incumbent firms as 
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a consequence of these alliances, blocked the development of further innovations in 
the field. Further research could take this track to analyse the impact of alliances on 
later innovation trajectories. 
iii. Further insights of co-creation of knowledge. Due to the relevance of the co-creation of 
knowledge revealed by this study, the researcher suggests additional research on the 
co-creation of knowledge paradigm (Lusch et al., 2007; Kristensson et al., 2008) with 
the aim of identifying best practices and limitations, particularly for BTIs where direct 
involvement of potential adopters might not be plausible.  
iv. Finally, as previously discussed in this section, comparative research on the legitimation 
mechanisms of TISs initiated by incumbent firms would contribute to extend the scope 
of the framework proposed in this thesis. 
 
6.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has summarised the main findings of the research, its contribution and 
limitations, and has presented a set of developed propositions and a framework illustrating 
the mechanisms that enable TIS legitimation. With this, the author brings this thesis to its 
conclusion. The researcher hopes that the contributions made can help to broaden 
knowledge in the area of systems of innovation and technological transitions, as well as 
improving the decision-making process of innovation practitioners and policy makers 
seeking for BTIs’ successful diffusion trajectories.  
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